

## Rationality and Morality



# **The Handbook of Rationality**

**Edited by Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn**

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## Contents

Preface ix

Overview of the Handbook xi

Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn

### **Psychological and Philosophical Frameworks of Rationality—A Systematic Introduction** 1

Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn

1. Why Study Rationality? 1
2. Contours of the Concept of Rationality 3
3. Theoretical and Practical Rationality 10
4. Normative and Descriptive Theories of Rationality 18
5. Individual and Social Rationality 26
6. Rationality in a Process-Oriented and an Output-Oriented Perspective 31
7. Preconditions of Rationality 34
8. Frontiers of Rationality 44
9. Conclusion and Open Issues 50

## **I Origins and Key Issues of Rationality**

### **Section 1 Origins of Rationality**

- 1.1 Theories of Rationality and the Descriptive–Normative Divide: A Historical Approach** 71  
Thomas Sturm
- 1.2 The Rationality Debate in the Psychology of Reasoning: A Historical Review** 87  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
- 1.3 Evolution of Rationality** 101  
Gerhard Schurz
- 1.4 Rationality and the Brain** 115  
Vinod Goel

### **Section 2 Key Issues of Rationality**

- 2.1 Reasons and Rationality** 129  
John Broome
- 2.2 Practical and Theoretical Rationality** 137  
Ralph Wedgwood

- 2.3 Mental Models, Reasoning, and Rationality** 147

P. N. Johnson-Laird

- 2.4 Heuristics and Biases** 159

Klaus Fiedler, Johannes Prager, and Linda McCaughey

- 2.5 Dual-Process Theories of Deductive Reasoning** 173

Karl Christoph Klauer

- 2.6 Logico-Computational Aspects of Rationality** 185

Johan van Benthem, Fenrong Liu, and Sonja Smets

## **II Theoretical Rationality**

### **Section 3 Deductive Reasoning**

- 3.1 Propositional and First-Order Logic** 201

Florian Steinberger

- 3.2 Natural Logic** 215

David P. O'Brien

- 3.3 Psychological Theories of Syllogistic Reasoning** 225

Sangeet Khemlani

### **Section 4 Probabilistic Reasoning**

- 4.1 Subjective Probability and Its Dynamics** 239

Alan Hájek and Julia Staffel

- 4.2 Bayes Nets and Rationality** 253

Stephan Hartmann

- 4.3 Evidential Relevance** 265

Arthur Merin

- 4.4 Probability Logic** 277

Niki Pfeifer

- 4.5 Bayesian Rationality in the Psychology of Reasoning** 285

Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford

4.6	<b>Probabilities and Conditionals</b>	295			
	Klaus Oberauer and Danielle Pessach				
4.7	<b>Representing Belief: Beyond Probability and Logic</b>	305			
	Didier Dubois and Henri Prade				
<b>Section 5 Belief Revision, Defeasible Reasoning, and Argumentation Theory</b>					
5.1	<b>Doxastic and Epistemic Logic</b>	319			
	Hans van Ditmarsch				
5.2	<b>Belief Revision</b>	327			
	Hans Rott				
5.3	<b>Ranking Theory</b>	337			
	Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, and Wolfgang Spohn				
5.4	<b>Defeasible Reasoning and Belief Revision in Psychology</b>	347			
	Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda and Markus Knauff				
5.5	<b>Argumentation Theory</b>	361			
	Ulrike Hahn and Peter Collins				
5.6	<b>Reasoning and Argumentation</b>	367			
	John Woods				
<b>Section 6 Conditional and Counterfactual Reasoning</b>					
6.1	<b>Conditional and Counterfactual Logic</b>	381			
	William B. Starr				
6.2	<b>The Suppositional Theory of Conditionals and Rationality</b>	395			
	David E. Over and Nicole Cruz				
6.3	<b>Conditional and Counterfactual Reasoning</b>	405			
	Ruth M. J. Byrne and Orlando Espino				
6.4	<b>Utility Conditionals</b>	419			
	Jean-François Bonnefon				
<b>Section 7 Causal and Diagnostic Reasoning</b>					
7.1	<b>Causal and Counterfactual Inference</b>	427			
	Judea Pearl				
7.2	<b>The Rationality of Everyday Causal Cognition</b>	439			
	Michael R. Waldmann				
7.3	<b>Diagnostic Causal Reasoning</b>	449			
	Björn Meder and Ralf Mayrhofer				
<b>III Practical Rationality</b>					
<b>Section 8 Individual Rationality and Decision Making</b>					
8.1	<b>Preferences and Utility Functions</b>	461			
	Till Grüne-Yanoff				
8.2	<b>Standard Decision Theory</b>	473			
	Martin Peterson				
8.3	<b>Prospect Theory</b>	485			
	Andreas Glöckner				
8.4	<b>Decision under Uncertainty</b>	495			
	Brian Hill				
8.5	<b>Bounded Rationality: A Vision of Rational Choice in the Real World</b>	505			
	Ralph Hertwig and Anastasia Kozyreva				
8.6	<b>Reasoning, Rationality, and Metacognition</b>	517			
	Valerie A. Thompson, Shira Elqayam, and Rakefet Ackerman				
<b>Section 9 Game Theory</b>					
9.1	<b>Classical Game Theory</b>	529			
	Max Albert and Hartmut Kliemt				
9.2	<b>Epistemic Game Theory</b>	543			
	Andrés Perea				
9.3	<b>Evolutionary Game Theory</b>	553			
	J. McKenzie Alexander				
9.4	<b>Rationality in Economics: Theory and Evidence</b>	565			
	Sanjit Dhami and Ali al-Nowaihi				
<b>Section 10 Aspects of Social Rationality</b>					
10.1	<b>Social Epistemology</b>	579			
	Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann				
10.2	<b>Collective Rationality</b>	591			
	Hans Bernhard Schmid				
10.3	<b>Rationality in Communication</b>	601			
	Georg Meggle				
10.4	<b>Rational Choice Theory in the Social Sciences</b>	611			
	Werner Raub				
10.5	<b>Structural Rationality</b>	625			
	Julian Nida-Rümelin, Rebecca Gutwald, and Niina Zuber				
10.6	<b>Adaptationism: A Meta-Normative Theory of Rationality</b>	633			
	Leda Cosmides and John Tooby				
<b>Section 11 Deontic and Legal Reasoning</b>					
11.1	<b>Deontic Logic</b>	645			
	John Horty and Olivier Roy				
11.2	<b>Deontic Reasoning in Psychology</b>	651			
	Shira Elqayam				
11.3	<b>Legal Logic</b>	659			
	Eric Hilgendorf				

- 11.4 Logical Models of Legal Argumentation** 669  
Henry Prakken

## Section 12 Moral Thinking and Rationality

- 12.1 Rationality and Morality** 681  
Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels
- 12.2 Moral Reasons** 693  
Michael Smith
- 12.3 The Psychology and Rationality of Moral Judgment** 701  
Alex Wiegmann and Hanno Sauer

## IV Facets of Rationality

### Section 13 Visual and Spatial Reasoning

- 13.1 Logical Reasoning with Diagrams** 715  
Mateja Jamnik
- 13.2 Rational Reasoning about Spatial and Temporal Relations** 725  
Marco Ragni
- 13.3 Visualization and Rationality** 735  
Markus Knauff

### Section 14 Scientific Rationality

- 14.1 Scientific Rationality and Objectivity** 747  
Line Edslev Andersen and Hanne Andersen
- 14.2 Rationality and the Value-Freedom of Science** 757  
Anke Bueter
- 14.3 Rationality and the Public Understanding of Science** 767  
Rainer Bromme and Lukas Gierth

### Section 15 Individual Differences, Learning, and Improvement of Rational Thinking

- 15.1 The Development of Basic Human Rationality** 779  
Henry Markovits
- 15.2 Rationality and Intelligence** 791  
Keith E. Stanovich, Maggie E. Toplak, and Richard F. West
- 15.3 How to Improve Rational Thinking?** 801  
Stephanie de Oliveira and Richard Nisbett

- Contributors 807
- Name Index 811
- Subject Index 843



## Preface

This book is for students and scholars who want to think about the big questions: Are we rational? What at all does it mean to be rational? Why do we sometimes deviate from the norms of rationality? What happens in our brain when we reason and decide? What is a good or bad decision? How do we come to sensible beliefs and knowledge? These are questions that people have wondered about since the beginning of humankind. And these are questions about which, since ancient times, thinkers have had much to say. The aim of *The Handbook of Rationality* is to show how (analytic) philosophers and (cognitive) psychologists think about these big questions. In the past decades, both disciplines have made tremendous advances in better understanding the very nature of human rationality. Yet, the interaction between the fields is developed only in rudimentary forms. The consequence is that no publications exist that provide students and scholars with an easily accessible integrated overview about the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. *The Handbook of Rationality* seeks to fill this gap and to be a novel resource for students and scholars in psychology and philosophy, but also in neighboring areas, such as economics, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, linguistics, law, sociology, anthropology, or education.

This handbook has not become so voluminous because we wanted it to be. A little less work with the publication of this volume would have been all right. But a less complete treatment would not have done justice to the importance of the subject. Of course we were fully aware of the complexity and breadth of the topic of rationality when we started to think about the chapters and authors that we wanted to collect in this handbook. However, during our work, we repeatedly encountered new topics and issues that we had not considered at the beginning because they only arose from our interdisciplinary cooperation. If we had merely concentrated on our respective home disciplines, we would have missed many of these interesting questions lying in the no man's land between the disciplines.

What has greatly facilitated our interdisciplinary collaboration and made it so productive is the fact that we already collaborated for many years within the Priority Program SPP 1516, *New Frameworks of Rationality*, which has been funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [DFG]) from 2011 to 2018. The program consisted of 15 research projects from psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence and often combined methods from these disciplines within highly interdisciplinary projects. The program was headed by Markus Knauff and coinitiated by Wolfgang Spohn, the cognitive psychologists Ralph Hertwig and Michael Waldmann, and the philosopher Gerhard Schurz. Later, the computer scientist Gabriele Kern-Isberner joined this governing board. In this priority program, we gathered many times, worked together very intensively, worked on many joint publications, and spent many, many hours of intensive discussion ([www.spp1516.de](http://www.spp1516.de)). All this resulted in enormous shared benefit and progress in mutual understanding.

At some point, we thought we should share our progress with a broader scientific public, and so the idea for this handbook was born in the summer of 2015. We are very grateful to the DFG for the generous funding of the interdisciplinary research program. We are aware that Germany is one of the few countries that still invest so much in basic research without expecting results that are directly economically exploitable. This is a privilege we greatly appreciate. Many scientists from this program have also contributed to this handbook, although we have taken great care to include many other experts from the worldwide community of rationality research. The handbook is a truly international enterprise. We are very pleased that most of the world's leading experts were very enthusiastic and immediately agreed to contribute a chapter to this handbook. The different disciplines use quite different formats for footnotes, indexing, references, and other stylistic matters. To establish uniformity throughout the handbook, we have chosen to

use the rules from the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (6th edition, 2010).

Our list of acknowledgments is long. First, we thank all our authors. In order to cover our field comprehensively, we had to engage the best authors across the disciplines. We expected that many authors would deliver too late, that we would have to wait a very long time for many contributions, that we would have to send out dozens of reminders, and so on. But we were too pessimistic. Most of our authors were very reliable, delivered their contributions fairly punctually, and were also very cooperative and responsive. We are very sad that one of our initial authors, Sieghard Beller, passed away before he could deliver his chapter and that another author, Arthur Merin, died shortly after finishing his chapter. We are most grateful to all of the authors for the exemplary cooperation.

We are also indebted to all our reviewers. In general, each chapter was reviewed by two reviewers, one from psychology and one from philosophy. In most cases, this was possible, and sometimes we even received three or four reviews from colleagues with different disciplinary backgrounds. For each chapter, at least one review came from an author of another chapter and the other from an external reviewer. We are very thankful to the following external reviewers:

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We are very sad that Christian Freksa died in an accident before the book came out.

We mentioned that we could build on a long previous cooperation within the Priority Program *New Frameworks of Rationality*. Here we want to thank all members of the program for the lively and productive cooperation. It was most instructive.

We are deeply grateful to Christopher von Bülow, who checked all the manuscripts and brought them into the final uniform shape. He did so with unsurpassable care, at times at which we editors were already exhausted. It is also his merit that this project came to a good end.

We also thank Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda, Andreas Kemmerling, and Christoph Klauer for their comments on an earlier version of the introductory chapter. Knauff wrote parts of the long introductory chapter at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), and thus wants to thank Daniel Montello for his hospitality and the perfect environment for focused thinking and writing. Knauff also wants to thank Estefania and his whole team for the many interesting and lively discussions. Spohn is doubly grateful to the DFG for support: in 2016–2018 through the research unit FOR 1614 at the University of Konstanz and in 2019–2020 through the excellence cluster EXC 2064/1 (project number 390727645) at the University of Tübingen.

We are also most grateful to Philip Laughlin and the team from MIT Press. The interaction with all of them was always pleasant and professional. This handbook was a huge enterprise and thus, in the final phase, an enormous work for the publisher, which was performed in an excellent way.

Normally, the editors form a unit that cannot thank itself. Still, we feel the urge to do this. We can only thank each other for the untiring willingness to work together over such a long period of time on such a large project. It was a great scientific experience that neither of us wants to miss, even though we spent so many days and nights discussing and Skyping, as well as exchanging (about 3,000) emails. Our spouses, Erika and Ulli, have faithfully accompanied our work with their understanding, charity, and support. We dedicate our work to them!

Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn  
Gießen and Konstanz, January 2021

## Overview of the Handbook

Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn

This handbook seeks to cover its topic, rationality, in an interdisciplinary way, more than any other existing handbook on this topic. Surely it cannot fulfill this intention completely. The topic is just too large. But it intends to reach broad representativity at least in its two main disciplines, philosophy and psychology. In addition, it presents some insights from disciplines such as artificial intelligence, behavioral and microeconomics, and neuroscience, although these areas are only partially covered here. The current program is already very ambitious.

The handbook is not organized along disciplinary lines of psychology and philosophy. This would be in clear contradiction to our interdisciplinary endeavor. Rather, it is organized along the common themes that occur in both fields, albeit often in different forms and under different names. In our introductory chapter, we propose various distinctions for classifying the overwhelming research on rationality. Certainly, the most important one is that between theoretical and practical rationality. This distinction is mirrored in the headings of part II and part III, the two main parts of this handbook. These parts are preceded by part I, which addresses some fundamental or propaedeutic matters concerning the history, some paradigms, and some key issues of research on rationality. The handbook concludes with part IV, which presents further facets of rationality that are relevant for both theoretical and practical rationality.

Each of the four parts consists of several sections, which in turn each contain several chapters, so that we ended up with 15 sections and 65 chapters. The order of chapters within a section does not have a particular significance. We just had to find one that creates connections between the different disciplinary backgrounds of the authors. The assignment of chapters to sections was more difficult. The field is so variegated and interlinked that no classification can be perfect. Still, we hope that we have organized the handbook in a way that makes it easy to read.

In our **introductory chapter**, we systematize the field by means of four binary distinctions: theoretical versus practical rationality, normative versus descriptive theories of rationality, individual versus social rationality, and outcome- versus process-oriented accounts of rationality. Since the distinctions can be combined with each other, we end up with a system of 16 compartments. Our chapter says something about most of the 16 compartments and uses this system not only to give guidance to the readers of this handbook but also to suggest a new classification system for researchers in human rationality. We recommend all readers to study this introductory chapter. This will certainly make it easier to orient oneself in, and to contextualize, the rich material collected in this handbook.

### Part I: Origins and Key Issues of Rationality

The chapters in **section 1** deal with the history of rationality research and the cortical and evolutionary foundations of rational thinking. In chapter 1.1, *Thomas Sturm* describes the history of philosophical conceptions of rationality, which were just as much psychological conceptions. Since this history is so enormously rich, he just focuses on the emergence of the distinction between a descriptive and a normative perspective, which is so important for the entire handbook. This philosophical chapter is then complemented by chapter 1.2, in which *Jonathan Evans* summarizes the younger history of the psychology of reasoning from his personal point of view. Then, in chapter 1.3, *Gerhard Schurz* looks even farther back in time by speculating about the evolution of rationality. In chapter 1.4, *Vinod Goel* deals with the material basis of rationality, the brain. He presents findings from cognitive neuroscience and brain imaging on which cortical networks are involved in different kinds of rational thinking.

The chapters in **section 2** are concerned with some substantial philosophical and psychological topics of rationality. The section begins with chapter 2.1, in which

*John Broome* deals with the relation between rationality and reasoning. Both keywords are extensively used in this handbook, but they do not seem to denote exactly the same matter. The terms are also used quite differently in philosophy and psychology. In chapter 2.2, *Ralph Wedgwood* discusses the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality. This is also the top-level distinction in this handbook. The next chapters present various cognitive approaches to rationality. In chapter 2.3, *Philip Johnson-Laird* gives an overview of the theory of mental models, which is a far-reaching framework for explaining accurate and fallacious human reasoning. Another cognitive framework is the heuristics and biases approach, which is presented and critically discussed in chapter 2.4 by *Klaus Fiedler*, *Johannes Prager*, and *Linda McCaughy*. An equally influential framework is established by dual-process theories of reasoning. This framework and the related empirical evidence are presented by *Karl Christoph Klauer* in chapter 2.5. We could have placed the Bayesian reasoning theories here, too, as these theories also have a quite universal ambition. However, the relevant chapter by *Chater and Oaksford* fits even better in the section that is particularly dedicated to probabilistic reasoning. The last chapter in section 2 is a big jump toward artificial intelligence. In their chapter 2.6, *Johan van Benthem*, *Fenrong Liu*, and *Sonja Smets* outline the logico-computational perspective on rationality. They show how this approach can be efficiently used to solve rationality problems in computers. This chapter also creates a bridge to section 3 in part II, which is about logical and deductive reasoning.

## Part II: Theoretical Rationality

Sections 3–7 are concerned with the key issues of theoretical (or “epistemic” or “doxastic”) rationality and reasoning. The first term originates from philosophy and is, in fact, not as common in psychology, in which cognitive theories of reasoning are a very active research field. However, the philosophical term is much broader and thus serves as the heading for the following sections. Not surprisingly, this part of the handbook starts with the two dominating reasoning paradigms: deductive logic as already conceived in ancient philosophy and probabilistic thinking as developed since the middle of the 17th century. These two paradigms are represented in sections 3 and 4, respectively.

The chapters in **section 3** are concerned with deductive logic and reasoning. Of course, the principles of propositional and first-order logic have long been part of the basic knowledge of our disciplines. Yet we wanted

to explain at least in one place of this handbook what a logical proof is and how it is related to rational belief. This is done in chapter 3.1 by *Florian Steinberger*, who added some novel ideas to this classical topic. Propositional and first-order logic are also important in cognitive research on human reasoning. In chapter 3.2, *David O’Brien* presents the natural-logic account and some evidence in support of this account. In chapter 3.3, *Sangeet Khemlani* explains the cognitive foundations of syllogistic reasoning, which is a fragment of first-order logic. His approach is based on mental models as described in chapter 2.3.

Then, **section 4** is concerned with approaches from probability theory. In chapter 4.1, *Alan Hájek* and *Julia Staffel* explain the normative foundations of Bayesianism. Chapter 4.2 by *Stephan Hartmann* complements this by explaining the usefulness of the theory of so-called Bayes nets. A further complement is given in chapter 4.3 by *Arthur Merin*, which unfolds the probabilistic core of all considerations of relevance. This is important for accounts of reasoning, since premises or arguments are usually assumed to be relevant for their conclusions. In chapter 4.4, *Niki Pfeifer* presents his probability logic. In chapter 4.5, *Nick Chater* and *Mike Oaksford* defend their psychological perspective on rationality as conceived within Bayesianism. This, in turn, is complemented by chapter 4.6 by *Klaus Oberauer* and *Danielle Pessach*, who explain what, for (some) psychologists, conditionals have to do with probability. Chapter 4.7 by *Didier Dubois* and *Henri Prade* also proceeds from the assumption that beliefs, or epistemic states in general, come in degrees. This is why the chapter is placed in this section. Yet, in their account, rational degrees of belief do not behave like probabilities but in certain other ways. We think it is important to acknowledge that such alternatives exist.

Logic and probability theory are, of course, not the only paradigms of theoretical rationality and reasoning. In fact, many other frameworks exist, and many of them are not restricted to quantitative conceptions of degrees of belief, as in Bayesianism. These alternative accounts are represented in the remaining sections of part II.

The chapters in **section 5** are concerned with qualitative representations of belief and the related accounts of reasoning. In chapter 5.1, *Hans van Ditmarsch* presents the basic theory of doxastic and epistemic logic. Then, belief revision theory is concerned with the rational change of epistemic states. This normative account of belief revision is described in chapter 5.2 by *Hans Rott*. The dynamic account of belief revision theory is completed by ranking theory. This theory is laid out in chapter 5.3 by *Gabriele Kern-Isberner*, *Niels Skovgaard-Olsen*,

and *Wolfgang Spohn*. The dynamics of belief is also important in cognitive theories of defeasible reasoning. In chapter 5.4, *Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda* and *Markus Knauff* describe the empirical results on human belief revision and defeasible reasoning. They also explain how qualitative and quantitative theories try to account for the empirical findings. Defeasible reasoning, finally, is closely related to argumentation, where (rational) arguments drive (rational) epistemic change. The psychological perspective on argumentation is presented in chapter 5.5 by *Ulrike Hahn* and *Peter Collins*. Chapter 5.6 by *John Woods* deals with the same matter from a philosophical perspective.

There is also a close relation between epistemic change, on the one hand, and conditional and counterfactual reasoning, on the other, although the relation is not easy to specify. The broad range of approaches to reasoning with conditionals and counterfactuals is the topic of **section 6**. It begins with chapter 6.1 by *William Starr*, who reviews the different attempts to capture the logic of conditional and counterfactual constructions. In psychology, so-called supposition theory has become prominent. This attempt to explain human conditional reasoning is represented in chapter 6.2 by *David Over* and *Nicole Cruz*. In chapter 6.3, *Ruth Byrne* and *Orlando Espino* explain how human reasoners deal with counterfactual inferences. A special, but psychologically particularly relevant, case of conditional reasoning, so-called utility conditionals, is treated by *Jean-François Bonnefon* in chapter 6.4.

From counterfactual reasoning, it is just a small step to causal reasoning and its subform, diagnostic reasoning. The importance of causal reasoning among our many reasoning activities cannot be overemphasized. This is a huge topic on its own. Thus, we devote the complete **section 7** to it. In chapter 7.1, *Judea Pearl* presents his influential account of causal (and counterfactual) inference in probabilistic or statistical terms. How this kind of reasoning actually works in humans is discussed by *Michael Waldmann* in chapter 7.2. The special case of diagnostic reasoning is dealt with by *Björn Meder* and *Ralf Mayrhofer* in chapter 7.3. This is what this handbook offers concerning theoretical or epistemic rationality and reasoning.

### Part III: Practical Rationality

Sections 8–12 deal with the core topics of practical rationality and decision making. Again, the first term is familiar in philosophy, and the second is mostly used in psychology. The terms are not equivalent, but they are close enough to be treated under one heading. We

think that in this way, we can best highlight the interdisciplinary links and show how both research areas are connected.

This part of the handbook should of course start with accounts of individual decision making, which is the topic of **section 8**. In chapter 8.1, *Till Grüne-Yanoff* explains the main ideas of preference and utility theory. Next, chapter 8.2 by *Martin Peterson* presents standard decision theory and the normative arguments in its favor. However, this account has been criticized from the psychological as well as from the economic side. Indeed, prospect theory arose from the observation that people often deviate from expected utility maximization. This theory is explained by *Andreas Glöckner* in chapter 8.3. However, there are still further ways how beliefs and desires can be combined to determine a rational decision. Some of them are presented in chapter 8.4 by *Brian Hill*. Another critical view on economic decision theory comes from the theory of bounded rationality, which is influential in psychology and economics. This approach is reviewed in chapter 8.5 by *Ralph Hertwig* and *Anastasia Kozyreva*. The section ends with a chapter 8.6 by *Valerie Thompson*, *Shira Elqayam*, and *Rakefet Ackerman*, which is concerned with the connection between rationality and metacognition. The authors report empirical results that show that metacognitive control and monitoring processes are important for promoting our rational performance. Thinking about our own thinking makes us more rational. This chapter is quite general, and it might have fit under other headlines, but it also connects well to the previous chapters on practical rationality.

Then, **section 9** deals with game theory, the other standard theory of practical rationality. We treat here only so-called noncooperative game theory, which is, strictly speaking, still about individual practical rationality but in a social context. Chapter 9.1 by *Max Albert* and *Hartmut Kliemt* presents the classical theory, as it has been developed since the 1940s. In the 1980s, epistemic game theory emerged, which promises a more rigorous rationalization of the norms of game theory. This theory is described in chapter 9.2 by *Andrés Perea*. A different perspective is offered by evolutionary game theory, which is outlined by *J. McKenzie Alexander* in chapter 9.3. Again, these theories are criticized from the empirical point of view. This led to the rise of behavioral and psychoeconomics, which are sometimes (mistakenly) seen as fields of psychology but are still driven by the interests of economists. The many different ideas in this area are presented in chapter 9.4 by *Sanjit Dhami* and *Ali al-Nowaihi*.

In our introductory chapter, we explain why most research on rationality focuses on individual rationality.

In fact, **section 10** is the only section that really deals with social rationality in the proper sense. Therefore, it is not strictly limited to practical matters. In chapter 10.1, *Franz Dietrich* and *Kai Spiekermann* deal with social epistemology, which discusses the normative standards for group belief formation. Recently, related topics such as we-intentionality and collective rationality have developed into a larger philosophical field. These topics are presented in chapter 10.2 by *Hans Bernhard Schmid*. Communication, particularly linguistic communication, is a very special social and rational activity, which is the topic of chapter 10.3 by *Georg Meggle*. Rational choice theory has also become a strong paradigm in the social sciences. This line of research is explained by *Werner Raub* in chapter 10.4. A look into the history of philosophy, into political philosophy, and so on reveals that the standard theories of practical rationality go far beyond the scope of instrumental decision making. At least chapter 10.5 by *Julian Nida-Rümelin*, *Rebecca Gutwald*, and *Niina Zuber* discusses such extensions and under the label of “structural rationality.” Finally, in chapter 10.6, *Leda Cosmides* and *John Tooby* present their adaptationist account of rationality. Although their evolutionary account seeks to explain all forms of human rationality, their chapter mainly focuses on practical rationality.

Practical reasoning need not proceed in quantitative terms of probabilities, utilities, or the like. Deontic and legal reasoning, for instance, can rely on qualitative representations and processes. Such qualitative accounts are the topic of **section 11**. In chapter 11.1, *John Horty* and *Olivier Roy* present the current state of the art in deontic logic (i.e., the logic of obligations and permissions). Then, in chapter 11.2, *Shira Elqayam* deals with the psychological theories of deontic reasoning. Legal reasoning is sufficiently different from deontic logic to deserve a separate treatment. This is given in chapter 11.3 by *Eric Hilgendorf* and in chapter 11.4 by *Henry Prakken*. A surplus of these chapters is that they represent different legal cultures, which heavily determine the field: chapter 11.3 is embedded in German law, while chapter 11.4 is based on the Anglo-Saxon legal system.

Whenever we are engaged in practical reasoning and decision making, moral issues come into play. In fact, they often are more important than issues of rationality. However, morality is a different topic, which we do not tackle in this handbook. We only wanted to address a few connections to rationality. These connections are the topic of **section 12**, which consists of two philosophical chapters and a psychological one. Chapter 12.1 by *Christoph Fehige* and *Ulla Wessels* describes the relation between rationality and morality in philosophy, while

chapter 12.2 by *Michael Smith* deals with moral reasons, also from a philosophical point of view. But moral judgments are also a big topic in psychology. In chapter 12.3, *Alexander Wiegmann* and *Hanno Sauer* describe the psychological view on moral judgments and their relation to rationality. This concludes our chapters on practical rationality.

#### Part IV: Facets of Rationality

Sections 13–15 deal with further facets of rationality. Their topics are so distinct that they could not be subsumed under the headings of theoretical and practical rationality. In fact, most of the questions arise in *both* areas of human reasoning. For example, **section 13** is concerned with visual and spatial thinking. Such cognitive processes are an important complement to the many chapters in which reasoning is conceptualized, more or less explicitly, in linguistic or propositional terms. An important question in this context is the connection between logical and diagrammatic reasoning. In chapter 13.1, *Mateja Jamnik* takes the perspective of a computer scientist and argues that diagrams can help to reason logically. Another question is how humans and artificial intelligence systems reason about space and time. In chapter 13.2, *Marco Ragni* describes some differences and explains why people sometimes commit errors in spatial and temporal reasoning. In chapter 13.3, *Markus Knauff* explores whether visualization supports or hampers human reasoning. The empirical results show that it can indeed sometimes impede reasoning.

Another distinct topic is scientific rationality, which has theoretical as well as practical aspects, and which is, of course, of essential concern to us as scientists. The three chapters in **section 14** deal with different aspects of scientific rationality. One idea is that the sciences exercise a particularly sophisticated form of epistemic rationality, which may have stronger claims on objectivity. This idea is pursued in chapter 14.1 by *Line Edslev Andersen* and *Hanne Andersen*. Another topic is the value-freedom of science. This is the topic of chapter 14.2 by *Anke Bueter*. Finally, it is also important how scientific results are communicated to and perceived by the public. In chapter 14.3, *Rainer Bromme* and *Lukas Gierth* discuss the public understanding of science and its relation to scientific rationality.

The final **section 15** consists of still more chapters of psychological and even political interest. Chapter 15.1 by *Henry Markovits* explains how children learn to reason rationally. Chapter 15.2 by *Keith Stanovich*, *Maggie Toplak*, and *Richard West* presents the psychological

findings concerning the connection between intelligence and rationality—it is not quite as close as it may seem. Chapter 15.3 by *Stephanie de Oliveira* and *Richard Nisbett*, finally, reports how training can improve people's rational thinking and that such training does not even need to be intensive or time-consuming.

This is also an optimistic message at the end of this handbook, which offers a big journey through the state of the art in rationality research. We can only recommend again to start this journey with our introductory chapter. It gives a systematic structure to the field and should help our readers to make cross-connections between the philosophical and psychological methods, theories, and ideas represented in this handbook. Research in these (and some other) areas has been conducted separately for too long, an anachronism that this handbook aims to overcome.



## 12.1 Rationality and Morality

Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels

### Summary

Is practical rationality on the side of morality? Is it even the benchmark or the ground of morality? Why do what morality requires you to do? The diversity of answers that are still in the running and of considerations for and against them is astonishing. Our aim is to delineate the structure of the debate and to locate and clarify some major questions, options, and moves. We organize the presentation around a pair of prominent sample views, linking the rationality of an action to the agent's desires but its morality to the general welfare. We expound how different the matter looks for other views of rationality or of morality. On the whole, thoughts about each of the two normative domains and about conflicting norms in general suggest that, even regarding well-informed agents, rationality and morality cannot be fully harmonized. To some extent, convergence will remain gappy and contingent.

### 1. The Question

How do the judgments of practical rationality relate to those of morality? Let us call that question the RM question, with "R" for practical rationality and "M" for morality. The RM question is complex because each of the two relata is controversial in its own right—what *is* the rational thing to do, and what *is* the morally right thing to do?—and so is the pecking order among them: does an action have to be morally right in order to qualify as rational, or vice versa, or is there no such connection?


Judgments of the two kinds appear at variance in many cases that have existential weight. It may well happen, for example, that morality appears to require an affluent person to donate eighty percent of her income to a charity that saves lives efficiently, whereas practical rationality appears to require her to use the same money for completing her beloved collection of abstract paintings. We would expect a satisfactory answer to the RM

question to get some kind of grip on such constellations. The answer should either show that R and M are in concord after all or tell us, insofar as they are not, what follows from the discord for theories of normativity and for thoughtful agents.

### 2. Actions and Requirements

As usual, it makes sense to restrict the inquiry. The plan is to look at rationality and morality in relation to actions. There are other items that beckon for our attention—think of the rationality and morality of beliefs, decisions, desires, emotions, intentions, maxims, or ways of life—but we will not extend the discussion to them. One consequence of the focus on actions is that the rationality that pertains is *practical* rationality by definition, which enables us to omit the adjective "practical" most of the time.

We will restrict the scope further by looking at only one kind of assessment by R and M, that of actions as (rationally or morally) required, permitted, optional, or forbidden. These are known as the "deontic" assessments, and it is the "all things considered" versions of them that we will be concerned with. We present the logical relations among the deontic terms in figure 12.1.1. There is one couple of terms, not in the diagram, that we will reserve for use in the domain R: the terms "rational" and "irrational" for actions that are rationally permitted and rationally forbidden, respectively. There is another couple, in the diagram,



**Figure 12.1.1** The main deontic terms and the logical relations among them. Terms written in the same field are roughly synonymous. Each term can occur in discourse about R and in discourse about M ("rationally permitted" vs. "morally permitted," etc.).

that today we will reserve for use in the domain M: in this chapter, the terms “right” and “wrong” will be used for moral assessments.

### 3. Two Sample Doctrines: Instrumentalism and Utilitarianism

It will help to look at the relations between one common criterion of R and one common criterion of M and to widen the view from there. As to the rationality of actions, many criteria that have been proposed are variations of one simple tenet: that it is rational for a person to try to get what she wants. There are competing ways of refining that outlook, and here is the version that will serve as our sample of a criterion: *An action that the agent can perform is rational if and only if the agent believes that no other action that she can perform brings about more fulfillment of her intrinsic desires.*

The performing, believing, and desiring in the criterion should all be understood as happening or obtaining at the same moment, but the believing and desiring don’t have to occur in the agent’s consciousness; they may be purely implicit. An intrinsic desire should be understood as a desire of something for its own sake, not of it as a means to something else; henceforth in this chapter, whenever we write “desire,” we will mean “intrinsic desire.” The quantitative notion of fulfillment takes into account both the number and the strengths of desires.

We will treat the criterion as the defining feature of “instrumentalism.”<sup>1</sup> The label is apt because the criterion codifies a view of actions as tools, assessing them with respect to their putative efficiency in achieving the agent’s ends. Instrumentalism is a close relative of that theory of rational decision-making that puts the maximization of expected utility (MEU) center stage and plays a large role in the behavioral sciences. The MEU theorist’s probabilities and amounts of utility correspond, by and large, to the instrumentalist’s beliefs and amounts of desire fulfillment.

In the moral domain, our sample criterion will be utilitarian: *An action is morally right if and only if no other action that the agent can perform brings about more welfare, worldwide.* The utilitarian message is that welfare counts, no matter whose welfare it is, and that nothing else does. What is that all-important stuff called “welfare”? One widely held view, and one that we will assume here, is that a person’s welfare is the fulfillment of her desires and that in consequence, due to conceptual connections between pleasure and desire fulfillment, pleasure is an important part of welfare.<sup>2</sup>

### 4. Convergence

To what extent do our sample criteria of R and M move in sync? One source of hitches can be an agent’s beliefs, which play a role in one criterion but not in the other. For example, even the most fervent utilitarian can have erroneous beliefs about the impact of her actions on the amount of general welfare, and those beliefs can make it rational for her to do what is morally wrong.

If we leave aside the threat posed by deficient beliefs, we reach more significant notions of convergence and divergence. Let us call an agent well-informed if her beliefs are in such a good state that the rational thing for her to do would not change if we improved them further (that is, if we corrected false beliefs or added true ones). Using well-informedness as a stepping-stone, let us understand “convergence” and “divergence” as follows: R and M converge insofar as the actions of well-informed agents that are morally required are also rational; R and M diverge insofar as the opposite is the case.

#### 4.1 Convergence through Moral Desires

If instrumentalism is on the right track, the principal forces of convergence will have to be desires that point in the right direction. Less metaphorically speaking, they will have to be desires that, provided the agent is well-informed, have a propensity to make it rational for her to perform an action that is morally right. Let us call them RM desires. Life abounds with such desires, and one challenge is to produce a helpful classification.

Some RM desires aim directly at something that would be morally positive in itself. Figure 12.1.2 presents them as the “moral desires.” Some of those attitudes even “bring up” the topic of morality. Examples are desires that the world be a better place, to do the right thing, or to be a virtuous person. Other moral desires do not invoke morality as such but exhibit the relevant directness all the same. Depending on what is morally positive in itself, examples might be desires that some specific people be happy, that there be a lot of happiness, that everybody be treated equally—or desires to keep promises and to refrain from telling lies. The propensity that defines RM desires is present in either case. Applied to our sample moral doctrine, utilitarianism: both if Mary desires to do the right thing and if Mary desires to maximize welfare worldwide, it holds true that, provided she is well-informed, the desire will tend to make it rational for her to do the right thing.

Sympathy and moral sentiment, widespread as they are, serve as high-yield sources of those moral desires that do not invoke morality.<sup>3</sup> If Mary sympathizes with others,




Figure 12.1.2

Some important kinds of RM desires. The abbreviation “mpi” stands for “morally positive in itself.” One and the same desire can belong to more than one kind, even on the same level.

her sympathy is likely to give rise to or even to constitute a desire that others fare well. And if Mary has moral sentiments (for example, sentiments of moral admiration, indignation, or satisfaction) with regard to acts of a certain kind, the sentiments are likely to give rise to or even to constitute desires for or against performing acts of that kind. The two sources are so rich that there have been proposals to feed morality from them alone, giving us an “ethics of sympathy” or a “sentimentalist ethics.”<sup>4</sup>

Are all moral desires contingent? Is it just as possible for a person to have them as to lack them? The rationality of morality would be a more robust affair if there were numerous strong moral desires that we cannot fail to have. An argument has been devised that purports to establish the existence of those resources. Everybody, the argument aims to establish, necessarily desires that other people have pleasure, with the strength of those desires proportional to that of the pleasure at issue. The idea is that, if you fully represented to yourself that another person experiences a specific pleasure, you would (this being entailed by full representing) experience that very pleasure yourself—and would thus yourself be pleased while representing. And since a disposition to be pleased when fully representing a state of affairs to oneself is a desire that the state of affairs obtain, you desire that the other experience the pleasure.<sup>5</sup> If the argument works, those desires—which on conceptual grounds everybody holds regarding everybody else all the time—will do a sizable part of the work that we are anxious to see done.

#### 4.2 Convergence and Rationality without Egoism

Our glance at other-regarding moral desires, no matter whether they are necessary or contingent, is a good

occasion for setting aside egoism. One might think on the following grounds that the relations between rationality and morality are particularly strained: (i) they would be strained if rationality required us to act egoistically, and (ii) according to instrumentalism rationality requires exactly that, because the word “egoistic” stands for the property of acting in the light of one’s own desires.

The train of thought is misguided. The notion of “egoism” that is advanced in claim (ii) is both unusual and apt to weaken claim (i). The usual understanding is that acting on one’s own desires is not a sufficient condition for being egoistic but that it also matters what those desires are. The usual understanding is that, if a good-hearted person strongly desires that other people fare well and acts on *such* desires, she is not an egoist but an altruist, while an egoist is a person who lacks or fails to put into action *such* desires. To be sure, somebody might go along with that understanding itself but still link instrumentalism to egoism by adding the claim that such desires do not exist. However, we know of no sound argument for the additional claim.<sup>6</sup>

The misclassification of rationality as egoistic can also result from sloppy thinking about the *combination* of instrumentalism and the theory of welfare as desire fulfillment. It is true that the combination entails some connection between rational action and the agent’s welfare: in acting rationally at point of time *t*, the well-informed person-stage Mary-at-point-of-time-*t* maximizes the fulfillment of its desires and cannot help thereby maximizing its own welfare. We should beware of letting that connection blur the picture. In the first place, the rational person (or person-stage) at issue need not be

concerned with her (or its) own welfare and can act, due to the nature of her (or its) desires, highly altruistically. Secondly, the person-stage that acts can still fail to maximize the welfare of the entire person, who is extended over time and may have different desires later. Thirdly, even the limited connection we are looking at requires as one ingredient a certain view of welfare; if we adopt a hedonistic view instead (seeing the welfare of an entity as the pleasure that the entity has and not as the fulfillment of her desires) and keep instrumentalism, the connection vanishes.

According to most conceptions of rationality, instrumentalism included, rationality does not require us to act egoistically. We need to distinguish the question how rationality relates to morality from the questions how egoism, how prudence, and how an agent's self-interest, self-love, or welfare relate to morality.<sup>7</sup> Many well-known discussions from the history of philosophy are largely about questions of the second kind. Plato, for example, assigns a key role in the *Republic* to the case of Gyges, who is ruthless in using for his own advantage his power to become invisible; Aristotle writes about virtue as a constituent of an agent's flourishing in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and Henry Sidgwick about individual versus universal happiness in *The Methods of Ethics*. Those discussions apply to our question at best partly or indirectly.

### 4.3 Convergence through Morally Causal Desires

Some RM desires, also indicated in figure 12.1.2, are related to the good or the right in a different way. If a person desires  $p$  and  $p$  would be causally linked to something that is morally positive in itself, we will speak of a "morally causal desire." We distinguish subgroups of such desires by distinguishing three kinds of the linkedness.

A desire that  $p$  is in the first subgroup if  $p$  would cause something morally positive. For example, a person desires to cultivate a garden, to keep the kitchen clean, or to mend broken bones, and her doing these things would cause pleasure in the beholders, eaters, and patients and would thus cause something that is morally positive in itself. A desire that  $p$  is in the second subgroup if, conversely, something that is morally positive in itself would cause  $p$ . For example, Mary desires that her parents treat her to cake, which the parents do only when, and in that case because, they are happy. The treat is desired and is the effect of the happiness, with the happiness being morally positive in itself. A desire that  $p$  is in the third subgroup if  $p$  and something that is morally positive in itself have a common cause.

Consider, for example, heartless Mary, who does not care about the victims of malaria but who desires to be praised at a charity ball for donating to the fight against malaria. If Mary donates, neither does the praise cause the thing that is morally positive in itself (the praise does not causally affect the saving of the lives) nor vice versa, but the two have a common cause: Mary's donation. In such cases, too, the one comes with the other, and that matters for RM purposes.

The key feature, wherever morally causal desires are in play, is the indirectness. A desire can fail to be directed at anything that would be morally positive in itself and still tend to make actions rational that are (or that cause things that are) morally positive in themselves. Links of the relevant kind are legion: you do the right thing and some "other" desire of yours is fulfilled. In that sense, large chunks of morality are connected to rationality through carrots and sticks.

The incentives can be external—think of fellow-citizens who in response to your morally positive behavior honor and help you and refrain from ignoring, deriding, jailing, or lynching you. The incentives can also be internal—think of the joys of believing to have done what was good or right and of the absence of pangs and remorse. Even when the incentives are internal, the constellation differs from the one that characterizes the first main group of RM desires, the moral desires. Two distinctions apply. In the first place, when you desire *your joy* of doing good and when you desire *to do good*, those are two different desires.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, we should in some cases distinguish even for one and the same desire between the reason to put it into one group and the reason to put it into another. Consider, for example, your desiring your own joy of having done good. The reason to count that desire as a morally causal one (your joy is caused by something morally positive) is different from the reason to count it as a moral one (your joy, too, is something morally positive in itself). One desire can be both.

Incentives are studied by game theorists in particular. We understand quite well by now, with regard to several moral standards, how even agents who have no moral desires and are at the same time without ifs and buts instrumentally rational find themselves drawn into actions and outcomes that are morally positive. Under various conditions, repeated encounters in the same group of such agents become, not least because rewards and punishments can emerge, a breeding ground for various amounts of cooperation, equality, justice, solidarity, trust, and public good. While significant general results, most prominently a family known as the "folk

theorems" of game theory, have been established by mathematical methods of the more traditional kind, there is also evidence from agent-based computer simulations, sometimes involving entire artificial societies: the rational thing to do for the virtual agents, it turns out, is often to spare or even to assist each other.<sup>9</sup>

So much for the many devices in human minds and societies that make it rational for people to do the right thing a lot of the time. On the other hand, given criteria of R or M resembling our two samples, there is not much hope of full convergence. In the example from our opening paragraphs, the agent might favor abstract paintings over human lives, which in the absence of competing considerations would make it the rational thing for her to violate her moral obligation. When incentives and the agent's moral desires do not add up, rationality will take a stand against morality.

### 5. Resisting Divergence by Aligning Rationality with Morality

The dominant impetus among philosophers is to keep the divergence of R and M in check. A proof that there is no divergence is the Holy Grail of practical philosophy, yearned for but hard to attain. Some philosophers go as far as to let their thinking on R itself or on M itself be governed by the premiss of "moral rationalism"—the claim that every action that is morally required is rational.<sup>10</sup> With that sweeping premiss or without, answers to questions like "Why be moral?" or "Why *act* morally?" are sought after, and the risk that, even with regard to well-informed persons, sometimes no good answer emerges is often perceived as an invitation to rethink R or M. Those who want to rethink in order to reduce or even eliminate divergence have essentially two options: they assimilate rationality to morality or vice versa. They could also combine the two moves, moralizing rationality *and* rationalizing morality, but for the bigger picture it will suffice if we treat each of the two in turn.

#### 5.1 Smaller Departures from Instrumentalism

As to alternative views of practical rationality, modest deviations from instrumentalism make some difference regarding divergences. One example is the temporal extension of the conative basis. We could modify the instrumentalist criterion so that it covers not just the desires that the agent has at the time of acting but all those that she had, has, or will have. The modification would prevent the rational agent from behaving ruthlessly toward her past self or her future self. Morally speaking, it would be a step in the right direction—but

only a small, intrapersonal one. Anchoring in a rational agent regard for the welfare of all her own person-stages is a far cry from anchoring in that agent regard for everybody's welfare.

A second example originates in the observation that, if instrumentalism is correct, rational agents can get caught in traps of practical rationality. Such traps are situations in which, if every agent acts rationally, each of them receives, predictably, less fulfillment of her desires than she would if everyone acted irrationally. General compliance with the requirements of rationality thus leads to the opposite of the moral goal, which is general welfare.

Many real-life situations appear to be traps of practical rationality. Consider societies that become much nastier because people carry weapons. Each individual reasons that to carry a weapon is likely to be more conducive to the fulfillment of her desires either way—that is, both if people whom she encounters carry a weapon and if they don't. Because of the individual decisions for weapons, the considerable advantages of a weaponless society and of avoiding an arms race remain out of reach for all. Even if a weaponless society could still be achieved by changing the individual decisions through the imposing of sanctions, the sanctioning itself would gobble resources and thus welfare. The ubiquity of such traps in human interaction and the unequivocalness of the moral setbacks—less welfare for one and all—have incited a vast complex of research in ethics, economics, and psychology.<sup>11</sup>

Can we devise a criterion of rationality that preserves the spirit of instrumentalism but spares us the traps? David Gauthier is one of the theoreticians who have tried.<sup>12</sup> Gauthier suggests, controversially, that a rational agent can choose, "on utility-maximizing grounds, not to make further choices on those grounds," but to adopt a certain stance that will determine her behavior. She will then be a "constrained maximizer." The stance that Gauthier has in mind is roughly this: I will do, provided that so will the others who are involved, my part in making possible an outcome that is better for everybody than the outcome that unconstrained maximizers could achieve. Since an agent who has recognizably adopted such a stance will sometimes produce and reap fruits of cooperation that are not available to one who hasn't, it is rational to become such an agent. Individual instrumental rationality is declared to be a tad more collective than we thought.

If Gauthier's claims are sound and help us make headway with the RM question, they do so within limits. Gauthier's ambition is restricted to establishing rational

support for a morality of *mutual* benefiting. He has no ambition to provide support for moral obligations toward beings who are in need but have nothing to offer.

## 5.2 Larger Departures from Instrumentalism

We find more radical consequences for the shape and extent of divergence when we turn our attention to more radically different pictures of practical rationality. The main move is the dethroning of desire.

Suppose that we break with instrumentalism by replacing the appeal to desire fulfillment with an appeal to conformity to reasons. Let us agree that facts can be reasons and that constellations of facts (for example, regarding pains and cures) can make it the case that there is, altogether, for a person more reason to perform one action (say, to see her cardiologist) than another (say, to see her homeopath). The new criterion of rationality could then read as follows: *An action that the agent can perform is rational if and only if she believes that there is not more reason for her to perform another action instead.*<sup>13</sup> Suppose further that we take many reasons to be “worldly” in that they do not involve the agent’s desires. Perhaps, for example, *that Peter’s education would be finished if he received a donation* is a reason to donate, even if the agent desires no such finishing or donating and desires nothing that comes with it; or perhaps *that serenading the moon would increase the glory of the moon* is a reason to serenade the moon.<sup>14</sup>

The impact on the RM nexus would be momentous. The task of showing that it is rational for a well-informed agent to do what morally she ought to do no longer has as its central component the task to track down a fitting constellation of desires of hers but the task to identify a fitting constellation of reasons for her to do things. In order for the entire scheme to be successful, worldly reasons for actions need to exist *and* to have a considerable affinity to morality *and* to be connected to rationality as stated by the new criterion. Whether all or at least some of the three conditions are fulfilled is controversial.

Which morality you take to be connectible to rationality-in-the-new-spirit will depend on your views, possibly your intuitions, about the realm of reasons. If morality is concerned with promise-keeping, loyalty, or the increase of human knowledge, and so are reasons to do things and in the same proportion, then every well-informed rational agent will do the right thing: keep her promises and so on. Our sample moral doctrine, utilitarianism, is no exception. If there is always most reason to maximize the amount of the fulfillment of everybody’s desires, then every well-informed rational agent will do the right thing and maximize that amount.

Following a markedly different path, Immanuel Kant, too, ends up advocating some variety of rational benevolence, maximization included. We read that a rational being would try, “as far as he can, to advance the ends of others” and would come to the conclusion: “the ends of a subject that is an end in itself must, as much as possible, also be *my* ends.”<sup>15</sup> In which way according to Kant rationality secures so much morality is extraordinarily contentious, even among his followers. He draws on the claim that a rational being is autonomous in the literal sense of giving herself a law. To Kant, that feature appears imbued with moral significance. Being autonomous, the agent’s rational will is not pushed around by anything, not even by the agent’s own inclinations; it finds itself with nothing left to be constituted by than the respect for rationality itself and for people who have it and for their ends; and, such being the character of laws, that will is general, not concerned with one person or group in particular. Sound statements of those connections remain a desideratum.

As expected, the picture of the relation between R and M changes when that of R changes. Our brief encounters with the “worldly reasons, not desires” approach and the “autonomy, not desires” approach have illustrated tectonic movements and the hopes of convergence that can be associated with them.

## 6. Resisting Divergence by Aligning Morality with Rationality

If divergence is to be avoided, what about getting to work at the other end? We could truncate morality. The fewer actions are morally obligatory in the first place, the smaller the risk that an action is morally obligatory but irrational.

The demands of some moralities are so removed from most agents’ conative constitution that cutting down on the demanding looks particularly promising. According to utilitarianism, for example, an agent ought to give the same weight to her own welfare and to that of her nearest and dearest as to everybody else’s. Since hardly an agent’s desires manifest such impartiality, utilitarian obligations that it is irrational for the obligated agent to comply with are thick on the ground.

Various moral prerogatives for agents have been suggested. We could permit the agent, for some factor  $k > 1$ , to attach up to  $k$  times as much weight in her decisions and actions to her own welfare as to the welfare of everybody else; or permit her, for some  $l > 0$ , never to give up more than  $l$  units of her own welfare; or permit her, for some threshold value  $m$ , never to make her own welfare

fall below *m*.<sup>16</sup> We could think of other permissions, too, concerning her projects rather than her welfare or concerning the welfare of those she is close to rather than just her own. Every such prerogative is a loosening of utilitarianism; it would allow the agent to be partial in the sense of granting in her decisions extra force to this or that, even if the amount of worldwide welfare suffers.

Prerogatives are apt to narrow the gap between R and M but will not close it. A morality that involves a prerogative will still demand *something* (for instance, that the interests of others be respected to *some* extent), and there is bound to be some well-informed agent who in some situation has desires that make it irrational for her to comply even with those moderate demands.

Structurally, contract theories in the Hobbesian tradition inhabit the same middle ground. Those theories are reciprocitarian. They say, with various qualifications, that what a person morally ought to do in relation to another person is to play by rules that satisfy the following condition: the fulfillment of the desires of each of the persons would increase if each of them, rather than none, played by those rules. For example, if both refrain from insulting each other, that will save both of them some distress.

Once again, we find the curtailing of moral obligation. If contractarians are right, there are fewer moral obligations than we thought and thus fewer that it might be irrational to meet. Most notably, about all persons (and other beings) who are not in a position to increase the fulfillment of her desires, the contractarian will say that she owes them nothing. And once again we also find that the curtailing does not suffice to provide full alignment with rationality. Sometimes a well-informed agent will have and see the possibility of maximizing the fulfillment of her desires by breaking even the few rules of that “minimal morality” and getting away with it. And no earthly regime of sanctions will eliminate such possibilities, since all such regimes are gappy.<sup>17</sup>

Some thinkers have suggested that we go one step further and prevent all divergence by fully rationalizing morality. The proposal is to combine moral rationalism with the claim that instrumentalism is by and large on the right track. Gilbert Harman endorses the combination. He writes: “If *S* says that (morally) *A* ought to do *D*, *S* implies that *A* has reasons to do *D*.” And he continues: “I assume that the possession of rationality is not sufficient to provide a source for relevant reasons, that certain desires, goals, or intentions are also necessary.” Since agents might lack the relevant attitudes, Harman infers “that there might be no reasons at all for a being from outer space to avoid harm to us” and “that, for

Hitler, there might have been no reason at all not to order the extermination of the Jews.”<sup>18</sup>

The moral consequences are remarkable. If the moral “ought” requires reasons, and reasons require desires, but the desires aren’t in place and thus neither are the reasons, then neither is the moral “ought.” While Harman invites us to say other things about Hitler (for example, that Hitler is evil or our enemy), he claims that the moral “ought” is out of place. It is “odd to say,” Harman asserts, that “it was wrong of Hitler to have acted as he did” or that “Hitler ought morally not to have ordered the extermination of the Jews.”

And so the rationalization of the moral “ought” would be completed. The approach is Procrustean. There is no mismatch between the moral “ought” and the practical rationality of its addressees because every instance of a moral “ought” that would not conform is discarded.

## 7. Accepting Divergence

Should we accept that R and M diverge? We should if it seems to us that they do and we see no reason to resist the claim. The two parts of that condition deserve separate treatments.

### 7.1 Finding Some Divergence in the First Place

Not many of us enter the inquiry holding fully convergent views of R and of M, each of which they deem plausible in its own right, independently of any pressure to see the two in line. It is true that there is full convergence according to some views of R and of M that we have encountered, but the independent plausibility of those views is the crux.

On the rational side, how plausible is the claim that something other than the agent’s aims and projects rules the roost? The subjective picture exerts a considerable pull: if you’ve set your heart on something, it is rational for you to go after it, and if you haven’t, it is not. On the moral side, the questions are inverse. How plausible is the claim that, provided you are indifferent to other people’s welfare and have to fear no backlash from wrecking it, you are morally permitted to wreck it? On either side, the claims that would secure full convergence do not have the ring of truth.

The problem does not just arise when, at least regarding well-informed agents, one of the two domains is claimed to fully look the way we always took the other one to look, with the implausibility due to the fact that *one* view does all the reaching out. If a view of R and a view of M met halfway, the implausibility would be distributed evenly but not lessened. Although we pointed

out that some independently plausible components with a conciliatory effect may well be missing from our two sample doctrines (which we didn't call sample doctrines for nothing), no such components are in sight that would happen to dovetail, resulting in a perfect fit.

## 7.2 Not Theorizing Away the Divergence We Find

Matters would look different if our thinking were driven by the will to rule out divergence. Maybe there are general considerations that speak against divergence and that should be taken into account when we form our views of R and M? It is surprisingly difficult to find distinct statements of such considerations in the literature, but here is a brief attempt to articulate and assess some candidates.

The argument from the *negativity of non-compliance* says: "Since people by and large act rationally, every morally required act that is irrational is a morally required act that is unlikely to be performed—which is a bad thing." We respond that any such badness would be a sad truth and that good theorizing should acknowledge truths, sad ones included. The badness at issue does not provide a right kind of reason for changing our views of R or M.

A follow-up argument adduces the *pointlessness of moral judgment due to the negativity of non-compliance*: "The point of engaging in moral judgment is to avoid the said negativity. Why bother if the project does not boost the right and the good through compliance?" Part of the answer is that not only are there many different functions that moral thinking, judging, and speaking have, but also many different paths, including indirect ones, on which the function of boosting the good and the right can be fulfilled. Some of the moral point of considering or making or uttering the moral judgment that, say, Mary ought to spend half of her spare time fighting for a certain cause may well be independent of the factual question whether Mary ends up conforming to the judgment. Sorting out and signaling our moral view of the matter can help shaping decisions, education, outlooks, politics, relationships, and sanctions in a myriad of ways, many of which do not even relate to Mary in particular.

Next, there is the threat of the *unjustifiedness of moral judgments*: "To 'provide morality with a foundation' or to 'justify moral judgments' is or includes showing that it would be rational to act, if the opportunity arose, in line with the moral judgments at issue. Moral judgments that are subject to divergences are therefore unfounded and unjustified." The complaint is worth pondering. Still, you justify something *to somebody*, and so the premiss

of the complaint licenses at best the conclusion that, in cases of divergence, the "ought" judgment has not been justified to *all* persons who, according to the judgment, ought to do a certain thing under certain circumstances. But maybe to some of them. Secondly, the premiss of the complaint is controversial in that there are other conceptions of what it is to justify a moral judgment. Thirdly, let's not forget that generally speaking, since justification stops somewhere, the use of unjustified items might be respectable.

A final argument asserts the *inacceptability of normative impasses*: "When an agent grasps the fact of the situation and the morally required action is irrational, what is there left for us to tell her? We can tell her that two kinds of norms that apply to her impending action point in opposite directions, irreconcilably so, and that we have no third kind of norm that would adjudicate between them. We can wish her good luck at the normative crossroads and move on. None of that is of any help to her, and theorizing about normativity should do better than that. It should avoid divergences."

The most general reply to the objection is that theorizing about normativity should "do better" only if there is independent evidence that it got the lay of the land wrong. That evidence would need to be produced—and will hardly consist in the fact that something is or feels awkward for a well-informed agent. Moreover, the objection misses its target, divergence, because divergence does not entail the alleged source of awkwardness, the absence of normative guidance. Divergence allows for the possibility that there is a boss: one of the divergers or some adjudicator. The possibility is very much alive in the literature on normative pluralism, where the view is not rare that divergences between kinds of norms coexist with unequivocal overall norms.<sup>19</sup>

When it comes to R and M, the observation that divergence and guidance can coexist gains in stature, since one of the two divergers is practical reason itself. There is a fairly straightforward sense in which practical reason is always in charge. Practical reason deals with practical reasons—with all of them. The fascinating question whether all of them involve agents' desires makes no difference for the following consideration, which is quite general. Neither does it make a difference whether some kind of incommensurability threatens to hold *among* an agent's practical reasons. We may ignore that possibility here because we're grappling with the specter of lacks of guidance that originate *between* R and M. Our question is whether the risk of such lacks exists and justifies the axiomatic excluding of a divergence of R and M. Surely a risk of such lacks could not justify such an excluding

if there is lack of guidance even *within* R. Thus, what remains to be looked at is only the other case, in which all is well within R: there is some balance of all practical reasons that an agent has and thus something that the agent has most reason to do.

And now to the question where the balance leaves *moral* practical reasons. They can relate to the “most reason” verdict in two different ways but can escape neither the verdict nor the guidance it gives. We can understand moral practical reasons either as being practical reasons of a certain kind (think of yellow bicycles, which are bicycles), in which case the balance of all practical reasons will have taken them into account—or as *not* being practical reasons (think of “root beer,” which is not beer, and of “toy money,” which is not money), in which case the balance of all practical reasons will not have taken them into account. There is guidance by the balance either way. It is guidance on the level “most practical reason,” a level on which all practical reasons—that is, all reasons to do things—have been taken into account. That seems guidance enough.

From the list of objections against divergence, not much is left. It seems that we should bemoan, but not deny, the existence of divergence.

## 8. Conclusion

We have explored in which sense and why it is in many cases rational for people to do what morally they ought to do but also why with respect to many cases, even of well-informed agents, the diagnosis is controversial. We have sided with the common-sense view that performing actions that are stupid (to use the laity’s term for “irrational”) and performing actions that are morally wrong are two very different kinds of shortcomings. The action that is stupid can be altruistic, benevolent, beneficent, and morally right, and the action that is not stupid can be egoistic, malevolent, maleficent, and morally wrong. Given the duality, theoreticians of the rational and the moral will keep or turn their spotlights on the kinds, mechanics, and extents of convergence and divergence, including the metanormative challenges posed by competing norms. In practice, both desires and ways of fulfilling them ought to be shaped—and that “ought” is a moral one—so that divergence is reduced.

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## Notes

1. More on doctrines like instrumentalism and on their rivals in Hutcheson (1728, section 1 of treatise 2), Millgram (2001), Schroeder (2007), and Schmidt (2016). For further references, see Fehige (2001, note 1).

2. For the equating of welfare with desire fulfillment, see von Wright (1963, esp. sections 5.9 and 5.11) and Carson (2000, chapter 3); see also Wessels (2011), with numerous sources. For the claim that pleasure is one kind of desire fulfillment, see Fehige (2004, esp. pp. 143–145) and Heathwood (2007), both of which give further references. As to normative ethics: utilitarianism and its rivals are sketched in Vaughn (2010/2013, chapter 2) and treated more thoroughly in Copp (2006, part 2); a helpful introduction to utilitarianism is Bykvist (2010).

3. Hutcheson (1728) covers in some detail the desires associated with the “publick sense,” which is the disposition “to be pleased with the *Happiness* of others, and to be uneasy at their *Misery*” (art. 1.1 of treatise 1), and with the “moral sense,” which is the disposition to have moral sentiments. More on the connections between morality, desire, sentiment, and sympathy in Bricke (1996, esp. chapter 6), Fehige (2004), and Fehige and Frank (2010).

4. Single-source approaches to morality have been championed, for example, by Arthur Schopenhauer (1841, esp. section 16), who counts on sympathy, and by Francis Hutcheson (1725, preface and treatise 2) and David Hume (1751, appendix 1), who count on the moral sentiments.

5. The argument is put forth in Fehige (2004); the book includes a discussion, in chapter 6, of the limits of even that connection between R and M.

6. Lucid treatments include Hutcheson (1728, esp. art. 1.3 of treatise 1 and the beginning of treatise 2) and Sharp (1923, section 2).

7. Gregory Kavka captures the difference with maximum clarity when he distinguishes the “Wider Reconciliation Project” (1985, section 5) from a narrower one. More on handling egoism and its relation to morality can be found in Cholbi (2011).

8. More on the important distinction, for example, in Hutcheson (1728, art. 1.4 of treatise 1), Rashdall (1907, esp. pp. 17–18, 28–32), and Schlick (1930, sections 2.6–2.8).

9. For the first kind of approach, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 5, esp. section 5.1.2) and Maschler, Solan, and Zamir (2008/2013, chapter 13, esp. sections 13.5 and 13.6). The agent-based simulation approach is surveyed by Gotts, Polhill, and Law (2003); a telling example is Hegselmann (1998).

10. Moral rationalism is also known as the “claim of overridingness” and is highly controversial; contributions to the dispute include Scheffler (1992a, chapter 4), Cholbi (2011, esp. section 1), Portmore (2011), and Dorsey (2012). An illuminating critical study of ways of engineering convergence is Brink (1992).

11. Peterson (2015) can serve as a gateway to the area; see also Dawes (1980) and Binmore (1994).

12. A good starting point is Gauthier (1986, esp. chapter 6, which has the upcoming quotation on p. 158). Appeals to “resolute choice” (McClennen, 1985) bear some resemblance to Gauthier’s “constrained maximization.” Gauthier later espouses a conception of rationality that he acknowledges is morally charged to begin with (2013, p. 624); for a similar step, see McClennen (2012).

Other devices, too complex to sketch here, have been invoked against the traps: the claim that people who are in similar circumstances are bound to act similarly (see Davis, 1985, and, on “mirror strategies,” J. V. Howard, 1988), the proposal to shift our attention from Nash equilibria to “dependency equilibria” (Spohn, 2009, foreshadowed by Aumann, 1987), and, although with an emphasis on the explanatory rather than the normative dimension, the conceptualization of a relevant decision situation as a “metagame” that involves partial commitments (N. Howard, 1971, esp. sections 2.5, 3.1, 3.2) or of the decision-makers as members of a group (Bacharach, 2006, esp. section 4 of the “Conclusion,” and Butler, 2012). For critical thoughts on some of the approaches, see, e.g., Binmore (1994, chapter 3).

13. The view that rationality is the corresponding of actions to beliefs about reasons can be spelt out in quite different ways; see, for example, Scanlon (1998, sections 1.1.3–1.1.5) and Parfit (2011, sections 1 and 17).

14. The claim that there are worldly normative reasons for actions has acquired quite a few supporters. Among them are Thomas Nagel (1970, esp. chapter 10, and 1986, esp. sections 8.4, 8.5, 9.2, 9.3), Thomas Scanlon (1998, sections 1.9–1.11), Jonathan Dancy (2000, chapters 2 and 5), Philippa Foot (2001, chapter 4), Frederick Stoutland (2001, sections 3.2 and 3.3), and Derek Parfit (2011, sections 1–15).

15. The quotations are from Kant (1785/1903, p. 430); for the moral impact of autonomy, see, for example, pp. 405, 428–434, 444, 447–452. Kant later invokes the moral law as a “fact of reason” (1788/1908, pp. 31–32, 42–43); whether in doing so he renounces, summarizes, or supplements his justificatory efforts is controversial. After Kant, attempts to ground morality in the respect for rationality itself have been numerous and varied; Smith (2011) is one case in point.

16. The three kinds of prerogatives are considered, one each, in Scheffler (1992b, section 1), Mulgan (2001, section 5.5), and Nagel (1986, p. 202). For further reflections on possible kinds and shapes of prerogatives, see Wessels (2002) and Stroud

(2010). Some prerogativists make it clear that anti-divergence is where they come from. It is for the sake of keeping M in the orbit of R that they conceive of M as partial and as in that respect non-utilitarian (see Nagel, 1986, pp. 202–203, and Portmore, 2011).

17. A particularly acute analysis of the connections between R and M in the contractarian project is provided by Rainer Trapp (1998), who also explains (pp. 339, 356–359) that it will not always be rational for a person to do what by contractarian lights she morally ought to do. Contractarians who acknowledge the divergence include Peter Stemmer (2017, pp. 646–648, esp. note 34) and Gregory Kavka (1985, pp. 305–308 and, most clearly in terms of rationality, section 5). That a contractarian like Gauthier might avoid the divergence by operating with a modified conception of rationality (Gauthier, 1986, chapter 6) is a different matter.

18. The preceding quotations are from Harman (1975, p. 9); the subsequent ones are from Harman (1977, p. 107). Stemmer has retracted the crucial claims (2017, note 34) but used to travel a very similar path. For a while, he saw norms geared so radically to the addressee’s wanting that even an accidental hole in the sanctioning was considered to constitute a hole in the norm itself. Insofar as an individual action would not be followed by a sanction that the agent herself wants to avoid, so the retracted claims run, the norm not to perform that action “does not exist,” and the action “is not really forbidden” (Stemmer, 2008, p. 181).

19. That domain-specific “ought” judgments relate to overarching ones, which have the last word, is argued by McLeod (2001) and Woods (2018, section 10.2.2). In a similar spirit, Case (2016) provides a powerful argument for the conditional claim that, if you accept “source pluralism” and “conflict,” you are committed to accepting “authoritative adjudication.” However, support for the claim that “ought” judgments from different domains diverge is wider and comes also from authors who deny that there is an adjudicative level—see Baker (2018) and the sources given there.

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## Name Index

*Italic* numbers indicate that the author is denoted by “et al.” or a similar phrase.

### A

- Aarnio, Aulis, 661  
Abdellaoui, Mohammed, 502  
Abelard, Peter, 208  
Aberdein, Andrew, 362  
Abraham, Martin, 620  
Abrahamsen, Adele, 31  
Ackerman, Phillip L., 794–795  
Ackerman, Rakefet, xiii, 38, 47, 517–521, 523  
Adam, Charles, 82  
Adamopoulos, John, 29  
Adams, Ernest W., 108, 150, 207, 259–260, 277–278, 280, 287, 296–297, 381, 389–390, 392, 397, 399, 405, 413  
Adams, Reginald B., Jr., 487  
Adler, Jonathan E., 738  
Adolphs, Ralph, 37  
Adorno, Theodor W., 5, 44, 758  
Adriaans, Pieter, 187, 193  
Ågotnes, Thomas, 323  
Ahmed, Arif, 248, 480  
Aichele, Alexander, 663  
Aichhorn, Markus, 412  
Ain, Deb, 512  
Ainslie, George, 469  
Ainsworth, Mary D. Salter, 783  
Akin, Ethan, 557  
Akiyama, Takekazu, 121, 123  
Albert, Hans, 44, 662, 665, 757, 758  
Albert, Max, xiii, 189, 191, 512, 537, 543, 547, 550, 554, 567, 571, 592, 604, 608, 611, 626, 647–648  
Albrecht, Rebecca, 730, 741  
Alchourrón, Carlos, 13, 40, 202, 327, 329, 350, 356, 662  
Aleven, Vincent, 672–673  
Alexander, Jason McKenzie, xiii, 27, 43, 191, 541, 567, 608, 620, 639  
Alexander, Larry, 707  
Alexander, Michael P., 123  
Alexy, Robert, 675  
Alksnis, Olaf, 348, 351, 785  
Allais, Maurice, 466, 480–481, 570  
Allen, Colin, 29  
Allen, James F., 726  
Allen, Roy G. D., 467  
Allman, John, 706  
Allport, Alan, 178  
Allum, Nick, 772  
Almenberg, Johan, 585  
Almor, Amit, 106  
Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 498  
al-Nowaihi, Ali, xiii, 15, 47, 368, 487, 541, 615–616, 625  
Alqadah, Mohanad, 717  
Alston, William, 606  
Amarel, Saul, 716  
Ames, Gail J., 781  
Amgoud, Leila, 421  
Ampe, Lisa, 412  
Anand, Paul, 463  
Andersen, Hanne, xiv, 45, 149, 585, 748, 753, 760, 763  
Andersen, Line Edslev, xiv, 45, 149, 585, 753, 760, 763  
Anderson, Adam K., 122  
Anderson, Alan Ross, 53, 381  
Anderson, Elizabeth, 594, 751, 759  
Anderson, John R., 40, 93, 174, 180, 454, 716  
Anderson, Michael, 717  
Anderson, R. Lanier, 50  
Andreoni, James, 469, 626  
Andrews, Gregory R., 186  
Angel, J. Lawrence, 35  
Anglberger, Albert J. J., 648  
Anjum, Rani Lill, 444  
Anticevic, Alan, 35  
Antonelli, G. Aldo, 280  
Antonioni, Grigoris, 280, 347  
Antonoglou, Ioannis, 507  
Apel, Karl-Otto, 607, 609  
Apostel, Leo, 648  
Åqvist, Lennart, 648  
Arana, Andrew, 735–736  
Arecas, Carlos, 331  
Argote, Linda, 30

Aristotle, 1, 17, 40–42, 72–73, 81–85, 88, 105, 109, 134,  
137–138, 144, 215, 226, 233, 280, 367, 370, 374, 470, 625,  
684, 715, 737  
Arkes, Hal R., 165, 440, 510, 801–803  
Arló-Costa, Horacio, 188, 391, 427  
Armbruster, Walter, 545, 550  
Armendt, Brad, 245  
Armstrong, Este, 35  
Arnauld, Antoine, 73  
Arntzenius, Frank, 243, 246  
Aronoff, Mark, 523  
Aronson, Jessica A., 37  
Arpaly, Nomy, 135  
Arrow, Kenneth J., 30, 191, 253–254, 280, 331, 391, 430, 432,  
442, 465, 468, 580–583, 585, 595–596, 611–614, 616, 619,  
794–797  
Artman, Lavee, 787  
Arvai, Joseph, 772  
Asch, Solomon E., 30  
Asheim, Geir B., 548–550  
Ashley, Kevin D., 660, 672  
Asterhan, Christa S. C., 364  
Astington, Janet Wilde, 654  
Athias, Renato, 220  
Atir, Stav, 518, 770  
Atkinson, Katie D., 673–674  
Audi, Robert, x, 71, 76, 291, 804  
Aumann, Robert J., 190, 464, 545, 547–550, 567, 690  
Aunger, Robert, 110  
Austen-Smith, David, 585  
Austin, John L., 601, 605–606, 609, 653  
Avni-Babad, Dinah, 787  
Awad, Edmond, 48–49  
Axelrod, Robert M., 28, 43, 103, 627, 639  
Ayars, Alisabeth, 704, 706  
Ayton, Peter, 802

**B**

Baars, Bernard J., 33, 40  
Bååth, Rasmus, 373  
Babbage, Charles, 186  
Bach, Christian W., 549  
Bach, Kent, 606  
Bacharach, Michael, 30, 594, 690  
Bächtiger, André, 584  
Bacon, Alison M., 232, 738–739  
Bacon, Francis, 44, 215, 305, 307, 312  
Baddeley, Alan D., 39, 94, 96  
Baetens, Kris, 412  
Baggio, Giosuè, 120, 192  
Bago, Bence, 179, 522  
Bahník, Štěpán, 161, 487  
Bailin, Sidney C., 718  
Baillargeon, Renée, 104  
Baillon, Aurélien, 502

Baker, Derek, 690  
Baker, Siani, 720  
Balas, Robert, 519  
Balbiani, Philippe, 323  
Baldwin, Mark W., 103, 784  
Balguy, John, 76, 82–83  
Balinski, Michel L., 582–583  
Balke, Alexander, 436  
Balkenius, Christian, 192  
Ball, Linden J., 522  
Ball, Thomas M., 738  
Baltag, Alexandru, 188–189, 192, 323, 549–550  
Balz, John P., 803  
Banerjee, Mohua, 309  
Banks, Jeffrey S., 76, 585  
Bannert, Maria, 737  
Bara, Bruno G., 22, 230, 235  
Baral, Chitta, 332  
Baratgin, Jean, 234, 286–287, 297, 303, 396–400, 406, 408, 410  
Barbey, Aron K., 93, 106, 414, 445  
Bareinboim, Elias, 432, 434–435  
Barelli, Paulo, 549–550  
Bargh, John A., 180  
Bar-Hillel, Maya, 161  
Barker, John A., 374, 718–719  
Barker-Plummer, Dave, 718–719  
Barkow, Jerome H., 42, 106  
Barkowsky, Thomas, 729–731  
Barlas, Sema, 167  
Barnes, Jonathan, 73  
Baron, Jonathan, 704, 792, 805  
Barreda-Tarrazona, Ivan, 626  
Barrett, H. Clark, 106, 108  
Barringer, Howard, 373  
Barron, Greg, 489–490, 492  
Barrouillet, Pierre, 303, 784–785, 787  
Barsalou, Lawrence W., 414  
Barston, Julie L., 88, 97  
Barth, Else M., 372, 374  
Bartlett, Frederic, 17  
Bartling, Björn, 179, 181  
Barto, Andrew G., 703  
Bartolo, Angela, 122  
Barwise, Jon, 719, 737  
Barzilai, Sarit, 773  
Basalla, George, 102  
Bassi, Agostino, 225  
Bates, Tom, 705  
Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 543, 549  
Bauer, Henry H., 748  
Bauer, Malcolm I., 736  
Baum, Kevin, 364, 412, 443, 689  
Baumgarten, Alexander, 79  
Baumann, Michael, 773  
Bayes, Thomas, 6

- Bazerman, Max H., 30  
 Beach, Lee Roy, 90, 163, 450  
 Beals, Kenneth L., 35  
 Bearman, Peter S., 620  
 Bechara, Antoine, 37  
 Becher, Verónica, 331  
 Bechtel, William, 31  
 Becker, Benedikt, 730  
 Becker, Gary S., 485, 611, 616, 620  
 Beddor, Bob, 580  
 Beesley, Tom, 441  
 Begg, Ian, 228, 235  
 Beierle, Christoph, 342  
 Bell, Victoria, 102, 156  
 Bellemare, Marc G., 705  
 Beller, Sieghard, x, 5, 49, 177, 290, 301, 653, 655  
 Beller, Yael, 519–520  
 Belliveau, John W., 122  
 Bello, Paul, 234  
 Belnap, Nuel D., jr., 53, 188, 648  
 Beltrán, David, 414  
 Bench-Capon, Trevor J. M., 672–674, 676  
 Ben-David, Shai, 320  
 Bender, Andrea, 49, 653  
 Bender, Jens, 771  
 Bender, Lisa, 737  
 Ben-Ellyahu, Rachel, 320  
 Benferhat, Salem, 280, 308–309, 342  
 Bengson, John, 705  
 Bennett, Jonathan, 52, 177, 296–297, 604  
 Bennett, W. Lance, 675  
 Benozio, Avi, 421  
 Bentham, Jeremy, 48, 466, 625  
 Ben-Yashar, Ruth C., 587  
 Berendt, Bettina, 727, 740  
 Berger, James O., 147, 503  
 Bergstra, Jan A., 186  
 Berk, Laura E., 780  
 Berkeley, George, 52  
 Berker, Selim, 213, 702  
 Berman, Donald H., 674  
 Bernecker, Sven, 52  
 Bernheim, B. Douglas, 27, 543, 548  
 Bernoulli, Daniel, 470, 481, 487  
 Bernoulli, Jakob, 306, 311  
 Bernoulli, Nicolaus, 473, 482  
 Bernstein, Michael J., 487  
 Bertel, Sven, 729  
 Berto, Francesco, 413  
 Bertrand, Joseph, 244  
 Beth, Evert Willem, 186  
 Betsch, Tilmann, 519  
 Betti, Arianna, 73  
 Bettman, James R., 165, 490–491, 511, 512  
 Betz, Gregor, 761  
 Beveridge, M., 786  
 Bewley, Truman F., 497  
 Bex, Floris J., 674–675  
 Bhatia, Jaydeep-Singh, 362  
 Biazzo, Veronica, 278  
 Bickel, Peter J., 433  
 Biddle, Justin, 762  
 Biele, Guido, 168  
 Bienenstock, Elie, 512  
 Bikhchandani, Sushil, 192  
 Billari, Francesco C., 619  
 Binkley, Robert W., 39  
 Binmore, Ken G., 463, 467, 536–537, 540, 690  
 Birnbaum, Michael H., 489  
 Biro, John, 374  
 Bischoff, Tobias, 263  
 Bishop, Sonia, 795  
 Bitterman, Morton E., 102  
 Bjork, Robert A., 38  
 Björklund, Fredrik, 704  
 Bjorndahl, Adam, 80  
 Blachowicz, James, 748  
 Black, Max, 71, 76  
 Blackburn, Simon, 474  
 Blair, Douglas H., 595  
 Blair, J. Anthony, x, 367–368, 371–374  
 Blair, Robert James R., 705  
 Blaisdell, Aaron P., 442, 449  
 Blanchard, Thomas, x  
 Blanchette, Isabelle, 47  
 Blank, Joshua M., 389, 637, 771  
 Blau, Peter M., 611  
 Blehar, Mary C., 783  
 Blöbaum, Bernd, 770  
 Block, Ned, 108, 216  
 Blokpoel, Mark, 34  
 Bloor, David, 750  
 Blossfeld, Hans-Peter, 619  
 Bluhm, Roland, 363  
 Blum, Ben, 443  
 Blumenberg, Bennett, 35  
 Blumenthal, Anna, 120  
 Blumer, Catherine, 801  
 Bochman, Alexander, 333  
 Bock, Tanja, 20, 342–343, 356  
 Bod, Rens, 193  
 Boddy, Rachel, 192  
 Boeddinghaus, Jona, 741  
 Boethius, A. M. T. S., 280  
 Böge, Werner, 545  
 Bohman, James, 753  
 Bohr, Niels, 109  
 Bolker, Ethan D., 241, 476  
 Bolte, Annette, 519  
 Boltzmann, Ludwig, 737

- Bolzano, Bernhard, 737  
 Bonatti, Luca L., 36, 120, 151  
 Bond, Charles F., jr., 162, 486  
 Bonelli, Laura, 373  
 Bongiovanni, Giorgio, 665  
 Bonhomme, Jennifer, 166  
 Bonizzoni, Paola, 186  
 BonJour, Laurence, 16, 52  
 Bonnefon, Jean-François, xiii, 11, 48, 277, 280–281, 342, 348, 419–422, 653, 655  
 Booch, Grady, 718  
 Boole, George, 4, 109, 147, 149, 193, 215  
 Booth, James R., 120, 122, 739  
 Booth, Richard, 331–332  
 Bordes, Georges, 595  
 Boring, Edwin G., 215, 510  
 Bossaerts, Peter, 34  
 Botvinick, Matthew, 37  
 Bouanini, Samiha, 49  
 Boudon, Raymond, 611, 618  
 Boudry, Maarten, 769  
 Boussahmine, Ahmed, 49  
 Boutilier, Craig, 331  
 Bovens, Luc, x, 193, 248, 262–263, 289  
 Bowlby, John, 783  
 Bowles, Samuel, 16, 28, 627, 640  
 Boyd, Robert, 109, 627  
 Boyer, Pascal, 103, 109  
 Bradley, Richard, 466, 470, 498, 501, 537  
 Bradley, Seamus, 497–498, 500  
 Braeges, Judith L., 704  
 Brafman, Ronen I., 188  
 Braine, Martin D. S., 22, 88, 216–222, 228, 235, 279, 348, 406, 782  
 Brainerd, Charles J., 105–107  
 Braman, Donald, 586, 771, 772  
 Bramley, Neil R., 443–444  
 Brams, Steven, 582–583  
 Brand, Daniel, 228, 230, 372, 488, 654  
 Brandão, Maria do Carmo, 220  
 Brandeis, Louis D., 584  
 Brandenburger, Adam, 191, 543, 547–550, 567  
 Brandom, Robert B., 45, 606  
 Brandstätter, Eduard, 168, 488  
 Bråten, Ivar, 770  
 Bratman, Michael E., 52, 189, 627–628  
 Brattka, Vasco, 186  
 Brauner, Jason, 118  
 Braver, Todd S., 35  
 Brehmer, Berndt, 163  
 Breiter, Hans C., 122  
 Brekke, Nancy, 161, 166  
 Bremer, Manuel, 71, 82, 85  
 Brennan, Geoffrey, 773, 786  
 Brentano, Franz, 52  
 Bretherton, Inge, 784  
 Brewer, Noel T., 161  
 Brewka, Gerhard, 333  
 Bricke, John, 689  
 Bridgers, Sophie, 105  
 Briggs, Rachael A., 234, 243, 392  
 Bright, Peter, 792, 795  
 Brighton, Henry, 489, 511–512  
 Brink, David O., 690, 695  
 Brisson, Janie, 177, 354, 780, 785  
 Brodbeck, Felix C., 30  
 Bröder, Arndt, 168, 522  
 Bromme, Rainer, xiv, 45, 762, 770–773  
 Bronfman, Aaron, 242  
 Brooks, Patricia J., 221  
 Broome, John, xii, 45, 51, 129, 134–135, 139, 142, 144, 212, 344, 473, 476, 596, 602, 608, 629, 665  
 Brown, George W., 558  
 Brown, Gordon D. A., 289  
 Brown, Matthew J., 761  
 Brown, Richard J. C., 753  
 Broyles, James E., 374  
 Bruch, Elizabeth, 616  
 Bruine de Bruin, Wändi, 805  
 Bruner, Jerome S., 17, 216  
 Brunero, John, 131  
 Brunet, Marie-Laurence, 177, 350, 787  
 Bruni, Luigino, 467  
 Brunswik, Egon, 23, 162–163  
 Brunton-Smith, Ian, 772  
 Brzezicka, Aneta, 122  
 Bucciarelli, Monica, 151, 154–155, 230, 232, 234, 653  
 Buchak, Lara, 175, 466, 482, 582  
 Buchanan, James M., 594–596, 611  
 Buchel, Christian, 119, 120–121, 123, 226, 235  
 Bucher, Leandra, 22, 352, 728–729, 730–731  
 Buchsbaum, Daphna, 105  
 Budai, Riccardo, 123  
 Buehner, Marc J., 444  
 Bueno, Orlando F. A., 735  
 Bueter, Anke, xiv, 44, 499, 748, 758–759  
 Bühler, Karl, 607, 737–738  
 Bülthoff, Heinrich H., 737  
 Bulygin, Eugenio, 662  
 Bunge, Mario, 535  
 Bunge, Silvia A., 119, 122, 729  
 Burge, Tyler, 370  
 Burgman, Mark A., 772  
 Burian, Richard M., 71  
 Burnett, Russell C., 444  
 Burnstein, Eugene, 414  
 Busemeyer, Jerome R., 491, 626  
 Buskens, Vincent, 615–616, 618–620  
 Butler, David J., 593, 690  
 Button, Tim, 212

- Buxton, Richard, 71  
 Bykvist, Krister, 689  
 Byrne, Ruth M. J., xiii, 5, 11, 22, 33, 87–89, 90, 149–150, 222, 232, 234, 281, 296–298, 300, 343, 348–349, 351–353, 396–398, 405–409, 410, 411–414, 420, 421, 728–731, 784–785
- C**
- Cacioppo, John T., 795  
 Cahan, Sorel, 787  
 Calamia, Matthew, 37  
 Call, Josep, 43, 105, 110  
 Camerer, Colin F., 485–486, 489, 495, 571–572, 614, 616–617, 620, 637  
 Campbell, Donald T., 102, 110  
 Campbell, Jamie I. C., 518  
 Cándido, Antonio, 441  
 Caño, Antonio, 441  
 Cantor, Joshua B., 221  
 Cantwell, John, 332  
 Caparos, Serge, 47  
 Caplin, Andrew, 568, 573  
 Capon, Alison, 786  
 Cara, Francesco, 273, 361  
 Caramazza, Alfonso, 123  
 Cardon, Alain, 188  
 Carey, Susan, 151  
 Carl, Wolfgang, 81  
 Carles, Laure, 13, 351, 355  
 Carnap, Rudolf, 5, 19, 82, 242, 248, 266–268, 272, 274, 339, 523  
 Carneades, 663, 672  
 Carozza, Paolo G., 665  
 Carr, Jennifer Rose, 213  
 Carrier, Martin, 763  
 Carroll, John B., 792, 796  
 Carroll, Lewis (Charles L. Dodgson), 369  
 Carruthers, Peter, 106  
 Carson, Thomas L., 689  
 Carter, Cameron S., 37  
 Cartwright, Nancy, 427, 444, 452  
 Case, Spencer, 690  
 Cassam, Quassim, 586  
 Cassirer, Ernst, 124  
 Castel, Alan D., 36  
 Castell, Sarah, 769  
 Cate, Christina L., 13, 351  
 Catena, Andrés, 441  
 Cattell, Raymond B., 792, 796  
 Cauchy, Augustin-Louis, 722  
 Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi Luca, 109  
 Caverni, Jean-Paul, 151  
 Caviola, Lucius, 702  
 Cesa-Bianchi, Nicolò, 107  
 Cevolani, Gustavo, 273–274  
 Chadha, Angad, 120, 122, 739  
 Chaiken, Shelly, 162, 167  
 Chaitin, Gregory J., 155  
 Chakraborty, Pinaki, 186  
 Chalmers, David J., 9  
 Chalupka, Krzysztof, 263  
 Chamberlain, Andrew, 106  
 Chammah, Albert M., 627  
 Chan, Hoi-Yee, 704, 706  
 Chan, Timothy, 16  
 Chandler, Jake, 332  
 Chandler, Michael J., 780  
 Chandrasekaran, B., 717  
 Chang, Kai-Min K., 29  
 Chang, Ruth, 462  
 Changeux, Jean-Pierre, 33, 40  
 Chapman, Loren J., 233  
 Chapman, Peter, 717  
 Charalambides, Laetitia, 655  
 Charlton, Anne, 769  
 Chase, Valerie M., 454  
 Chase, William G., 507  
 Chateaufeuf, Alain, 313, 502  
 Chater, Nick, xii, 5–6, 12, 21–22, 40, 47, 88, 91, 93–96, 106–107, 150, 153, 176–178, 221, 228, 230, 233–234, 239, 263, 270, 271, 277, 285–290, 292, 300–301, 342, 344, 349, 353–354, 356, 368, 373, 395, 397, 400–401, 405–408, 454, 652, 654, 767, 782, 798  
 Cheeseman, Peter, 310  
 Chein, Jason M., 793  
 Chen, Yiling, 585  
 Cheney, Richard, 364  
 Cheng, Patricia W., 40, 43, 156, 220, 406, 441–443, 446, 449, 451–452, 652, 783  
 Cheng, Peter C.-H., 716  
 Cherniak, Christopher, 83  
 Cherubini, Paolo, 120  
 Cheung, Benjamin Y., 769  
 Chi, Michelene T. H., 769  
 Chin, Jui-Chih, 654  
 Chinn, Clark A., 773  
 Choi, Incheol, 801, 802  
 Cholbi, Michael, 689–690  
 Chomsky, Noam, 1, 103  
 Choquet, Gustave, 306  
 Christensen, David, 243–244, 246, 248, 338  
 Christmann, Ursula, 362–363  
 Christodoulides, George, 166  
 Christoff, Kalina, 729  
 Christoff, Zoé L., 192  
 Christoforides, Michael, 780  
 Chrysippus, 215–216  
 Chuderski, Adam, 795  
 Chun, Woo Young, 178, 180–181  
 Church, Alonzo, 186  
 Churchland, Paul M., 102

- Churchman, C. West, 80, 748  
 Ciardelli, Ivano, 189  
 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 3  
 Ciechanowska, Iwona, 795  
 Cisewski, Jessi, 537  
 Ciucci, Davide, 308  
 Claidière, Nicolas, 29  
 Clark, Dav, 772  
 Clark, Kenneth, 626  
 Clark, Ruth Swan, 225, 235  
 Clarke, Leesa, 653, 655  
 Clarke, Samuel, 76  
 Clemence, Michael, 769  
 Clement, Douglas, 620  
 Clément, Fabrice, 29, 770  
 Cobos, Pedro L., 441  
 Cohen, Hermann, 80  
 Cohen, Jonathan D., 37, 49, 702, 703, 705  
 Cohen, L. Jonathan, 2, 25, 53, 90–92, 94, 307, 312, 341, 454, 798  
 Cohen, Mark S., 122  
 Cohen, Morris R., 371  
 Cohn, Anthony G., 726  
 Colberg, Magda, 233  
 Colbourn, Christopher, 783  
 Cole, Michael W., 35  
 Coleman, James S., 611–620  
 Coletti, Giulianella, 277–279, 282, 286–287  
 Collins, Paul F., 35  
 Collins, Peter J., xiii, 29, 188, 190, 259, 300, 362, 373, 586, 606, 665, 676, 780  
 Colombo, Matteo, x, 32, 262, 342, 753  
 Coltheart, Max, 702  
 Colyvan, Mark, 257  
 Combs, Barbara, 160, 162  
 Condorcet, Antoine, Marquis de, 580, 582–584, 595  
 Condotta, Jean-François, 726  
 Coniglio, Marcelo R., 333  
 Connell, Jeffrey, 348  
 Connell, Louise, 420  
 Connor Desai, Saoirse, 259  
 Conradt, Larissa, 511  
 Conway, Erik M., 769  
 Conway, Paul, 702  
 Cooper, David J., 422, 616  
 Cooper, Richard P., 32, 168  
 Cooper, Russell, 626  
 Copeland, David E., 288  
 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 74, 79  
 Copi, Irving, 371  
 Copp, David, 689  
 Corcoran, John, 367  
 Corner, Adam, 291, 362–363, 420, 770  
 Corr, Philip J., 626  
 Corten, Rense, 615, 618  
 Cory, H. T., 670  
 Cosmides, Leda, xiv, 27, 42, 92–93, 103, 106, 108, 174, 220, 406, 422, 510, 573, 636–641, 652, 772, 783, 798  
 Costello, Fintan, 399  
 Couto, Marta, 420–421  
 Covello, Vincent T., 770  
 Cox, David R., 619  
 Cox, James R., 108, 652  
 Cox, Richard T., 226, 248, 290, 310  
 Cox, Sally, 795  
 Cozman, Fabio G., 262  
 Craik, Kenneth J. W., 148, 229  
 Cramer, Gabriel, 473, 481–482  
 Cressman, Ross, 561  
 Critchley, Christine R., 770  
 Crockett, Molly J., 701, 702, 703–704, 707  
 Cromheeke, Sofie, 520  
 Crone, Eveline A., 729  
 Cronin, Blaise, 752–753  
 Crowell, Amanda, 362, 364, 781  
 Crupi, Vincenzo, x, 14, 256, 269–271, 273–274, 399  
 Cruse, Pierre, 7, 47  
 Cruz, Nicole, xiii, 6, 150, 248, 278–279, 300, 395–400, 406–408, 410  
 Cubitt, Robin P., 462  
 Cui, Zhan, 726  
 Cummings, Louise, 770  
 Cummins, Denise Dellarosa, 348–349, 351, 654, 783, 785  
 Cuneo, Terence, 705  
 Curry, Oliver Scott, 704  
 Curtis-Holmes, Jodie, 178  
 Cushman, Fiery A., 701–704, 707
- D**
- Dacey, Raymond, 540  
 Dack, Lisa Ain, 654  
 D'Agostini, Serena, 36, 120  
 D'Agostino, Fred, 751  
 Dahlman, Christian, 373  
 Dahrendorf, Ralf, 44, 758  
 d'Alembert, Jean-Baptiste le Rond, 305, 314  
 Dal Mas, Dennis E., 37  
 Damasio, Antonio R., 47, 706  
 Damasio, Hanna, 37  
 DaMatta, Roberto A., 801  
 Dames, Hannah, 228, 230  
 Dancy, Jonathan, 135, 690  
 Danks, David, x, 441, 443, 751  
 Danto, Arthur C., 50  
 D'Arcy, Aoife, 192  
 Dardashti, Radin, 259  
 Darley, John M., 49, 702, 703, 705  
 Dar-Nimrod, Ilan, 769  
 Darwall, Stephen, 696  
 Darwiche, Adnan, 254, 262, 331

- Darwin, Charles R., 43, 109  
 Da Silva Neves, Rui, 281, 342  
 Daston, Lorraine J., x, 12, 82, 83  
 Datta, Saugato, 570, 763  
 David, Marian, 660  
 Davidson, Donald, 52, 134, 462–463, 467, 477  
 Davis, James H., 29–30  
 Davis, Jennifer N., 512  
 Davis, Lawrence H., 593, 690  
 Daw, Nathaniel, 703  
 Dawes, Robyn M., 165, 167, 690, 792, 803  
 Dawid, A. Philip, 254  
 Dawid, Richard, 260–262  
 Dawkins, Richard, 109–110, 638  
 Day, Mabel, 130  
 Dayan, Peter, 703  
 Dean, Mark, 573  
 DeBoer, George E., 768  
 De Bona, Glauber, 247  
 Debreu, Gerard, 461, 464  
 de Chantal, Pier-Luc, 354, 785–787  
 Declerck, Renaat, 391  
 DeCoster, Jamie, 162  
 DeDeo, Simon, 290  
 de Finetti, Bruno, 6, 193, 240, 242, 248, 278, 305–306, 310, 312, 395, 397–398, 400  
 De Freitas, Julian, 705  
 Dehaene, Stanislas, 33, 40, 731  
 Dehghani, Morteza, 413  
 De Houwer, Jan, 180  
 DeJong, Douglas V., 626  
 De Jong, Menno, 420  
 De Jong, Peter J., 47  
 De Jong, Willem R., 73  
 Dekel, Eddie, x, 543, 545, 547–549  
 De Langhe, Rogier, 751  
 Del Favero, Brendan, 343  
 Delgrande, James P., 332, 342  
 de Lima, Tiago, 323  
 Delius, Juan, 102  
 Delton, Andrew W., 641  
 de Lubières, Charles-Benjamin de Langes de Montmirail, 314  
 DeLuca, David, 123  
 de Melo-Martín, Inmaculada, 762  
 Demetriou, Andreas, 780  
 Demeure, Virginie, 420  
 Demey, Lorenz, 277  
 Dempster, Arthur P., 311–312  
 De Neys, Wim, 36, 94, 123, 178–179, 181, 348–349, 355, 520, 522, 785, 793, 797  
 Dennett, Daniel C., 43, 102–103, 110  
 Dennis, Ian, 653, 786  
 Denny, J. Peter, 228, 235  
 de Oliveira, Stephanie, xv, 802  
 Dermen, Diran, 235  
 Descartes, René, 11, 44, 71, 73–75, 80, 82–86, 105, 737  
 De Soto, Clinton B., 738  
 de Sousa, Ronald, 7, 47  
 de Vega, Manuel, 40, 412  
 De Vito, Stefania, 422  
 Devitt, Michael, 52  
 De Vooght, Gino, 40  
 Dhami, Sanjit, xiii, 15, 47, 368, 487, 541, 567–574, 615–616, 625  
 Diaconis, Persi, 245, 256  
 Diamond, Peter A., 537, 625, 718–720  
 Dias, Maria da Graça B. B., 220–221  
 Diderot, Denis, 305, 314  
 Diekmann, Andreas, 612, 615, 620  
 Diesendruck, Gil, 421  
 Dietrich, Franz, xiv, 29–30, 53, 192, 467–468, 581–587, 594, 596, 750  
 Dietz Saldanha, Emmanuelle-Anna, x  
 Dieussaert, Kristien, 349, 355, 421  
 DiGirolamo, Gregory J., 122  
 Dimitrov, Mariana, 47  
 Ding, Guosheng, 118  
 Ditto, Peter, 704  
 Dodd, Stephen M., 35  
 Dogramaci, Sinan, 246  
 Doise, Willem, 780  
 Dokow, Elad, 581  
 Dokumaci, Emin, 564  
 Dolan, Raymond J., 38, 118–123, 226, 235, 703  
 Donagan, Alan, 649  
 Dong, Huimin, 648  
 Dopp, Joseph, 217  
 Dor, Daniel, 103, 104  
 Dörner, Dietrich, 32  
 Dornhege, Christian, 727  
 Dorsey, Dale, 690  
 Dorst, Kevin, 212–213  
 Douglas, Heather E., 499, 748, 760, 762  
 Doursat, René, 512  
 Douven, Igor, x, 234, 245, 248, 262, 286, 290, 292, 297, 299–300, 303, 397, 400, 522–523  
 Downar, Jonathan, 49  
 Downs, Anthony, 611  
 Dreber, Anna, 585  
 Driver, Jon, 123  
 Druckman, James N., 773  
 Dryzek, John S., 584  
 Dsouza, Sohan, 48, 49  
 Dube, Chad, 88  
 Dubois, Didier, xii, 6, 12, 20, 193, 248, 263, 274, 306–309, 313–314, 328, 341, 344, 500  
 Duchaine, Bradley, 106  
 Dudman, Victor H., 391, 413  
 Dunbar, Kevin N., 118  
 Dunbar, Robin I. M., 105  
 Duncan, John, 795

Dung, Phan Minh, 671–673  
 Dunlosky, John, 38  
 Dunn, John C., 290  
 Dunning, David, 518–519, 770  
 Dunwoody, Philip T., 165  
 Dupré, John, 763  
 Dutt, Varun, 490  
 Dworkin, Ronald M., 669  
 d'Ydewalle, Géry, 177, 302, 348–349, 354, 406, 785  
 Dylla, Frank, 727

## E

Earman, John, 257, 268, 271  
 Earp, Brian D., 702  
 Easwaran, Kenny, 210–213, 243–244, 482  
 Eberhardt, Frederick, 263  
 Edgington, Dorothy, 95, 139, 286, 296–297, 299, 353, 388, 390, 395, 397  
 Edis, Taner, 769  
 Edwards, Anthony W. F., 274, 314  
 Edwards, Ward, 90, 163, 166, 450, 792  
 Eells, Ellery, 269, 272  
 Egan, Andy, 480  
 Egan, Suzanne M., 411  
 Egré, Paul, 391  
 Ehring, Douglas, 441  
 Eichhorn, Christian, 20, 342–343, 356  
 Eimontaite, Iveta, 118  
 Einhorn, Hillel J., 168  
 Einstein, Albert, 109, 149  
 Eisele, Theo, 545  
 Eitel, Alexander, 737  
 Ekstrom, Ruth B., 233  
 Elga, Adam, 246, 498  
 Elio, Renée, 13, 347, 350–351  
 Elkin, Lee, 262, 342  
 Elliott, Kevin C., 248, 758–759, 761–763  
 Ellis, Alan L., 29–30  
 Ellis, M. Charles, 653  
 Ellsberg, Daniel, 19, 311, 489, 495–498, 502  
 Elqayam, Shira, xiii–xiv, 2, 11, 18, 24, 26, 38, 47, 51, 91–92, 95–96, 117, 277, 300, 395, 398, 400, 408–409, 419, 421, 517–518, 520–523, 654–655  
 Elster, Jon, 16, 82, 618  
 Emerson, Michael J., 37  
 Enders, Markus, 71, 82, 85  
 Enderton, Herbert B., 212  
 Engel, Christoph, 166, 665  
 Engell, Andrew D., 702  
 Engisch, Karl, 48, 661  
 Englich, Birte, 167  
 Enoch, David, 705  
 Epley, Nicholas, 161, 167, 289  
 Epper, Thomas, 570  
 Epstude, Kai, 405

Erdfelder, Edgar, 175  
 Erev, Ido, 489–490, 492  
 Ergin, Haluk, 503  
 Erickson, Paul, 82–83  
 Eriksson, Lina, 241  
 Ermakoff, Ivan, 620  
 Ert, Eyal, 490, 689  
 Espino, Orlando, xiii, 5, 22, 150, 348, 353, 408–409, 410, 412, 414  
 Esser, Hartmut, 611, 616  
 Esser, James K., 30  
 Esterling, Kevin M., 584  
 Estlund, David M., 581  
 Etchemendy, John, 719, 737  
 Etling, Kathryn M., 161, 166  
 Etzioni, Amitai, 792  
 Euclid, 109, 715  
 Euler, Leonhard, 715, 718, 722, 736  
 Eva, Benjamin, 256, 259, 261–262  
 Evans, Christopher, 82  
 Evans, Dylan, 7, 47  
 Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., xi, 2, 4–5, 8, 10–11, 18, 23–24, 26, 33, 51–52, 71, 80, 82, 87–92, 94–95, 106–108, 117, 121, 147, 149, 159, 173–176, 178–181, 221, 228–229, 234, 274, 279, 281, 286–287, 296, 298–299, 302, 303, 348–349, 353–354, 356, 361–362, 389, 395–397, 399–400, 405–409, 413, 419–421, 518, 520–521, 523, 651–655, 660, 665, 702–703, 772, 781–782, 786, 792–794  
 Everett, Jim A. C., 702

## F

Faber, Nadira S., 702  
 Fagin, Ronald, 188, 190, 320–321, 540  
 Fallenstein, Benja, 510  
 Fangmeier, Thomas, 36, 41, 120, 122, 729–730, 739–740  
 Fargier, Héléne, 308  
 Farias, Miguel, 702  
 Faro, José Heleno, 502  
 Farrelly, Daniel, 654  
 Fawcett, Tim W., 510  
 Feeney, Aidan, 289  
 Fehige, Christoph, xiv, 9, 17, 48, 133, 593, 625, 689, 707  
 Fehr, Ernst, 179, 181, 568, 616  
 Fehr-Duda, Helga, 570  
 Feinberg, Fred, 616  
 Feinberg, Geoffrey D., 773  
 Feinstein, Jeffrey A., 795  
 Feinstein, Noah, 768  
 Feld, Scott L., 584  
 Feldman, Marcus W., 109  
 Feldman, Martha S., 675  
 Feldman, Richard, 246, 248  
 Felletti, Silvia, 373  
 Fenton, Norman, 259, 675  
 Ference, Richard, 1, 30

Ferguson, Adam, 76  
 Ferguson, Heather J., 412, 420  
 Fermé, Eduardo, 332–333  
 Fernbach, Philip M., 440, 518  
 Ferreira, Mário B., 519  
 Festa, Roberto, 274  
 Peteris, Eveline T., 373, 420, 665, 676  
 Feyerabend, Paul, 748  
 Fiddick, Laurence, 93, 637  
 Fiedler, Klaus, xii, 53, 168, 176, 354, 454, 490, 520, 572, 665, 779  
 Fiedler, Susann, 491  
 Field, Hartry, 207–208  
 Fillenbaum, Samuel, 653  
 Fincher, Katrina, 805  
 Fine, Cordelia, 705  
 Fine, Kit, 323  
 Fink, Andreas, 35  
 Fink, Gereon R., 123  
 Finocchiaro, Maurice A., 372, 374  
 Fisch, Shalom M., 175, 220  
 Fischer, Frank, x  
 Fischer, Katrin, 299, 400, 409, 410  
 Fischhoff, Baruch, 168, 519, 805  
 Fishburn, Peter C., 248, 465, 567, 583  
 Fisher, Irving, 467  
 Fisher, Ronald A., 553, 748  
 Fishkin, James S., 584  
 Fiske, Susan T., 520  
 Fissell, Kate, 37  
 Fitch, Frederic B., 217–218, 323  
 Fitelson, Branden, 14, 211, 212, 268–269, 272  
 Flache, Andreas, 616, 620  
 Flajolet, Philippe, 34  
 Flanagan, Owen, 108  
 Flavell, John H., 779  
 Fleming, Stephen M., 38  
 Flender, Jürgen, 362, 363  
 Fleury, Marie-Léda, 785, 786  
 Flitman, Stephen S., 118  
 Fodor, Jerry A., 9, 52, 93, 216, 285  
 Fong, Geoffrey T., 803–804  
 Foot, Philippa, 649, 663, 690, 696  
 Forsythe, Robert, 585, 626  
 Foucault, Michel, 50  
 Fox, Craig R., 488, 490, 502, 518  
 Frackowiak, Richard S. J., 120, 123  
 Fraenz, Christoph, 35  
 Franchetti, Francisco, 564  
 Franco-Watkins, Ana M., 491  
 Frank, Robert H., 689  
 Frankfurt, Harry G., 38, 75, 586, 627  
 Frankish, Keith, 94  
 Franks, Bridget A., 780  
 Franzmeier, Imke, 36, 122, 123, 729, 739

Fraser, Ben, 705  
 Fratianne, Angela, 441  
 Frede, Michael, 72–73, 82, 84  
 Frederick, Shane, 354, 510, 519, 522, 799  
 Freeman, James P., 374  
 Frege, Gottlob, 2, 4–5, 18, 81–83, 203, 215, 233, 367, 382, 609  
 Freksa, Christian, x, 726, 727  
 French, John W., 233  
 Freud, Sigmund, 215  
 Frey, Bruno S., 28  
 Fricker, Miranda, 586  
 Friedell, Morris F., 322  
 Friedenber, Amanda, 543, 550  
 Friedkin, Noah E., 192  
 Friedman, Jane, 139  
 Friedman, Jeffrey, 619  
 Friedman, Milton, 507  
 Friedman, Naomi P., 37  
 Friedrich, Patrick, 35  
 Frigg, Roman, 263  
 Frith, Christopher D., 38, 119, 120–121, 123, 226  
 Frith, Uta, 106  
 Frommberger, Lutz, 727  
 Frosch, Caren A., 411  
 Fu, Wai-Tat, 730, 741  
 Fudenberg, Drew, 529, 532, 534, 537, 549, 567, 620, 689  
 Fugard, Andrew J. B., 278–279, 299, 396  
 Fugelsang, Jonathan A., 118, 175, 179, 519  
 Fuhrmann, André, 332  
 Funt, Brian V., 740

## G

Gabaix, Xavier, 570  
 Gabbay, Dov M., 20, 187–188, 215, 368, 373–374, 659  
 Gabriel, Gottfried, 51  
 Gächter, Simon, 619  
 Gadenne, Volker, 541  
 Gaffey, Allison, 703  
 Gagnon-St-Pierre, Émilie, 787  
 Gaissmaier, Wolfgang, 159, 167, 511, 803  
 Galileo Galilei, 44, 74, 374  
 Galinsky, Adam D., 161  
 Galles, David, 429  
 Ganis, Giorgio, 739  
 García-Carpintero, Manuel, 52  
 García García, Grecia, 716  
 García-Madruga, Juan A., 412  
 Gärdenfors, Peter, x, 13, 40, 46, 192, 202, 327, 329, 333, 350, 355, 356, 444, 501, 503  
 Gardner, Anne von der Lieth, 671  
 Garrett, Don, 75  
 Garrett, R. Kelly, 771  
 Garssen, Bertus Johan, 362, 363–364, 665  
 Gauchat, Gordon, 771  
 Gauffroy, Caroline, 303, 784, 787

- Gauthier, David, 592–593, 685, 690, 693  
 Gawronski, Bertram, 793  
 Gazzaniga, Michael S., 117, 123  
 Gazzo Castañeda, Lupita Estefania, x, xiii, 8, 23, 37, 48, 52, 153, 187, 327, 342, 349, 373, 421, 608, 676, 735, 739  
 Gebharter, Alexander, 105  
 Gehlen, Arnold, 103, 105  
 Gehrlein, William V., 595  
 Geiger, Atticus, 193  
 Geiger, Dan, 430  
 Geiger, Sonja M., 299, 302, 349–350, 356, 409, 410  
 Geil, Molly, 29, 781  
 Geis, Michael L., 219  
 Geman, Stuart, 512  
 Genç, Erhan, 35  
 Genest, Christian, 582  
 Gentzen, Gerhard, 203, 216–218  
 George, Christian, 350  
 George, Rolf, 215  
 Georgeff, Michael P., 189  
 Gerbrandy, Jelle, 323  
 Gerrans, Philip, 705  
 Gershman, Samuel J., 32  
 Gerstenberg, Tobias, 413, 444  
 Gettier, Edmund, 319, 580  
 Geurts, Bart, 228, 235  
 Ghirardato, Paolo, 497, 499, 503  
 Ghosh, Sujata, 191  
 Giaquinto, Marcus, 736  
 Giardino, Valeria, x  
 Gibb, Maia, 179, 780  
 Gibbard, Allan F., 135, 388  
 Gierasimczuk, Nina, 189  
 Giere, Ronald N., 82, 256  
 Gierth, Lukas, xiv, 45, 762  
 Gigerenzer, Gerd, 6–7, 23, 34, 43, 83, 92–93, 106, 107, 159, 162–168, 175, 178–180, 356, 440, 449–450, 454, 488–489, 508, 510–512, 521, 572–573, 625, 636, 652, 665, 703, 728, 798, 803  
 Gigli, Gian Luigi, 123  
 Gigone, Daniel, 586  
 Gilbert, Margaret, 598, 627  
 Gilboa, Itzhak, x, 495–498, 500, 503  
 Giles, Robin, 312–313  
 Gilhooly, Kenneth J., 228  
 Gilio, Angelo, 278–282, 287, 397, 410  
 Gillies, Anthony S., x, 385–386, 388, 391  
 Gillies, Donald, 6, 12  
 Gilligan, Carol, 704  
 Gillingham, Susan, 123  
 Gilovich, Thomas, 90, 92, 159, 161, 167, 520, 574  
 Ginsburg, Simona, 103, 104  
 Gintis, Herbert, x, 554, 567, 570, 620, 627, 640  
 Girard, Patrick, 192, 333  
 Girle, Rod, 147–148  
 Giroto, Vittorio, 13, 151, 154, 273, 353, 355, 361, 364, 422, 728, 783  
 Gissler, Marc, 727  
 Gjesdal, Adam, 706–707  
 Glanzberg, Michael, 52  
 Gläscher, Jan, 37, 703  
 Glasgow, Janice, 717  
 Gleitman, Lila, 41  
 Glenberg, Arthur M., 40, 414  
 Glendon, Mary Ann, 665  
 Glick, J., 782  
 Glöckner, Andreas, xiii, 7, 12, 15, 24, 168, 188, 246, 344, 465, 488–491, 502, 509, 519, 570, 616  
 Glucksberg, Sam, 234  
 Glumicic, Tamara, 179  
 Glymour, Clark, 105, 268, 427–428, 436, 439, 441–443, 449  
 Glymour, Madelyn, 432  
 Goble, Lou, 649  
 Gödel, Kurt, 31, 109, 186, 715  
 Godlewska, Małgorzata, 519  
 Goel, Ashok K., 735  
 Goel, Vinod, xi, 10, 35–36, 115–116, 118–123, 225–226, 729, 739  
 Gola, Mateusz, 122  
 Gold, Brian, 35, 118  
 Gold, Natalie, 594  
 Goldberg, Adele, 234  
 Goldberger, Arthur S., 433  
 Goldblatt, Robert, 322  
 Goldman, Alvin I., 33, 579–580  
 Goldman, Susan R., 770, 773  
 Goldstein, Daniel G., 159, 164–165, 167, 512  
 Goldstein-Greenwood, Jacob, 702  
 Goldstone, Robert L., 29, 666  
 Goldszmidt, Moises, 280  
 Goldthorpe, John H., 619  
 Gollwitzer, Mario, 771  
 Gomberg, Paul, 28  
 Gómez-Veiga, Isabel, 412  
 Gonthier, Georges, 722  
 Gonzalez, Cleotilde, 490  
 Gonzalez, Michel, 151  
 González-Mora, José Luis, 120  
 González-Vallejo, Claudia, 167  
 Good, Irving J., 270–271, 273, 513  
 Goodin, Robert E., 584, 586  
 Goodman, Nelson, 384  
 Goodman, Noah D., 230, 289, 292, 705  
 Goodwin, Geoffrey P., x, 5, 12, 149, 151, 231, 234, 303, 353, 397, 407–408, 705, 728, 731  
 Gopnik, Alison, 105, 441, 443  
 Gordin, Michael D., 82–83  
 Gordon, Joel, 123  
 Gordon, Thomas F., 670, 672, 675  
 Gorham, Michael, 585  
 Goschke, Thomas, 519

- Gossen, Hermann Heinrich, 465–466  
 Gottesman, Leonard, 233, 235  
 Gottinger, Hans W., 34  
 Gottlieb, Sara, 773  
 Gotts, Nicholas Mark, 689  
 Gould, Stephen Jay, 42  
 Governatori, Guido, 675  
 Govier, Trudy, 371, 374  
 Goyal, Namrata, 655  
 Grabenhorst, Fabian, 37  
 Graesser, Arthur C., 40  
 Grafman, Jordan, 36, 47, 118–121, 122  
 Graham, Jesse, 704  
 Grandin, Temple, 735  
 Granovetter, Mark S., 617–618  
 Gratzl, Norbert, 648  
 Gray, Kurt, 703  
 Greaves, Hilary, 213, 244  
 Greco, Daniel, 246  
 Green, Adam E., 118  
 Green, Donald P., 619–620  
 Green, Jerry R., 463, 464, 467  
 Greene, Joshua D., 49, 701–703, 705, 707  
 Greenland, Sander, 432, 437  
 Greenlee, Mark W., 36  
 Greenspan, Alan, 574  
 Greifeneder, Rainer, 38  
 Grice, H. Paul, 29, 45–46, 52, 83, 286, 290, 391, 601–603, 605, 609, 653  
 Griffin, Dale, 90, 92, 159, 501, 520, 574  
 Griffiths, Oren, 441  
 Griffiths, Thomas L., 289, 292, 441, 444, 705  
 Griggs, Richard A., 108, 652  
 Groeben, Norbert, 362, 363  
 Groenendijk, Jeroen, 189, 388  
 Grofman, Bernard, 584, 620  
 Grootendorst, Rob, 362, 370, 372, 374  
 Grosset, Nelly, 784  
 Grove, Adam, 331  
 Groves, Trish, 752  
 Gründer, Karlfried, 51  
 Grüne-Yanoff, Till, xiii, 15, 20, 47, 241, 331, 468–470, 473–474, 497–498, 512, 535, 595, 608, 629  
 Guala, Francesco, 467  
 Guenther, Franz, 187–188  
 Guesgen, Hans Werner, 726  
 Guez, Arthur, 507  
 Guglielmo, Steve, 706  
 Gul, Faruk, 467–468, 503  
 Gundlach, Horst, 80, 84  
 Gurcay, Burcu, 805  
 Gureckis, Todd M., 444  
 Gülerk, Özgür, 103  
 Gustafsson, Johan E., 477  
 Güth, Werner, x, 28, 540–541  
 Guthrie, William C. K., 72, 84  
 Gutwald, Rebecca, xiv, 49, 135, 615, 630  
 Guyer, Paul, 78  
 Guyote, Martin J., 228, 235  
 Güzeldere, Güven, 108
- H**
- Ha, Young-Won, 92, 98  
 Haag, Karl, 659  
 Haavelmo, Trygve, 427  
 Habermas, Jürgen, 5, 9, 17, 44–46, 50, 601, 605–609, 753, 758  
 Hacking, Ian, 12, 152, 513  
 Hadar, Liat, 490  
 Hadjichristidis, Constantinos, 95, 279, 287, 298, 299, 302, 396, 400, 401, 413  
 Haenni, Rolf, 277, 312, 314  
 Hafner, Carole D., 674  
 Hage, Jaap C., x, 659, 665–666, 670–671, 673  
 Hagen, Cornelius, 726–727, 729–730, 740  
 Hagen, Gottlob Friedrich, 79  
 Hagmayer, York, 439–444, 449  
 Hagoort, Peter, 192  
 Hahn, Robert, 585  
 Hahn, Ulrike, xiii, 29–30, 166, 188, 190, 259, 290–292, 300, 343, 361–364, 373, 420, 586, 606, 665, 676, 770, 780  
 Haidt, Jonathan, 704–705  
 Haigh, Matthew, 420–422  
 Hailperin, Theodore, 277  
 Hájek, Alan, xii, 14, 17, 19, 144, 193, 240–242, 248, 256, 263, 268, 271, 274, 278, 287, 306, 344, 392, 473, 475, 481, 529, 582, 630, 747  
 Haldane, Elizabeth S., 82  
 Halford, Graeme S., 728  
 Hall, Ned, 248  
 Halldén, Sören, 470  
 Hallett, Darcy, 780  
 Halligan, Peter W., 123  
 Halpern, Joseph Y., 12, 20, 188, 190–191, 193, 262, 310, 314, 320–323, 429, 540  
 Hamblin, Charles L., 362, 367, 369–370  
 Hamburger, Kai, 36, 123, 739  
 Hammel, Eugene A., 433  
 Hammer, Eric M., 717–718  
 Hammond, Kenneth R., 23, 93, 163, 511, 801  
 Hammond, Peter J., 498, 670  
 Hampton, Jean, 77, 84  
 Handel, Stephen, 738  
 Handley, Simon J., x, 88, 95, 108, 175, 178–180, 232, 279, 286, 296, 298–299, 302, 354, 361, 362, 396, 400, 406, 407, 408, 413, 420–421, 653–654, 739, 782, 786  
 Hands, D. Wade, 467  
 Hanna, Robert, 83  
 Hannikainen, Ivar A., 703  
 Hanoch, Yaniv, 508  
 Hansen, Eric K., 118

- Hansen, Hans V., 374  
 Hansen, Jens Ulrik, 192  
 Hansen, Lars Peter, 502  
 Hanson, Norwood R., 748  
 Hanson, Robin, 585  
 Hansson, Bengt, 466  
 Hansson, Sven Ove, x, 330–333, 461–463, 468, 470, 648  
 Haraway, Donna, 751  
 Harding, Sandra, 751  
 Hardman, David, 24  
 Hardwig, John, 770  
 Hare, Brian, 103, 105  
 Hare, Richard M., 626, 693  
 Hare, Todd, 179, 181  
 Harel, David, 186  
 Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun P., 626  
 Harley, Clare, 654  
 Harman, Gilbert H., 139, 206–208, 216, 235, 287, 289, 291, 350, 367, 371, 374, 687, 690  
 Harman, Harry H., 233  
 Harner, Hillary, 234  
 Harnish, Robert M., 606  
 Harp, Shannon F., 737  
 Harper, William, 327, 330, 427  
 Harrenstein, Paul, 191  
 Harris, Adam J. L., 259, 363, 770  
 Harris, Paul L., 654  
 Harris, Phil, 665  
 Harrison, Tony, 234  
 Harrison-Trainor, Matthew, 193  
 Harsanyi, John C., 27, 529, 544, 611, 618–619, 626  
 Hart, Herbert L. A., 18  
 Hartmann, Stephan, xii, 14, 193, 256, 259–263, 268, 289, 301, 340, 342, 440, 449, 676  
 Hartwig, Maria, 162  
 Haruvy, Eran, 490  
 Hassabis, Demis, 705  
 Hasse, Dag Nikolaus, 71, 82, 85  
 Hastie, Reid, 440, 444, 453, 586, 803  
 Hastings, Arthur C., 363, 373  
 Hatfield, Gary, 74, 80, 84  
 Hattori, Masasi, 229–231, 234, 288  
 Hau, Robin, 490  
 Haugeland, John, 186  
 Haun, Daniel B. M., 41  
 Hauser, Marc, 702–703  
 Hausknecht, Matthew, 445  
 Hausman, Daniel M., 452, 467–468, 536  
 Hawkins, J., 782  
 Hawthorne, James, 280  
 Hawthorne, John, 582  
 Hayek, Friedrich. *See* von Hayek, Friedrich A.  
 Hayes, Brett K., 290  
 Hayes, John R., 351  
 Haynes, John-Dylan, 120  
 Hazan, Cindy, 784  
 Heath, Joseph, 595, 609  
 Heathwood, Chris, 689  
 Hechter, Michael, 620  
 Heckerman, David E., 271, 310  
 Heckhausen, Heinz, 8, 16  
 Heckhausen, Jutta, 8, 16  
 Hedden, Brian, 246  
 Hedström, Peter, 615, 620  
 Heekeren, Hauke R., 23  
 Hegarty, Mary, 302, 717  
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 50, 80, 626  
 Heggstad, Eric D., 795  
 Heggemann, Rainer, 689  
 Heidegger, Martin, 50  
 Heidelberger, Michael, 6, 12  
 Heim, Irene R., 388  
 Heine, Steven J., 49, 655, 769, 771  
 Heiner, Ronald Asher, 537  
 Heintz, Christophe, 29, 364, 770  
 Heis, Jeremy, 80, 84  
 Heit, Evan, 88, 289–290  
 Hell, Wolfgang, 637  
 Helm, Bennett W., 7, 48  
 Hempel, Carl Gustav, 52–53, 148, 271, 620, 747, 750  
 Hendricks, Vincent F., 188  
 Hendriks, Friederike, 770–771  
 Henkin, Leon, 370  
 Henle, Mary, 87–88, 90–91, 117, 215  
 Henning, Tim, x  
 Henninger, Felix, 490  
 Henrich, Joseph, 49, 110, 655  
 Henrion, Max, 343  
 Henry, John, 73  
 Hentschke, Johannes, 772  
 Hepburn, Brian, 748  
 Hepfer, Karl, 76, 82, 84  
 Herbold, Ann-Katrin, 491  
 Hernández-Lloreda, María Victoria, 105  
 Herrmann, Esther, 105  
 Hertwig, Ralph, ix, xiii, 7, 10, 15, 24, 34, 101, 162, 165, 168, 246, 274, 440, 454, 488–490, 508, 510–513, 520–521, 523, 554, 572–573, 616, 636, 772  
 Herzig, Andreas, 323  
 Herzog, Stefan M., 168, 490, 508, 510  
 Hewitt, Emily, 35  
 Heyes, Cecilia M., 42, 103–104, 106  
 Hiatt, Laura, 234  
 Hicks, Daniel J., 762  
 Hicks, John R., 467  
 Hiddleston, Eric, 391–392  
 Higginson, Andrew D., 510  
 Higham, James P., 638  
 Hilbert, David, 523, 715, 735  
 Hilbig, Benjamin E., 168, 480, 522

- Hild, Matthias, 340  
 Hilgendorf, Eric, xiv, 48, 659, 665, 670, 672  
 Hill, Brian, xiii, 12, 15, 20, 159, 235, 308, 344, 482, 501, 503  
 Hilpinen, Risto, x, 645  
 Hilton, Denis J., 290, 292, 420–421, 655, 793  
 Hinterecker, Thomas, 12, 148, 353, 356  
 Hintikka, Jaakko, 188, 305, 308, 320–322, 370  
 Hirata, Satoshi, 110  
 Hirshleifer, David, 192  
 Hitchcock, Christopher, 240  
 Hitchcock, David, 367, 372, 374  
 Hoareau-Blanchet, Stéphanie, 655  
 Hobbes, Thomas, 43, 48–49, 73, 413, 592, 620, 661  
 Hodges, Wilfrid, 190  
 Hoeken, Hans, 363, 364, 420  
 Hoepelman, Jaap, 648  
 Hofbauer, Josef, 555, 557, 559, 561–562  
 Hoffman, Elizabeth, 639–640  
 Hoffrage, Ulrich, 92, 168, 450, 510, 573, 636  
 Hogarth, Robin M., 168, 512, 804  
 Hogger, Christopher J., 20, 187  
 Holliday, Wesley H., 193  
 Holmes, Emily A., 738  
 Holyoak, Keith J., 40, 43, 108, 156, 220, 291, 406, 441, 451–452, 491, 652, 783  
 Holzman, Ron, 581  
 Homans, George C., 611  
 Homer, 72  
 Honda, Manabu, 118  
 Hong, Lu, 585  
 Honomichl, Ryan D., 729  
 Horn, Christoph, 71, 82  
 Horn, John L., 792  
 Horn, Laurence R., 605  
 Horne, Zach, 234  
 Hörnig, Robin, 354  
 Hornikx, Jos, 259, 363  
 Horovitz, Joseph, 659  
 Horowitz, Sophie, 246  
 Horty, John F., xiv, 190, 608, 648–649, 651, 659, 665, 673–674  
 Horvitz, Eric J., 32, 310  
 Hoshi, Tomohiro, 323  
 Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, Janina, 271–272  
 Hossiep, Rüdiger, 35  
 Houle, Sylvain, 35, 118  
 Houston, Alasdair I., 510  
 Houston, Christopher E., 161, 166  
 Houtlosser, Peter, 363  
 Howard, John V., 690  
 Howard, Nigel, 690  
 Howerter, Amy, 37  
 Howie, David, 748  
 Howie, Pauline, 519  
 Howse, John, 717–718  
 Howson, Colin, 257, 289, 399–400  
 Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, 82, 749, 753  
 Hsieh, Shulan, 178  
 Hsu, Anne S., 259, 363  
 Huang, Yimin, 431  
 Hubbard, Edward M., 731  
 Huber, Franz, x, 256, 274, 305  
 Hubert, Thomas, 507  
 Hudson, W. Donald, 77, 654  
 Huemer, Michael, 705  
 Huey, Edward D., 121  
 Hug, Klaus, 43, 93, 652  
 Hull, David, 750  
 Hume, David, 4, 8–9, 24, 27, 45, 48–49, 71, 74–80, 82–83, 101–102, 105, 107, 109, 137, 141–142, 144, 152–153, 215, 440–441, 620, 654, 689, 694, 737, 757  
 Hummell, Hans J., 614  
 Hunt, Thomas E., 522  
 Hurley, Susan, 627  
 Hurwicz, Leonid, 312, 497  
 Husserl, Edmund, 81  
 Hutcheson, Francis, 689  
 Hütter, Mandy, 177, 290, 301  
 Huvermann, Daniela, 342  
 Hyowon, Gweon, 421, 422
- I**  
 Iatridou, Sabine, 388  
 Ibeling, Duligur, 193  
 Icard, Thomas F., III, 193  
 Iliev, Petar, 323  
 Iliev, Rumén, 413  
 Imai, Kosuke, 436  
 Inhelder, Bärbel, 4, 24, 88, 90, 106  
 Intemann, Kristen, 762  
 Ioup, Georgette, 217  
 Ippolito, Michela, 387  
 Ireland, Andrew, 720  
 Irigaray, Luce, 751  
 Irlenbusch, Bernd, 103  
 Irvine, Andrew D., 362  
 Irwin, Terry, 135  
 Irzik, Gürol, 770  
 Isaac, Alistair M. C., 190  
 Isaksson, Siri, 585  
 Isberner, Maj-Britt, 342  
 Itmi, Mhamed, 188  
 Iyengar, Sheena S., 570  
 Iyer, Ravi, 704
- J**  
 Jablonka, Eva, 103–104, 109  
 Jackendoff, Ray, 352  
 Jackson, Michelle, 619  
 Jackson, Simon A., 519  
 Jacobs, Perke, 450

- Jacobson, Daniel, 706  
 Jacobson, Ivar, 718  
 Jacoby, Larry L., 180  
 Jaffray, Jean-Yves, 312–313, 497  
 Jago, Mark, 413  
 Jahn, Georg, 352, 728  
 James, William, 16–17, 19, 153, 209–210, 212  
 Jamnik, Mateja, xiv, 41, 229, 716, 718–719, 720, 736–737, 740–741  
 Janik, Allan, 374  
 Janis, Irving L., 1, 30  
 Jansen, Jennifer L., 414  
 Janveau-Brennan, Geneviève, 786  
 Jara-Ettinger, Julian, 421–422  
 Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Ainhoa, 626  
 Jarvis, W. Blair G., 795  
 Jäsche, Gottlob, 138  
 Jastrzębski, Jan, 795  
 Jaynes, Edwin T., 244, 310  
 Jednoróg, Katarzyna, 122  
 Jeffrey, Richard C., 12, 14, 139, 147, 225, 241, 245, 248, 268, 287, 297, 344, 398, 401, 406, 427, 461, 465, 467, 470, 474–476, 761, 792  
 Jekel, Marc, 168  
 Jenkins-Smith, Hank, 771  
 Jern, Alan, 29  
 Jevons, William Stanley, 466, 470  
 Jewell, Nicholas P., 432  
 Jin, R. Kang-Xing, 703  
 Jin, Yi, 332, 342  
 Jin, Zhen, 118  
 Jitsumori, Masako, 102  
 Joerden, Jan C., 659  
 Johannesson, Magnus, 585  
 John, Stephen, 762–763  
 Johnson, Eric J., 165, 468, 490–491, 511, 512  
 Johnson, Joseph G., 490–491  
 Johnson, Ralph H., 368, 371–372, 374  
 Johnson, Stephen C., 38, 518, 520, 522  
 Johnson, William E., 270, 274  
 Johnson-Glenberg, Mina C., 414  
 Johnson-Laird, Philip N., xii, 5, 11–13, 22, 36, 41, 87–91, 107, 117, 120, 122, 148–156, 177, 222, 226, 228–232, 234, 278–279, 286, 288, 295–298, 300, 302–303, 349, 351–353, 355–356, 396–398, 405–409, 412–415, 573, 637, 639, 652–653, 717, 728, 730–731, 736, 738–739, 784–785  
 Jola, Corinne, 40  
 Jones, Matt, 52  
 Jonker, Leo B., 555–556, 562  
 Jönsson, Martin L., 30  
 Joslyn, Mark R., 772  
 Joyce, James M., 19, 139, 141, 143, 242, 246, 268, 271, 274, 428, 470, 480, 495–496, 500, 503  
 Juhos, Csongor, 730  
 Jukola, Saana, 760  
 Jung, Nadine, 47  
 Jung, Rex E., 35  
 Juslin, Peter, 167, 343  
 Just, Marcel, 717
- K**
- Kadane, Joseph B., 247, 363, 537  
 Kadunz, Gert, 736  
 Kagel, John H., 422, 616  
 Kahan, Dan M., 586, 771–772  
 Kahane, Guy, 702  
 Kahane, Howard, 371  
 Kahneman, Daniel, 6–7, 15, 22, 24, 90–94, 106, 118, 153–154, 159–163, 165–168, 173, 176, 274, 281, 354, 398–399, 449–450, 466–467, 482, 485–489, 491, 509–510, 520, 570, 572, 574, 616, 620, 625, 633, 636, 702, 705, 781, 792–793, 798–799, 802  
 Kalberg, Stephen, 135  
 Kalinowski, George, 659  
 Kalter, Frank, 619  
 Kamp, Hans, 388  
 Kanazawa, Satoshi, 620  
 Kanfer, Ruth, 794  
 Kanger, Stig, 648  
 Kanngiesser, Patricia, 654  
 Kano, Fumihiko, 110  
 Kant, Immanuel, 3, 9, 16, 25, 45, 48, 71, 74, 78–83, 102, 108, 137–138, 144, 609, 626, 686, 690, 695, 725, 736  
 Kapur, Shitij, 35, 118  
 Karandikar, Rajeeva, 573  
 Karelaia, Natalia, 512  
 Karimpur, Harun, 36, 123, 739  
 Karmiloff-Smith, Annette, 786  
 Kasparov, Garry, 507  
 Kassam, Karim S., 803–804  
 Kassubek, Jan, 36  
 Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos V., 512  
 Katsuno, Hirofumi, 331–332  
 Katti, Chittaranjan Padmanabha, 186  
 Kaufmann, Stefan, 391, 413  
 Kaup, Barbara, 414  
 Kauppinen, Antti, 705  
 Kavka, Gregory S., 689–690  
 Kavukcuoglu, Koray, 705  
 Keane, Mark, 415  
 Keele, Luke, 436  
 Keene, George B., 148  
 Keeney, Ralph L., 468  
 Keil, Frank C., 289, 440, 518, 768, 770  
 Keisler, H. Jerome, 550  
 Kekulé, August, 737  
 Kelleher, John D., 192  
 Kellen, David, 300, 343, 400, 490  
 Keller, Evelyn Fox, 758  
 Kelly, Jerry S., 595

- Kelly, Kevin T., 187  
 Kelly, Laura, 234, 730  
 Kelly, Thomas, 141, 245, 247  
 Kelman, Mark, 798–799  
 Kelsen, Hans, 659  
 Kemeny, John G., 240, 270  
 Kemmelmeier, Markus, 361, 420  
 Kemmerling, Andreas, x, 38, 609  
 Kemp, Charles, 29, 289, 292, 391, 406, 413, 705  
 Kennes, Robert, 312  
 Kennett, Jeanette, 705  
 Kepler, Johannes, 74, 79  
 Keren, Arnon, 770, 773  
 Keren, Gideon, 167, 179–180  
 Kerkvliet, Timber, 313  
 Kern-Isberner, Gabriele, ix, xii, 12, 14, 20, 45, 187, 193, 274, 307, 313, 323, 328, 342–343, 350, 356, 454, 586, 608, 676  
 Kerr, Norbert L., 30, 364  
 Kerschreiter, Rudolf, 30  
 Ketelaar, Timothy, 419  
 Keynes, John Maynard, 268, 270, 274, 474, 495  
 Keys, Daniel J., 802  
 Khemlani, Sangeet S., xii, 5, 12, 13, 22, 149–151, 154–155, 226, 227–232, 234, 286, 288, 302–303, 351, 353, 355, 397, 407–408, 730  
 Kienhues, Dorothe, 770, 771  
 Kienpointner, Manfred, 363  
 Kiesewetter, Benjamin, 132, 135, 630  
 Kießner, Ann-Kathrin, 728  
 Kilpatrick, Steve G., 654  
 Kim, Kwanwoo, 706  
 Kim, Nancy S., 289  
 Kim, Richard, 49  
 Kind, Per M., 768  
 Kirby, Simon, 103  
 Kirk, Ulrich, 49  
 Kirkham, Richard L., 17  
 Kita, Sotaro, 41  
 Kitcher, Philip, 82, 585, 750, 759  
 Klaczynski, Paul A., 781  
 Klatt, Matthias, 663  
 Klauer, Karl Christoph, x, xii, 23, 40, 88, 149, 175, 177, 273, 287, 290, 299–301, 343, 368, 396, 399, 400  
 Klayman, Joshua, 92, 167  
 Kleene, Stephen C., 31  
 Klein, Dominik, 189, 192–193  
 Klein, Felix, 735  
 Klein, Gary A., 507  
 Klein, Judy L., 82–83  
 Klein, Richard A., 487  
 Kleiter, Gernot D., 108, 277–281, 286–287, 299, 396, 398–399, 636  
 Kleitman, Sabina, 519  
 Klibanoff, Peter, 499, 502–503  
 Kliemt, Hartmut, xiii, 53, 189, 191, 512, 540, 543, 547, 550, 554, 567, 571, 592, 604, 608, 611, 626, 647–648  
 Klippel, Alexander, 727  
 Klug, Ulrich, 659, 661, 665  
 Knauff, Markus, ix–x, xiii–xiv, 8, 12–13, 22–23, 32, 36–37, 40–42, 47–48, 52, 82, 120, 122–123, 129, 148, 150, 153, 187, 225, 234, 327, 342, 349, 351–356, 369, 373, 408, 421, 454, 608, 676, 717, 720, 722, 726, 727–731, 735, 737–741, 757, 772  
 Kneale, Martha, 185  
 Kneale, William, 185  
 Knight, Frank H., 503, 509  
 Knobe, Joshua, 705  
 Knutson, Kris, 119, 122  
 Koch, Christof, 51  
 Koch, Hans-Joachim, 659, 661  
 Koechlin, Etienne, 37  
 Koehler, Derek J., 175, 179, 519  
 Koehler, Jonathan J., 450  
 Koenneker, Carsten, x  
 Koertge, Noretta, 758  
 Kohlberg, Lawrence, 104, 704–705  
 Köhler, Heinrich, 661  
 Kola, Ilir, 153, 406, 652  
 Koleva, Spassena, 704  
 Kollei, Tanja, 519  
 Kolmogorov, Andrey N., 239, 241, 243, 248, 567, 587  
 Kolodny, Niko, 131, 133–135, 142, 212, 388  
 Konek, Jason, 11  
 Konieczny, Sébastien, 332  
 Kooi, Barteld, 188, 277, 322–323  
 Koons, Robert, 20  
 Koopman, Bernard O., 306  
 Kopec, Matthew, 245  
 Kordig, Carl R., 759  
 Koriat, Asher, 38, 166, 517–518, 520–521  
 Kornhauser, Lewis A., 581  
 Korris, James H., 803–804  
 Korsgaard, Christine M., 76–77, 630, 695  
 Korta, Kepa, 605  
 Koscholke, Jakob, x  
 Kosslyn, Stephen M., 41, 122, 735, 738–740  
 Koun, Eric, 35, 122  
 Kouneiher, Frédérique, 37  
 Kourany, Janet A., 758  
 Kowalski, Radoslaw A., 670  
 Köymen, Bahar, 654  
 Kozyreva, Anastasia, xiii, 7, 10, 15, 24, 34, 168, 246, 274, 440, 454, 511, 513, 520–521, 554, 572–573, 616, 636, 772  
 Krabbe, Erik C. W., 372, 374, 665  
 Kraemer, David J. M., 118  
 Krahl, Hannes, 400  
 Krajbich, Ian, 179, 181  
 Kramer, Geoffrey P., 30  
 Krämer, Sybille, 736

- Krantz, David H., 470, 803, 804  
 Krasnow, Max M., 641  
 Kratzer, Angelika, 387–388, 392  
 Kraus, Sarit, 280, 309, 332–333, 356  
 Krebs, John R., 636–638  
 Kremer, Philip, 192  
 Kreps, David M., 547, 549, 572, 574, 617, 626  
 Krettenauer, Tobias, 780  
 Krimphove, Dieter, 665  
 Kripke, Saul A., 31, 319, 322–323, 370, 384–385, 545  
 Kriwaczek, Frank R., 670  
 Królicki, Leszek, 122  
 Kronbichler, Martin, 412  
 Kroneberg, Clemens, 616, 619  
 Krueger, Frank, 118  
 Krügel, Sebastian, 541  
 Kruger, Frank, 120  
 Kruger, Justin, 519  
 Krüger, Lorenz, 122  
 Kruglanski, Arie W., 167, 178–181, 703  
 Krumnack, Antje, 22, 352, 729–731  
 Krupenye, Christopher, 110  
 Krzyżanowska, Karolina, 299–300  
 Ku, Gillian, 161  
 Kühberger, Anton, 490  
 Kuhlmann, Wolfgang, 609  
 Kuhn, Deanna, 362, 364, 781  
 Kuhn, Steven, 592  
 Kuhn, Thomas S., 5–6, 26, 45, 748–753, 760, 763  
 Kuhnmünch, Gregory, 653  
 Kukla, Rebecca, 762  
 Kulakova, Eugenia, 412  
 Kumar, Shikhar, 704, 706  
 Kumar, Victor, 705, 707  
 Kumar, Vipin, 35  
 Kunda, Maithilee, 735  
 Kunda, Ziva, 771  
 Künne, Wolfgang, 17  
 Kurtulmus, Faik, 770  
 Kurz-Milcke, Elke, 167, 803  
 Kusch, Martin, 81, 84  
 Kushnir, Tamar, 441, 443  
 Kuss, Thomas, 726–727, 729–730, 740  
 Kusser, Anna, 9  
 Kwart, Igal, 390  
 Kyburg, Henry E., jr., 305, 308, 310
- L**
- Lacey, Hugh, 760  
 Lackey, Jennifer, 248  
 Ladeur, Karl-Heinz, 665  
 Lagnado, David A., 259, 405–406, 413, 443–444  
 Lai, Matthew, 507  
 Laibson, David, 571  
 Lakatos, Imre, 5, 722, 750  
 Lakoff, George, 217  
 Lamb, Marion J., 103, 109  
 Lambert, Johann Heinrich, 306, 311  
 Lancaster, Kelvin J., 468  
 Landau, Barbara, 352  
 Landemore, Hélène, 584  
 Landes, Jürgen, 259  
 Landy, Justin F., 705  
 Lang, Jérôme, 309  
 Langdon, Robyn, 702  
 Langlois, David J., 629  
 Langlotz, Curtis P., 310  
 Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 150, 312  
 Laraki, Rida, 582–583  
 Larenz, Karl, 662, 665  
 Largier, Niklaus, 71, 82, 85  
 Larkin, Jill H., 716  
 Larkin, Joanne, 287, 300–301, 354  
 Larrick, Richard P., 453, 803–805  
 Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria, 247  
 Lassen, Inga, 689  
 Latombe, Jean-Claude, 188  
 Laudan, Larry, 748, 759  
 Laughlin, Patrick R., 29–30  
 Laughlin, Philip, x  
 Lauterman, Tirza, 518, 520  
 Lauwers, Luc, 482  
 Lavaroni, Antonio, 123  
 Lavda, Anastasia, 47  
 Law, Alistair N. R., 689  
 Law, Stephen, 767  
 Lazer, David M. J., 584  
 Lea, R. Brooke, 175, 220  
 Leahy, John, 568  
 Lear, Jonathan, 72, 84  
 Lebiere, Christian, 490  
 LeBoeuf, Robyn A., 161  
 Lecas, Jean-François, 303, 784–785  
 Ledyard, John O., 585  
 Lee, Carole J., 752–753, 798  
 Lee, Hee Seung, 452  
 Leeman, Robert F., 706  
 Legrenzi, Maria Sonino, 151  
 Legrenzi, Paolo, 13, 151, 154, 353, 355, 422  
 Lehman, Darrin R., 802–803  
 Lehmann, Daniel, 280, 309, 333–334, 356  
 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 73, 78, 105, 185  
 Leiserowitz, Anthony A., 773  
 Leising, Kenneth J., 442  
 Leitgeb, Hannes, 52, 193, 212, 242, 244, 308, 341, 362  
 Lejarraga, Tomás, 490, 512  
 Lemmon, E. John, 649  
 Lemov, Rebecca, 82–83  
 Lempert, Richard O., 802, 803  
 Lenhard, Johannes, 748

- Lenzen, Wolfgang, 321, 608  
 Leonard, Robert, 529  
 Leonardo da Vinci, 109  
 Leonesio, R. Jacob, 521  
 Leontief, Wassily W., 464  
 Le Pelley, Mike E., 441  
 Lepper, Mark R., 570  
 Leslie, Alan M., 104–105  
 Lessmöllmann, Annette, x  
 Leuker, Christina, 511  
 Leuthold, Hartmut, 412  
 Levi, Isaac, 11, 212, 243–246, 327–328, 330–331, 333, 342, 495–497, 500, 761  
 Levine, Brian, 37  
 Levine, David K., 549, 620  
 Levinson, Stephen C., 29, 41, 290  
 Levinstein, Benjamin A., 11  
 Levy, Neil, 770  
 Levy-Sadot, Ravit, 166  
 Lewandowsky, Stephan, 772  
 Lewin, Shira B., 467  
 Lewis, Clarence I., 52  
 Lewis, David K., 1, 19, 43, 46, 105, 150, 242–244, 248, 282, 286, 297, 306, 321–322, 330, 381, 383–389, 391–392, 397, 405, 410, 427–428, 604–605, 608–609  
 Lewis, Karen S., 387, 392  
 Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 188  
 Li, Huamei, 364  
 Li, Peggy, 41  
 Li, Shujing, 216–217, 220  
 Liang, Diane Wei, 30  
 Lichtenstein, Sarah, 246, 519, 570  
 Liddell, Henry George, 82  
 Lifschitz, Vladimir, 187  
 Light, Paul, 783  
 Ligozat, Gérard, 726  
 Liljeholm, Mimi, 441, 451  
 Lin, Miao-Hui, 654  
 Lindahl, Lars, 648  
 Lindenberg, Siegwart, 611–612, 614, 616–617  
 Lindley, Dennis V., 290, 310  
 Lindman, Harold, 166  
 Lindsay, D. Stephen, 180  
 Lindsey, Samuel, 510  
 Linskog, Marcus, 343  
 Lipkin, Stanley G., 351  
 Lipps, Theodor, 81, 84  
 Lipton, Peter, 45, 675  
 List, Christian, 29–30, 467–468, 579, 581–582, 584, 594–597  
 Littlejohn, Clayton, 212–213  
 Littlewood, John E., 319  
 Liu, Fenrong, xii, 185–186, 189, 192, 322, 470, 586  
 Lloyd, Geoffrey E. R., 49  
 Llull, Ramon, 185  
 Locke, John, 737  
 Loder, Elizabeth, 752  
 Loeb, Louis E., 75, 84  
 Loewenstein, George, 16, 37, 568  
 Logan, Gordon D., 174, 180  
 Lombardi, Doug, 770  
 Lombardo, Vincenzo, 22  
 Lombrozo, Tania, x, 289, 446, 773  
 London, Alex John, 80  
 London, Marvin, 738  
 Longino, Helen, 751–753, 760, 763  
 López, Francisco J., 441  
 Lopez, Theresa L., 704, 706  
 López-Rousseau, Alejandro, 419, 421  
 Lorberbaum, Jeffrey, 103  
 Lord, Errol, 135, 665  
 Lorenz, Hendrik, 2  
 Lorenz, Kuno, 370  
 Lorenzen, Paul, 370  
 Lorini, Emiliano, 190  
 Lortie-Forgues, Hugues, 350, 786  
 Lösch, Johanna, 739  
 Losee, John, 748, 753  
 Lotstein, Max, 150, 151, 232, 234, 302  
 Loui, Ronald P., 673  
 Love, Bradley C., 52  
 Lovelace, Ada, 186  
 Löwe, Benedikt, 186  
 Lowe, Ric K., 716  
 Lowenberg, Kelly, 702  
 Lu, Hanson, 193  
 Lu, Hongjing, 441, 451–452  
 Lubart, Todd, 348, 351, 785  
 Lucas, Christopher G., 391, 406, 413  
 Luce, R. Duncan, 165, 463, 470, 593, 629, 792  
 Luciana, Monica, 35, 60  
 Luders, Eileen, 35  
 Lüdtke, Jana, 414  
 Lugosi, Gábor, 107  
 Luhmann, Niklas, 593  
 Luo, Qian, 118  
 Lyon, Aidan, 30
- M**
- Ma, Ning, 412  
 Ma'ayan, Hilit, 38, 521  
 Macagno, Fabrizio, 362–363, 364, 373, 672  
 Macaluso, Emiliano, 120  
 Maccheroni, Fabio, 497, 500–501, 503  
 MacColl, Hugh, 270  
 MacCormick, Neil, 662  
 MacCoun, Robert J., 30  
 MacDonald, Angus W., 37  
 MacFarlane, John, 206–208, 388  
 Machamer, Peter K., 748  
 Machery, Edouard, 702

- Machina, Mark J., 496, 502  
 Macià, Josep, 52  
 Mackenzie, Catriona, 702  
 Mackenzie, Dana, 428  
 Mackenzie, Jim D., 374  
 Mackiewicz, Robert, 151, 154  
 Mackor, Anne Ruth, 674  
 MacLeod, Colin M., 180  
 Mac Namee, Brian, 192  
 Macy, Michael W., 616, 620  
 Madey, Scott F., 161  
 Madsen, Jens K., 259, 363  
 Magidor, Menachem, 280, 309, 333–334, 356  
 Magnus, P. D., 212  
 Maguire, Barry, 665  
 Mahner, Martin, 767  
 Mahtani, Anna, 243  
 Maibach, Edward W., 773  
 Maier, Simon, 36, 122, 729, 739  
 Makale, Milan, 119, 121  
 Mäki, Uskali, 467  
 Makinson, David, 13, 40, 202, 208, 280, 329, 333, 341, 350, 356  
 Malaspina, Dolores, 233  
 Maldonado, Antonio, 441  
 Mallpress, Dave E. W., 510  
 Mally, Ernst, 645  
 Mancosu, Paolo, 735–736  
 Mandel, Gregory, 586, 772  
 Mandler, George, 215  
 Manfrinati, Andrea, 220  
 Mani, Kannan, 122  
 Manktelow, Ken I., 11, 90, 92, 108, 296, 361, 652, 654, 792  
 Mann, Adam, 585  
 Mansbridge, Jane, 584  
 Mansinghka, Vikash K., 444  
 Manski, Charles F., 501  
 Mantel, Susanne, 689  
 Manzano, Gilberto M., 735  
 Manzo, Gianluca, 620  
 Marchal, Kai, 49, 82, 84  
 Marchewka, Artur, 122  
 Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 649  
 Marek, Victor W., 333  
 Marewski, Julian N., 167  
 Margalit, Avishai, 83, 85  
 Marinacci, Massimo, 496–497, 499, 501–503  
 Marinsek, Nicole, 123  
 Markovits, Henry, xiv, 5, 177, 349–350, 354, 780, 785–787  
 Marks, Allison, 118  
 Marks, Harry M., 784  
 Marling, Miriam, 118, 120  
 Marr, David, 9–10, 13, 31, 93, 356  
 Marrett, Sean, 23  
 Marschak, Jacob, 629  
 Marshall, John C., 123  
 Martignon, Laura, 512  
 Martin, Andrea E., 412  
 Martin, Daniel, 573  
 Martinez, Michael J., 35  
 Mascaro, Olivier, 29, 770  
 Maschler, Michael, 53, 529, 532, 535, 539, 689  
 Mas-Colell, Andreu, 463–464, 467  
 Massey, Gerald J., 374  
 Mast, Vivien, 727  
 Masuda, Sayako, 121, 123  
 Mata, André, 519  
 Matheson, Jonathan, 248  
 Mathias, Armin Paul, 739  
 Matthew, Mervin R., 626  
 Maxim, Hiram Stevens, 152  
 Maxwell, Edwin A., 722  
 May, Elisabeth, 738–739  
 May, Jon, 444  
 May, Joshua, 702, 705  
 Mayer, Birgit, 47  
 Mayer, Richard E., 737  
 Mayerhofer, Bastian, 279, 299, 396  
 Maynard Smith, John, 191, 553–555, 564, 639  
 Mayo, Ruth, 414  
 Mayo-Wilson, Conor, 751  
 Mayrhofer, Ralf, xiii, 440–441, 443–446, 449, 450–452, 453, 454  
 McAdams, Richard H., 30  
 McCabe, David P., 36  
 McCabe, Kevin A., 639, 640  
 McCallum, David B., 770  
 McCaughey, Linda, xii, 176, 354, 454, 520, 572, 665, 779  
 McClelland, James L., 46, 491  
 McClennen, Edward F., 16, 462, 477, 479, 628, 690  
 McClure, Samuel M., 37  
 McConway, Kevin J., 582  
 McCrae, Robert R., 786  
 McDonald, Emma L., 739  
 McDowell, Michelle, 450  
 McFadden, Daniel, 619  
 McGee, Vann, 388  
 McGrath, Mary C., 773  
 McGrath, Matthew, 337  
 McGuire, Jonathan, 702  
 McKaughan, Daniel J., 759, 761–762  
 McKay, Thomas J., 385  
 McKenzie, Craig R. M., 454  
 McKinsey, John C. C., 462, 477  
 McLeod, Owen, 690  
 McMahan, Christopher, 593  
 McMullin, Ernan, 760  
 McNamara, John M., 510  
 McNamara, Paul, 645, 651  
 Meacham, Christopher J. G., 245  
 Meckl, Fabian, 541

- Meder, Björn, xiii, 413, 441–444, 449–454  
 Mednick, Martha Tamara Schuch, 519  
 Mednick, Sarnoff A., 519  
 Medvec, Victoria Husted, 161  
 Meester, Ronald, 313  
 Meggle, Georg, xiv, 1, 9, 46, 50, 602–606, 609  
 Meier, Stephan, 28  
 Meilinger, Tobias, 737  
 Mellers, Barbara A., 805  
 Melnyk, Laura, 47  
 Menary, Kyle, 35  
 Mendel, Gregor, 225  
 Mendelssohn, Moses, 78  
 Mendelzon, Alberto O., 331–332  
 Mendes, Wendy Berry, 703  
 Mercier, Hugo, x, 29, 42, 83, 93, 174–176, 180, 290, 292, 361, 364, 367, 637–638, 770, 773, 780–781  
 Merdes, Christoph, 259  
 Mergenthaler-Canseco, Max, 490  
 Merin, Arthur, x, xii, 10, 256, 274, 344, 605  
 Mertens, Jean-François, 545  
 Merton, Robert K., 615, 618  
 Mesoudi, Alex, 110  
 Meuffels, Bert, 362, 363–364  
 Meyer, Bernd, 717  
 Meyer, John-Jules, 331  
 Meyer, Thomas, 191  
 Meyerson, Roger B., 536  
 Michotte, Albert E., 444–445  
 Mikhail, John, 701–704  
 Milgrom, Paul, 626  
 Mill, John Stuart, 80–81  
 Miller, Dale T., 398  
 Miller, Geoffrey F., 508  
 Miller, George A., 39  
 Miller, Joan G., 655  
 Miller, John H., 626  
 Miller, Michael B., 123  
 Miller, Michael K., 582  
 Miller, Ryan M., 703  
 Millgram, Elijah, 144, 689  
 Millikan, Ruth G., 104  
 Mills, Candice M., 770  
 Milne, Peter, 207  
 Minker, Jack, 332  
 Minkowski, Hermann, 109  
 Mints, Grigori, 192  
 Mischo, Christoph, 362, 363  
 Mishra, Sandeep, 637  
 Mitra, Debasis, 726  
 Miyake, Akira, 37  
 Mnih, Volodymyr, 705  
 Modgil, Sanjay, 671–672  
 Modica, Salvatore, 321  
 Modroño, Cristián, 120  
 Mojzisch, Andreas, 30  
 Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin), 521  
 Möllers, Thomas M. J., 665  
 Monahan, John, 167  
 Mondani, Massimo, 123  
 Mongin, Philippe, x, 581–582  
 Montague, P. Read, 49  
 Montague, Richard, 38  
 Montello, Daniel, x  
 Montgomery, Hugh, 321  
 Monti, Martin M., x, 35  
 Mookherjee, Dilip, 573  
 Moore, George E., 24, 322  
 Moore, Michael, 707  
 Moorhead, Gregory, 1, 30  
 Moors, Agnes, 180  
 Moral, Serafin, 314  
 Moratz, Reinhard, 726–727  
 Moreland, Richard, 30  
 Morelli, Sylvia A., 702  
 Moreno-Rios, Sergio, 739  
 Morewedge, Carey K., 804  
 Morgan, James N., 804–805  
 Morgan, Mary S., 6, 12  
 Morgenstern, Oskar, 15, 464–465, 467, 474–477, 482, 485, 536–537, 543, 553, 629–630  
 Moro, Rodrigo, 91, 98  
 Morris, Michael W., 453  
 Morsanyi, Kinga, 518  
 Moses, Yoram, 188, 190, 320, 322–323, 540  
 Moshman, David, 29, 779–781  
 Moss, Jessica, 82  
 Moss, Lawrence S., 188  
 Moss, Sarah, 392  
 Muetzel, Ryan, 35  
 Mugny, Gabriel, 780  
 Mujica-Parodi, Lilianne Rivka, 233  
 Mukerji, Nikil, 586  
 Mukerji, Sujoy, 499, 502, 503  
 Mulack, Thomas, 36  
 Muldoon, Ryan, 585, 751  
 Mulgan, Tim, 690  
 Mullainathan, Sendhil, 570, 573  
 Mumford, Stephen, 53, 444  
 Munholland, Kristine A., 784  
 Munro, Cynthia A., 36  
 Munro, Geoffrey D., 36, 771  
 Murawski, Carsten, 34  
 Murray, Frank B., 781  
 Murray, M. Aisling, 409  
 Musch, Jochen, 88  
 Mussoni, Alessandro, 123  
 Mussweiler, Thomas, 161, 167  
 Myerson, Roger B., 53, 567  
 Myung, In Jae, 512

**N**

Naccache, Lionel, 33, 40  
 Nagel, Ernest, 371, 620  
 Nagel, Jonas, 49, 702  
 Nagel, Thomas, 135, 690  
 Nakic, Marina, 119, 122  
 Narayanan, N. Hari, 717  
 Narens, Louis, 523  
 Narr, Katherine L., 35  
 Naselaris, Thomas, 738  
 Nash, John Forbes, Jr., 532, 543, 547, 554, 572  
 Nau, Robert F., 501, 503  
 Naumer, Birgit, 88  
 Nauroth, Peter, 771  
 Navarrete, Gorka, 120  
 Navarro, Pablo E., 659  
 Nayak, Abhaya C., 331–332  
 Nebel, Bernhard, 22, 330, 727, 729, 730–731, 741  
 Neblo, Michael A., 584  
 Neck, Chris P., 1, 30  
 Nee, Victor, 611, 619–620  
 Nehring, Klaus, 581–582, 595  
 Neil, Martin, 259, 675  
 Neilens, Helen, 296, 298, 361, 362, 396, 421, 653  
 Neiman, Susan, 79, 85  
 Nejasmic, Jelica, 22, 352, 728–729, 730–731  
 Nelsen, Roger B., 716  
 Nelson, Thomas O., 523  
 Nester, Mary Anne, 233  
 Neubauer, Aljoscha C., 61  
 Neumann, Ulfrid, 659  
 Newcomb, William, 479  
 Newell, Allen, 6, 21, 31, 228  
 Newell, Ben R., 522  
 Newman, George E., 705  
 Newman, Ian R., 38, 780  
 Newman, Lex, 75  
 Newstead, Stephen E., 5, 11, 33, 87–88, 90, 175, 178, 180, 232, 281, 296, 348, 653–654  
 Newton, Isaac, 4, 74, 79, 256, 722  
 Newton-Smith, William H., 753, 757  
 Neyman, Jerzy, 748  
 Nichols, Shaun, 104, 704, 706  
 Nickerson, Raymond, 405, 410  
 Nickles, Thomas, 753, 759  
 Nicod, Jean, 149  
 Nicole, Pierre, 73  
 Nicolle, Antoinette, 120  
 Nida-Rümelin, Julian, xiv, 49, 135, 615, 626–628, 630  
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 50, 215  
 Nieuwland, Mante S., 412  
 Nilsson, Håkan, 167, 343  
 Nimmo-Smith, Ian, 795  
 Nisan, Noam, 188  
 Nisbett, Richard E., xv, 156, 166, 801–805

Nishimori, Hidetoshi, 192  
 Nitzan, Shmuel I., 587  
 Niv, Yael, 703  
 Norenzayan, Ara, 49, 655, 801, 802  
 Norman, Jeff, 673  
 North, Douglass C., 618  
 Northcutt, Wendy, 147  
 Norton, John D., 244  
 Norvig, Peter, 192  
 Nosek, Brian A., 487, 704  
 Novack, Greg, 244  
 Noveck, Ira A., 35, 188, 123, 175, 220, 731  
 Nover, Harris, 481  
 Novick, Laura R., 441, 443, 451–452  
 Nozick, Robert, 9, 76, 479  
 Núñez, María, 654  
 Nussbaum, E. Michael, 364  
 Nussinson, Ravit, 38, 521  
 Nute, Donald, 292, 392, 649  
 Nystrom, Leigh E., 37, 49, 702, 703, 705

**O**

Oaksford, Mike, xii, 5–6, 21–22, 37, 40, 88, 91, 93–96, 106–107, 150, 153, 176–178, 221, 228, 230, 233–234, 239, 259, 263, 277, 285–288, 290–292, 300–301, 303, 342, 344, 349, 353–354, 356, 361–363, 368, 373, 395–397, 399–401, 405–408, 410, 420, 454, 652, 654, 767, 782, 798  
 Oberauer, Klaus, xii, 40, 95, 108, 150, 248, 278–279, 286, 298–300, 302–303, 349–350, 353–354, 356, 396, 398, 400, 409–410, 771–772  
 Oberlander, Jon, 720, 722  
 O'Brien, David P., xii, 5, 21–22, 88, 148, 175, 216–221, 279, 371, 406, 782  
 Ockham, William of, 45, 289  
 O'Connell, J. William, 433  
 O'Connor, Cailin, 579  
 O'Doherty, John P., 703  
 O'Donoghue, Ted, 568  
 Ody, Chrystèle, 37  
 Ohm, Eyvind, 653  
 Okruhlik, Kathleen, 759  
 Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie, 363, 373–374  
 Oliver, Lindsay M., 156  
 Olivier, Patrick, 717  
 Olson, Elizabeth A., 35  
 Olson, Mancur, 611–612  
 Olsson, Erik J., 30  
 Olsson, Henrik, 167  
 Onishi, Kristine H., 104  
 Opp, Karl-Dieter, 611, 620  
 Oppenheim, Paul, 270  
 Oppenheimer, Daniel M., 161, 164, 453, 511  
 Orbell, John M., 592  
 Ordeshook, Peter C., 611  
 Orenes, Isabel, 231, 235, 412, 414

- Oreskes, Naomi, 769  
 Origgi, Gloria, 29, 770  
 Ormel, Johan, 617  
 Ormerod, Thomas C., 409  
 Orwant, Carol J., 617  
 Osborne, Jonathan, 768  
 Osborne, Martin J., 614, 618  
 Osgood, Charles E., 43  
 Osherson, Daniel N., 14, 35, 122, 287–288, 401, 582  
 Osman, Magda, 23, 356, 520  
 Ostrom, Elinor, 28, 611  
 Otworowska, Maria, 34  
 Ouellette, Lisa Larrimore, 586, 772  
 Over, David E., xiii, 6, 11, 18, 24, 90, 92–93, 95, 106, 108, 117, 150, 221, 234, 248, 277–279, 282, 285–287, 296–300, 302–303, 348–350, 353–354, 361, 362, 389, 395–401, 405–410, 413, 421, 520, 651–655, 782, 792–793  
 Overton, Willis F., 782  
 Owen, Guillermo, 564  
 Özgün, Aybüke, 320
- P**
- Pachur, Thorsten, 7, 34, 162, 164, 168, 488–490, 510–511, 512  
 Pacuit, Eric, 30, 188, 321, 543  
 Page, Scott E., 585  
 Paglieri, Fabio, 362, 373  
 Panagiotidou, Elpida, 739  
 Papadimitriou, Christos H., 34, 186  
 Papineau, David, 104  
 Parent, Xavier, 649, 659  
 Pareto, Vilfredo, 467  
 Parfit, Derek, 134–135, 144, 469, 690, 697  
 Parikh, Rohit, 188  
 Paris, Jeff B., 310  
 Park, Juhwa, 444, 453  
 Parker, Andrew M., 805  
 Parr, Alice, 795  
 Parsons, Lawrence M., 35, 122  
 Parsons, Talcott, 593  
 Pascal, Blaise, 242, 305, 307, 312, 473, 482  
 Pass, Rafael, 191  
 Passmore, John A., 215  
 Patzig, Günther, 72, 82  
 Paulesu, Eraldo, 120  
 Paulus, Markus, 654  
 Pavan, Marina, 626  
 Payne, John W., 165, 468, 489–491, 511–512  
 Paz, Azaria, 432, 436  
 Pea, Roy D., 782  
 Pearce, David G., 27, 543, 546, 550  
 Pearce, Glenn, 427  
 Pearl, Judea, xiii, 12, 33, 105, 193, 254, 262–263, 267, 280, 301, 331, 340–342, 390–392, 397, 413, 427–437, 442–443, 449, 453, 480  
 Pearson, Egon S., 748  
 Pearson, Joel, 738  
 Peckhaus, Volker, 82, 85  
 Peebles, David, 32  
 Peels, Rik, 773  
 Peirce, Charles Sanders, 16–17, 231, 270, 385, 500, 607, 715, 717, 736  
 Pelletier, Francis Jeffrey, 13, 347, 350–351  
 Pemberton, John M., 444  
 Peng, Danling, 118  
 Peng, Kaiping, 801, 802  
 Penke, Lars, 35  
 Pennycook, Gordon, 38, 161, 175, 179, 518–519, 520, 522, 780, 793, 797  
 Penta, Antonio, 549  
 Perales, José C., 441  
 Perea, Andrés, xiii, 27, 188, 191, 540, 543, 547–549, 567, 603, 608–609, 626  
 Perelman, Chaim, 363, 374, 665, 780  
 Perkins, David N., 796  
 Perky, Cheves W., 737  
 Perler, Dominik, 75, 82, 85  
 Perloff, Michael, 188, 648  
 Perner, Josef, x, 39, 43, 104, 412  
 Perona, Pietro, 263  
 Perrow, Charles, 152  
 Perry, Conrad, 118  
 Perry, Gavin, 626  
 Perry, John, 605  
 Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 467–468  
 Pessach, Danielle, xii, 108, 150, 248, 278–279, 353, 396  
 Pessoa, Luiz, 703  
 Peter, Fabienne, 581, 596  
 Peters, Ellen, 586, 772  
 Peters, Richard G., 770  
 Peterson, Cameron R., 90, 163, 450  
 Peterson, Martin, x, xiii, 6, 15, 19, 188, 248, 273, 311, 313, 337, 427, 465–466, 475, 477, 479, 485, 492, 495, 497, 536, 570, 602, 611, 629, 665, 690  
 Pettigrew, Nick, 769  
 Pettigrew, Richard, 29, 210, 212–213, 242–244, 362  
 Pettit, Philip, 29, 468, 581, 594, 596–597  
 Petty, Richard E., 795  
 Pfeifer, Niki, xii, 33, 108, 150, 248, 277–282, 286–287, 299, 301, 342, 396, 398–400, 408  
 Pfeiffer, Thomas, 585  
 Phelps, Edmund S., 571  
 Phillips, Ann, 105  
 Phillips, Lawrence D., 450  
 Phillips, Steven, 728  
 Phipps, Michael, 47  
 Piaget, Jean, 4, 7, 13, 17, 24, 88, 90, 104, 106, 705, 782, 787  
 Piazza, Manuela, 731  
 Piccione, Michele, 537  
 Picker, Colin, 665  
 Picton, Terence W., 123

- Pietschnig, Jakob, 35  
 Pigden, Charles R., 77, 85  
 Pighin, Stefania, 444  
 Pigou, Arthur Cecil, 469  
 Pigozzi, Gabriella, 332  
 Pilot, Harald, 44, 758  
 Pinder, Mark, 207, 212  
 Pinel, Philippe, 731  
 Ping Ping Tse, Alice. *See* Tse, Alice Ping Ping  
 Pinker, Steven, 40  
 Pino Pérez, Ramón, 332  
 Pinto, Robert C., 368, 374  
 Pischedda, Doris, 120  
 Pitchford, Melanie, 522  
 Pitt, Mark A., 512  
 Pivato, Marcus, 582, 584  
 Placido, Laetitia, 502  
 Plantin, Christian, 374  
 Plato, 40, 49, 71–73, 82, 176, 592, 602, 684, 737  
 Plaza, Jan, 323  
 Pleskac, Timothy J., 510–511, 512  
 Pochwatko, Grzegorz, 519  
 Pohl, Rüdiger F., 168  
 Polacek, David, 702  
 Polak, Ben, 548, 567  
 Polanyi, Michael, 369  
 Poldrack, Russell A., 702  
 Poletiek, Fenna H., 92, 98  
 Polhill, J. Gareth, 689  
 Politzer, Guy, 13, 225, 228, 234, 286–287, 303, 342, 348, 351, 355, 396, 397, 398–400  
 Polk, Thad A., 228  
 Pollak, Robert A., 571  
 Pollard, Paul, 88  
 Pollock, John L., 392, 675  
 Polonioli, Andrea, 798  
 Pólya, George, 716  
 Pompéia, Sabine, 735  
 Ponse, Alban, 186  
 Pope, Sarah, 769  
 Popper, Karl R., 5–6, 26, 44, 45, 82, 90–91, 156, 187, 248, 290, 495, 620, 633, 639, 652, 747–748, 753, 757, 758  
 Poprawe, Franziska, 135  
 Pörn, Ingmar, 648  
 Porter, Bruce, 187  
 Porter, James N., 35  
 Portmore, Douglas W., 690, 696  
 Postema, Gerald, 665  
 Postlewaite, Andrew, 495, 498  
 Pothos, Emmanuel M., 626  
 Potochnik, Angela, 753  
 Potts, Christopher, 193  
 Potvin, Frédéric, 786  
 Prade, Henri, xii, 6, 12, 20, 193, 248, 263, 306–309, 313–314, 328, 341, 344, 421, 500  
 Pradella-Hallinan, Márcia, 735  
 Prado, Jérôme, 35, 120, 122–123, 731, 739  
 Prager, Johannes, xii, 53, 176, 354, 454, 520, 572, 665, 779  
 Prakken, Henry, xiv, 48, 259, 373, 648, 665, 670–676  
 Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 549  
 Prein, Gerald, 619, 664  
 Premack, David, 190  
 Preston, Jesse, 289  
 Price, George R., 553–555, 564  
 Prichard, Harold A., 135  
 Prinz, Jesse, 702, 704  
 Pritchard, Duncan, 52  
 Proctor, Robert N., 763  
 Proulx, Travis, 769  
 Provan, Gregory, 343  
 Prowse Turner, Jamie A., 38, 179, 518, 520, 522, 780  
 Pucella, Riccardo, 321  
 Puppe, Clemens, 581–582  
 Putnam, Hilary, 9, 52  
 Pylyshyn, Zenon W., 285, 728, 731, 738
- Q**  
 Quelhas, Ana Cristina, 152, 411, 420, 421, 730  
 Quiggin, John, 466, 500, 570  
 Quigley, Anna, 769  
 Quine, Willard Van Orman, 17, 24–25, 52, 330, 383, 387  
 Quinn, Stéphane, 349, 785–786  
 Quinn, Warren S., 463  
 Quisling, Vidkun, 374
- R**  
 Rabin, Matthew, 466, 485, 568  
 Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 135, 478, 479  
 Rader, Aaron W., 175  
 Radvansky, Gabriel A., 288  
 Rafetseder, Eva, 39, 105  
 Rafiee Rad, Soroush, 30, 262, 356, 301  
 Raggi, Daniel, 716  
 Ragni, Marco, xiv, 12, 20, 22, 36, 122, 123, 148, 150, 153, 228, 230, 232, 234, 342–343, 352, 356, 406, 454, 652, 726–731, 739–740  
 Rahwan, Iyad, 48, 49  
 Rai, Tage S., 291  
 Raidl, Eric, x, 212, 341  
 Raiffa, Howard, 15, 33, 52, 468, 593, 629, 792  
 Railton, Peter, 695, 702–703, 705–707  
 Rakoczy, Hannes, 651, 654  
 Ramanujam, Ramaswamy, 188  
 Ramos, Jaime, 805  
 Ramsey, Frank P., 6, 95, 177, 239–241, 279, 286, 296–297, 299, 305–306, 339, 343, 353, 395, 397–399, 407, 462, 465, 469, 474–475, 629–630  
 Randell, David A., 726  
 Ranney, Michael Andrew, 772  
 Rao, Anand S., 189

- Rapoport, Anatol, 627  
 Rapp, Christof, 71, 82  
 Rasch, Björn H., 41  
 Rashdall, Hastings, 689  
 Ratliff, Kate A., 487  
 Raub, Werner, xiv, 6, 44, 468, 535, 594, 608, 611, 615–616, 618–620, 625  
 Raufaste, Eric, 281, 342, 420  
 Rauh, Reinhold, 40, 726–727, 728, 729–731, 740  
 Rawls, John, 49, 82, 469, 626  
 Ray, Debraj, 149  
 Raymond, Vanessa, 118, 120, 122  
 Raz, Joseph, 135, 142–143  
 Real, Leslie A., 636  
 Reason, James T., 1  
 Reber, Arthur S., 94  
 Reber, Rolf, 162  
 Reder, Lynne M., 518–519  
 Reed, Chris A., 361, 362–363, 373–374, 675  
 Reed, Susan, 391  
 Regan, David, 627  
 Rêgo, Leandro C., 190  
 Rehder, Bob, 441, 444  
 Rehg, William, 753  
 Reichenbach, Hans, 82, 107, 267, 274, 452  
 Reid, Thomas, 76–77, 85  
 Reimer, Torsten, 168  
 Reimers, Stian, 259  
 Reiser, Brian J., 218, 220, 738  
 Reiss, Julian, 747  
 Reiter, Raymond, 649  
 Rendsvig, Rasmus K., 192  
 Renkl, Alexander, 737  
 Reny, Philip J., 549–550  
 Rényi, Alfred, 248  
 Renz, Jochen, 727  
 Repovš, Grega, 35  
 Rescher, Nicholas, 341, 370, 374, 665  
 Rescorla, Robert A., 441  
 Restall, Greg, 190  
 Reverberi, Carlo, 36, 120, 123  
 Revlin, Russell, 13, 351  
 Revlis, Russell, 228, 351  
 Ribeiro, Márcio M., 333  
 Ricco, Robert B., 782  
 Richards, Anne, 47  
 Richards, Ted, 762  
 Richardson, Alan, 739  
 Richardson, Henry S., 9  
 Richardson, Juliet, 409  
 Richardson, Robert C., 42  
 Richerson, Peter J., 109, 627  
 Richter, Bruno, 421  
 Ridge, Michael, 53  
 Rieger, Susann, 13, 342, 351, 354  
 Rieke, Richard D., 374  
 Riesterer, Nicolas, 228, 230, 232, 234  
 Riffo, Bernardo, 412  
 Riker, William H., 611  
 Killing, James K., 37  
 Rinard, Susanna, 246  
 Rini, Regina, 586  
 Rips, Lance J., 21–22, 88, 218, 228, 279, 286, 288, 290, 391–392, 406, 637, 738  
 Rist, Robert, 348, 351, 785  
 Ritov, Ilana, 161, 704  
 Ritter, Frank E., 518–519  
 Ritter, Joachim, 51  
 Riveret, Regis, 675  
 Roazzi, Antônio, 220–221  
 Roberts, John, 626  
 Robertson, David A., 414  
 Robins, James M., 432, 437  
 Robinson, John Alan, 20, 187  
 Robinson, Paul H., 665  
 Rock, Irvin, 102  
 Rocke, Alan J., 737  
 Rockenbach, Bettina, 103  
 Rode, Catrin, 637  
 Rödiger, Jürgen, 659  
 Rodríguez, Jorge L., 659  
 Roelofsen, Floris, 189  
 Roese, Neil J., 405  
 Rogers, Todd, 518  
 Roh, Sungjong, 772  
 Rojas, Raúl, 102  
 Rolls, Edmund T., 37  
 Romeijn, Jan-Willem, 277  
 Rooney, Phyllis, 760  
 Rosenbaum, Paul R., 432  
 Rosenkrantz, Roger D., 362  
 Rosenzweig, Emily, 518, 770  
 Ross, Don, 467–468  
 Ross, George R. T., 82  
 Ross, Lee, 166, 802  
 Ross, Robert M., 519  
 Ross, Thomas W., 626  
 Ross, W. David, 630  
 Rotello, Caren M., 88, 290  
 Roth, Abraham Sesshu, 596  
 Roth, Alvin E., 490  
 Rothmund, Tobias, 771  
 Rotolo, Antonino, 665, 675  
 Rott, Hans, xii, 11, 14, 33, 45, 153, 187, 189–190, 256, 282, 287, 308, 323, 330–333, 337–338, 340–342, 350, 356, 391, 470, 501, 586, 608, 676  
 Rottman, Benjamin Margolin, 440–441, 444, 453  
 Rouet, Jean-François, 773  
 Roughgarden, Tim, 188  
 Rouss, Tena S., 13, 351

- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 49  
 Routley, Richard, 321  
 Roy, Olivier, xiv, 543, 608, 648, 651, 665  
 Royzman, Edward B., 706  
 Rozenblit, Leonid, 440, 518  
 Rubbens, Peter, 751  
 Rubin, Donald B., 432  
 Rubinstein, Ariel, 33–34, 537, 567, 572, 614, 616, 618  
 Rückert, Helge, 689  
 Rückert, Joachim, 664  
 Rudner, Richard, 748, 761–762  
 Rudrauf, David, 37, 57  
 Ruff, Christian C., x, 36, 41, 120, 122, 729, 739  
 Romain, Barbara, 218, 220, 228, 235, 348  
 Rumbaugh, James, 718  
 Rumelhart, David E., 46  
 Ruphy, Stéphanie, 760  
 Russell, Bertrand, 76, 215, 370, 645, 715  
 Russell, Jeffrey Sanford, 582  
 Russell, Stuart J., 192  
 Rülßmann, Helmut, 659, 661  
 Russo, Selena, 273, 399  
 Rustichini, Aldo, 321, 501  
 Rusu, Andrei A., 705  
 Rutjens, Bastiaan T., 771  
 Ryle, Gilbert, 52–53, 72, 369, 736
- S**
- Sabater-Grande, Gerardo, 626  
 Sabbadin, Régis, 308  
 Sack, Joshua, 277  
 Sackeim, Harold A., 233  
 Sacks, Ben, 135  
 Sadri, Fariba, 670  
 Sager, Lawrence G., 581  
 Sahlin, Nils-Eric, 501, 503  
 Sakatani, Kaoru, 121, 123  
 Salih, Helmut R., 36  
 Salmerón, Ladislao, 770  
 Samet, Dov, 321  
 Samuels, Mark C., 220  
 Samuels, Richard, 798–799  
 Samuelson, Paul A., 15, 331, 467, 469  
 Sanborn, Adam N., 289, 400, 444  
 Sanders, Gillian, 343  
 Sandholm, William H., 556–559, 562, 564  
 Sanfey, Alan G., 37  
 Sanfilippo, Giuseppe, 277, 279, 282  
 Sanford, Anthony J., 412  
 Santamaría, Carlos, 348, 353, 408, 409, 412, 414  
 Sargent, Thomas J., 502, 509  
 Sarin, Rakesh, 467  
 Sartor, Giovanni, x, 373, 665, 670, 672–676  
 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 648–649  
 Sarwar, Farhan, 373  
 Sato, Yuri, 718, 737  
 Sauer, Hanno, xiv, 49, 422, 702, 704–706  
 Sauerwald, Kai, 342  
 Savage, Leonard J., 19, 140–141, 166, 241, 270, 273, 307, 311, 313, 462, 465, 467, 474–477, 480, 498, 503, 506, 509, 537, 567, 792  
 Savary, Fabien, 89  
 Savulescu, Julian, 702  
 Sawa, Kosuke, 442  
 Saxena, Prem Chandra, 186  
 Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 17  
 Scaife, Mike, 716  
 Scanlon, Thomas M., 135, 587, 629, 690, 693, 697  
 Scha, Remko, 193  
 Schachter, Stanley, 47  
 Schaeken, Walter, x, 177, 296, 300, 302, 348–349, 354, 355, 406, 421, 728, 785  
 Scharrer, Lisa, 770–771  
 Schauer, Frederick, 662, 665  
 Scheffler, Israel, 750  
 Scheffler, Samuel, 690  
 Scheines, Richard, 105, 427–428, 436, 439, 442–443, 449  
 Schellens, Peter Jan, 363–364, 420  
 Schelling, Thomas C., 512  
 Schervish, Mark J., 247, 537  
 Schick, Frederic, 477, 479  
 Schickore, Jutta, 82, 763  
 Schiebinger, Londa, 758  
 Schiffer, Stephen R., 606  
 Schindler, Igor, 118  
 Schlag, Karl H., 557  
 Schlechta, Karl, 333–334  
 Schlick, Moritz, 689  
 Schlieder, Christoph, 40, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 740  
 Schlüter, Caroline, 35  
 Schmeidler, David, 495–496, 498, 500, 502–503  
 Schmid, Hans Bernhard, xiv, 580, 594, 597, 608, 615  
 Schmidt, Klaus M., 568, 616  
 Schmidt, Marco F. H., 654  
 Schmidt, Thomas, 689  
 Schmidt, Ulrich, 488  
 Schmidt-Petri, Christoph, 305  
 Schmitt, Frederick, 579  
 Schmittberger, Rolf, 28  
 Schneider, Walter, 180, 793  
 Schnotz, Wolfgang, 737  
 Schockaert, Steven, 309  
 Schoenfield, Miriam, 244–245  
 Scholten, Marc, 166  
 Schooler, Lael J., 164, 167–168, 508, 512  
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 48, 689  
 Schreier, Margrit, 362–363  
 Schrittwieser, Julian, 507  
 Schroeder, Mark, x, 17, 142, 689, 695  
 Schroyens, Walter J., 296, 300, 406

- Schul, Yaacov, 167, 179–180, 414  
 Schuldt, Jonathon P., 772  
 Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Michael, 490  
 Schultheis, Holger, 729–731, 741  
 Schultze, Thomas, 30  
 Schulz, Armin W., x, 104  
 Schulz, Jonathan, 49  
 Schulz, Katrin, 193, 391  
 Schulz, Laura E., 421, 422, 441, 443  
 Schulze, Ralf, 40  
 Schulz-Hardt, Stefan, 30  
 Schum, David A., 363  
 Schumm, George F., 463  
 Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, 595  
 Schupbach, Jonah N., 290  
 Schurz, Gerhard, xi, 5, 24–25, 27, 44, 77, 101–102, 104–105, 107–110, 280, 511, 523, 654  
 Schurz, Matthias, 412  
 Schübler, Rudolf, 689  
 Schuster, Peter, 555, 561  
 Schwartz, Barry, 802  
 Schwartz, Lisa M., 167, 803  
 Schwarz, Baruch B., 364  
 Schwarz, Norbert, 772  
 Schwarze, Bernd, 28  
 Schweikard, David P., 597  
 Schweitzer, Stephan, 689  
 Schwitalla, Maria, 39, 105  
 Scopelliti, Irene, 803–804  
 Scott, Robert, 82  
 Scozzafava, Romano, 278–279, 282, 286–287  
 Scribner, S., 782  
 Scriven, Michael J., 371  
 Seabright, Paul, 627  
 Searle, John R., 9–10, 601, 605, 628, 651, 653  
 Sędek, Grzegorz, 122  
 Sedgewick, Robert, 34  
 Sedlmeier, Peter, 162  
 Sefton, Martin, 626  
 Segerberg, Krister, 332  
 Segev, Ella, 321  
 Seidenfeld, Teddy, 247, 498, 503, 537  
 Seligman, Jeremy, 192  
 Sells, Saul B., 13, 87–88, 228  
 Selten, Reinhard, 6, 106, 148, 508, 529, 533–535, 539–540, 547, 549, 573, 625, 728  
 Sen, Amartya K., 28, 331, 464, 467–468, 592, 595, 627  
 Seo, Kyoungwon, 503  
 Sepielli, Andrew, 695  
 Sergot, Marek J., 648, 670  
 Serrano, Francisca, 739  
 Šešelja, Dunja, 759  
 Sethi, Rajiv, 627  
 Setiya, Kieran, 76–77, 139, 142  
 Seyranian, Viviane, 770  
 Shackel, Nicholas, 702  
 Shackle, George L. S., 307, 341, 500  
 Shafer, Glenn, 52, 305–306, 310–312, 314, 341  
 Shafer-Landau, Russ, 705  
 Shaffern, Robert W., 661  
 Shah, Anuj K., 511  
 Shallice, Tim, 36, 120, 123  
 Shamosh, Noah A., 118  
 Shams, Zohreh, 718  
 Shanks, David R., 522  
 Shannon, Claude E., 288  
 Shapere, Dudley, 748, 750  
 Shapiro, Ian, 619–620  
 Shapley, Lloyd S., 312  
 Shariff, Azim, 49, 53  
 Sharp, Frank Chapman, 689  
 Shaver, Phillip, 784  
 Shaw, Daron, 771  
 Shayer, Michael, 780  
 Sheesley, Laura, 36, 121, 122  
 Shenoy, Prakash P., 344  
 Sherman, Jeffrey W., 793  
 Sherman, Steven J., 519  
 Shi, Jing, 772  
 Shiffrin, Richard M., 180  
 Shimojima, Atsushi, 717  
 Shimony, Abner, 242  
 Shin, Sun-Joo, 715, 717–718, 736  
 Shleifer, Andrei, 574  
 Shoenfield, Joseph R., 33  
 Shoham, Yoav, 188  
 Shpitser, Ilya, 431–432, 434  
 Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S., 758  
 Shtulman, Andrew, 769  
 Shuren, Jeffrey, 36, 121  
 Shwartz, Steven P., 740  
 Shweder, Richard A., 160  
 Shynkaruk, Jody M., 522  
 Sibley, William M., 82, 85  
 Sidgwick, Henry, 684  
 Siegel, Harvey, 374  
 Siegrist, Michael, 772  
 Siemann, Martina, 102  
 Sigmund, Karl, 555, 561–562  
 Silman, Tim, 769  
 Silver, David, 161, 507, 705  
 Sima'an, Khalil, 193  
 Simmons, W. Kyle, 414  
 Simon, Dan, 491  
 Simon, Herbert A., 6–7, 15, 21, 31, 89, 92, 159, 164, 440, 490, 505–511, 513, 520, 523, 573, 716, 728  
 Simoneau, Michael, 786  
 Şimşek, Özgür, 512  
 Sinatra, Gale M., 770  
 Singer, Daniel J., 77

- Singer, Jerome, 47  
 Singer, Peter, 626  
 Singmann, Henrik, 177, 273, 287, 299–301, 343, 396, 399–400  
 Siniscalchi, Marciano, 496, 543, 549  
 Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 707  
 Sklarek, Benjamin, 37  
 Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels, xii, 12, 14, 20, 45, 187, 193, 273–274, 299–300, 307, 313, 323, 328, 341, 343, 350, 356, 400, 454, 586, 608, 676  
 Skrap, Miran, 36, 120, 123  
 Skyrms, Brian, 43, 103, 191, 241, 244–245, 427, 604  
 Sloman, Steven A., 93, 95–96, 106, 162, 167, 279, 287, 298, 299, 302, 392, 396, 400, 401, 405–406, 413, 421, 441–444, 453, 518, 781  
 Slotta, James D., 769  
 Sloutsky, Vladimir M., 36, 122, 175, 729, 739  
 Slovic, Paul, 90, 92, 159–160, 162, 246, 450, 462, 509, 519, 570, 586, 625, 636, 772  
 Smaill, Alan, 720  
 Smedslund, Jan, 91, 99  
 Smetana, Judith G., 704  
 Smets, Philippe, 312–313  
 Smets, Sonja, 187, 189, 192, 322–323, 549, 586  
 Smith, Adam, 465, 620  
 Smith, Cedric A. B., 312  
 Smith, Courtland L., 35  
 Smith, Eliot R., 162  
 Smith, Kathleen W., 118, 120  
 Smith, Kenny, 103  
 Smith, Michael, xiv, 48, 344, 690, 699  
 Smith, Michael J., 558  
 Smith, Michael R., 129  
 Smith, Richard, 752  
 Smith, Vernon L., 513, 639–640  
 Smolka, Scott A., 186  
 Snijders, Tom A. B., 611, 619, 620  
 Snoeck Henkemans, A. Francisca, 372, 665  
 Snow, John, 152  
 Snow, Paul, 308  
 Sobel, David M., 384, 388, 441, 443  
 Sober, Elliott, 45, 102–104, 110  
 Socrates, 72, 76  
 Solan, Eilon, 53, 529, 532, 535, 539, 689  
 Solecki, Slawomir, 188  
 Soll, Jack B., 167  
 Söllner, Anke, 168  
 Solomon, Miriam, 751  
 Somanathan, Eswaran, 627  
 Sommerville, R. Brian, 49, 702, 703, 705  
 Son, Ji Yun, 666  
 Song, Grace, 445  
 Song, Jie, 653  
 Sorensen, Roy, 592  
 Šorm, Ester, 363, 364, 420  
 Soskova, Jitka, 220  
 Sozou, Peter D., 469  
 Spanoudis, George, 780  
 Speekenbrink, Maarten, 443  
 Speer, Andreas, 71, 82, 85  
 Spelke, Elizabeth S., 105  
 Spellman, Barbara A., 665  
 Sperber, Dan, 29, 35, 42, 83, 93, 147, 174–176, 180, 273, 286, 290, 292, 361, 367, 637–638, 770, 773  
 Sperry, Roger, 117  
 Spiekermann, Kai, xiv, 29–30, 53, 192, 583–586, 594, 596, 750  
 Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 511  
 Spirtes, Peter, 105, 427–428, 436, 439, 442–443, 449  
 Spohn, Wolfgang, ix–x, xiii, 1–2, 4, 6, 8–10, 12–18, 20, 22, 24–28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44–46, 48, 50, 52–53, 82, 129, 150, 187, 193, 202, 212, 254, 262, 274, 282, 307, 313, 323, 328, 337, 340–343, 350, 356, 369, 374, 436, 439, 441, 449, 454, 540–541, 543, 547–548, 586, 608, 620, 630, 676, 690, 722, 757, 772  
 Spotorno, Nicola, 35, 62  
 Spreer, Joachim, 36  
 Sprenger, Charles, 469  
 Sprenger, Jan, 256, 260, 261, 262–263, 747  
 Srinivasan, Amia, 212  
 Stadler, Marc, 770–771, 773  
 Staffel, Julia, xii, 14, 17, 19, 193, 247, 256, 274, 278, 287, 306, 344, 473, 475, 529, 582, 630, 747  
 Stahl, Christoph, 175  
 Stalnaker, Robert C., 20, 292, 296–297, 321, 381, 385–387, 389, 391–392, 397, 405, 410, 427  
 Stankov, Lazar, 519  
 Stanovich, Keith E., xiv, 34, 38, 91–94, 124, 173–176, 179–181, 235, 290, 354, 519–521, 654, 702–703, 772–773, 781, 792–799  
 Stapleton, Gem, 716, 717–718, 720  
 Starmer, Chris, 488, 574  
 Starr, William B., xiii, 33, 262, 287, 308, 327, 339, 384, 386, 388–389, 391–392, 428, 501, 665, 676  
 Stasser, Garold, 30, 586  
 Steedman, Mark J., 88, 228–229, 235  
 Steel, Daniel, 271, 274, 761  
 Steel, Richard, 522  
 Steele, Katie, 497–498, 500  
 Stefánsson, H. Orri, 241, 248, 466, 537  
 Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn, 144  
 Stein, Edward, 83, 513, 798  
 Steinberger, Florian, xii, 18, 33, 207–209, 212, 228, 239, 241, 277, 328, 338, 382  
 Steingold, Eugenia, 148  
 Steinhoff, Uwe, 609  
 Steinle, Friedrich, 82, 763  
 Steinmann, Derick O., 163  
 Steinmann, Florian, 162  
 Stemmer, Peter, 690  
 Stenger, V. Andrew, 37  
 Stenning, Keith, x, 20, 193, 226, 290, 720, 722, 737

- Stephan, Simon, 443–444, 446, 452  
 Stephens, David W., 636–637  
 Stephens, Rachel G., 290  
 Sterelny, Kim, 104  
 Stern, Rafael, 537  
 Sternberg, Robert J., x, 228  
 Stevenson, Charles L., 76  
 Stevenson, Rosemary J., 348, 350, 361  
 Steverink, Nardi, 617  
 Stewart, Andrew J., 420, 422  
 Stewart, Neil, 289  
 Stewart, Thomas R., 163  
 Steyvers, Mark, 443  
 Stich, Stephen P., 71, 104, 523, 798–799  
 Stigler, George J., 509, 616  
 Stigler, Stephen M., 6  
 Stockdill, Aaron, 716  
 Stöckle-Schobel, Richard, 279  
 Stojnić, Una, 388  
 Stokhof, Martin, 388  
 Stollstorff, Melanie, 119, 122  
 Störriing, Gustav W., 2, 4, 225–226, 233–234  
 Stott, Henry P., 488  
 Stoutland, Frederick, 690  
 Strack, Fritz, 161, 167  
 Straßer (Strasser), Christian, 280, 759  
 Strasser, Jeremy, 248  
 Strawson, Peter F., 606  
 Strevens, Michael, 585  
 Striker, Gisela, 72, 82, 84  
 Strotz, Robert H., 427, 469  
 Stroud, Barry, 75–77  
 Stroud, Sarah, 690  
 Strube, Gerhard, 40, 726, 727, 728–730, 740  
 Stupple, Edward J. N., 522  
 Sturgis, Patrick, 772  
 Sturm, Thomas, xi, 2, 4, 9, 45, 48, 79–80, 82–83, 96, 159, 772  
 Stuss, Donald T., 37, 123  
 Styles, Elizabeth A., 178  
 Subrahmanian, Venkatraman Siva, 332  
 Sugden, Robert, 462, 488, 535, 538–839, 594  
 Sugeno, Michio, 306  
 Sugimoto, Yutaro, 737, 752–753  
 Suldovsky, Brianne, 773  
 Sulloway, Frank J., 512  
 Sunstein, Cass R., 510, 512, 584, 586, 702, 803  
 Suppes, Patrick, 259, 462, 477  
 Surowiecki, James, 30, 803  
 Süß, Heinz-Martin, 40  
 Sutton, Richard S., 703  
 Sutton, Robbie M., 771  
 Suzumura, Kotaro, 595  
 Swedberg, Richard, 620  
 Sweers, Marieke, 34  
 Sweklej, Joanna, 519  
 Swets, John A., 167  
 Sylvan, Kurt, 135  
 Sylvester, Steven M., 772  
 Symborski, Carl W., 803–804  
 Sztencel, Magdalena, 653, 655  
 Szymanik, Jakub, x, 190
- T**
- Tabak, Iris, 773  
 Tabourazi, Dimitra, 772  
 Tafer, Zoheir, 49  
 Tagart, Joanna, 295–298  
 Talbott, William, 193, 243  
 Talmy, Leonard, 444  
 Tammelo, Ilmar, 659  
 Tamminga, Allard, 648  
 Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu, 547–548  
 Tanaka, Koji, 333  
 Tannery, Paul, 82  
 Tardos, Eva, 188  
 Tarski, Alfred, 371, 382, 523  
 Tasso, Alessandra, 411–412  
 Taylor, Charles, 626  
 Taylor, John, 717–718  
 Taylor, Peter D., 555–556, 562  
 Taylor, Shelley E., 109, 520  
 Téglás, Ernő, 151  
 Tenbrink, Thora, 727  
 Tenenbaum, Joshua B., 32, 151, 289, 292, 421, 422, 441–444, 451, 705  
 Teng, Choh Man, 308, 310  
 Tentori, Katya, 14, 270–271, 273–274, 399, 444  
 Teodorescu, Kinneret, 523  
 Tertullian, 3  
 Tessler, Michael H., 230  
 Testa, Rafael R., 333  
 Tetens, Johann Nikolaus, 79  
 Tetlock, Philip E., 574, 801, 803, 805  
 Thaler, Richard H., 15, 510, 512, 571, 620, 803  
 Thébault, Karim, 259  
 Theiner, Georg, 29  
 Therriault, Nicole H., 38  
 Thielscher, Michael, 342  
 Thomas, Nigel J. T., 737  
 Thomason, Richmond H., 386, 648  
 Thomm, Eva, 770, 772  
 Thompson, Bill, 103  
 Thompson, Erik P., 167  
 Thompson, Paul M., 35  
 Thompson, Russell, 795  
 Thompson, Simon, 718  
 Thompson, Valerie A., xiii, 38, 47, 161, 173–174, 177, 179, 287, 299, 302, 349, 399, 408, 411–412, 420–421, 517–520, 522–523, 653–655, 780, 785–786  
 Thompson, William L., 122, 739

- Thorn, Paul D., 107–108  
 Thorndike, Edward L., 107  
 Thorstad, Robert, 445  
 Tian, Jin, 432, 435  
 Tierney, Michael, 121, 122  
 Tilley, John, 592–593  
 Timmermann, Jens, 82  
 Timmers, Rian, 363, 420  
 Tindale, Christopher W., 374  
 Tindale, R. Scott, 30, 364  
 Tirole, Jean, 529, 532, 534, 537, 567–568, 614, 689  
 Titchener, Edward B., 738  
 Titelbaum, Michael G., 246, 257  
 Titus, William, 30, 586  
 Todd, Anita, 454  
 Todd, Peter M., 83, 93, 106–107, 159, 163, 164–166, 168, 175, 508, 510, 521, 798  
 Toga, Arthur W., 35  
 Tomasello, Michael, 28, 43, 103, 105–106, 110, 651, 654  
 Tooby, John, xiv, 27, 42, 92–93, 103–104, 106, 108, 422, 510, 573, 636–641, 652, 772, 783, 798  
 Topitsch, Ernst, 103, 105  
 Toplak, Maggie E., xiv, 34, 38, 94, 179, 519, 792–793, 794–795  
 Topolinski, Sascha, 519  
 Torgovitsky, Ilan, 521  
 Toulmin, Stephen E., 367, 369–371, 374, 670–671, 675, 748  
 Townley, Barbara, 592  
 Townsend, James T., 491  
 Tracey, Irene, 702  
 Trafton, J. Gregory, 232, 234  
 Tranel, Daniel, 37, 57  
 Trapp, Rainer Werner, 690  
 Trautmann, Stefan T., 489  
 Trémolière, Bastien, 47  
 Trimmer, Pete C., 510  
 Trinkaus, Erik, 35  
 Trippas, Dries, 88, 175, 178, 179, 180  
 Trivers, Robert L., 42, 639  
 Trope, Yaacov, 162, 167, 793  
 Trouche, Emmanuel, 29, 364  
 Truszczyński, Mirosław, 333  
 Tsakas, Elias, 549  
 Tse, Alice Ping Ping, 20, 343, 356, 739  
 Tsujii, Takeo, 121, 123  
 Tulkki, Leena, 278–281, 400, 408  
 Tullock, Gordon, 611  
 Tulving, Endel, 39  
 Tuomela, Raimo, x, 627  
 Turiel, Elliot, 704–705  
 Turing, Alan M., 31, 186–188, 270, 381, 729  
 Turner, Benjamin O., 123  
 Tutić, Andreas, 615  
 Tversky, Amos, 6–7, 24, 90–93, 106, 118, 154, 159–162, 165–168, 176, 178, 281, 399, 449–450, 482, 485–491, 501–502, 509–510, 570, 572, 574, 616, 620, 625, 633, 636, 781, 792, 798, 802  
 Twyman-Musgrove, Joanna, 653  
 Tye, Michael, 737
- U**  
 Udehn, Lars, 595, 611, 615, 620  
 Udell, Wadiya, 781  
 Ueda, Kazuhiro, 737  
 Undorf, Monika, 521  
 Ungar, Lyle H., 805  
 Ungerleider, Leslie G., 23  
 Unkelbach, Christian, 38, 490  
 Urbach, Peter, 91, 257, 289, 399–400  
 Urbas, Matej, 718, 720  
 Urrutia, Mabel, 412  
 Usher, Marius, 491
- V**  
 Väänänen, Jouko, 190  
 Vachon, Robert, 785–786  
 Vadeboncoeur, Isabelle, 349–350  
 Vaihinger, Hans, 80, 85  
 Valentini, Chiara, 665  
 Vallentyne, Peter, 479, 482  
 Vallesi, Antonino, 123  
 Valtorta, Marco, 431  
 Van Assen, Marcel A. L. M., 620  
 Van Belle, William, 421  
 van Benthem, Johan, xii, 187–191, 193, 322–323, 374, 586, 648  
 van Deemter, Kees, 320  
 Vandekerckhove, Marie, 412  
 van de Kuilen, Gijs, 489  
 van den Herik, H. Jaap (Jacob), 670, 671  
 Van Den Hout, Marcel, 47  
 van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste, 35, 361, 728, 731  
 van der Hoek, Wiebe, 188, 191, 321–323  
 van der Linden, Sander L., 771, 773  
 van der Torre, Leendert (Leon), 649  
 Vanderveken, Daniel, 605  
 VanderWeele, Tyler, 432  
 Vandierendonck, André, 40  
 van Ditmarsch, Hans, xii, 11, 33, 188, 212, 323, 239, 309, 322–323, 337, 344, 608  
 van Eck, Jacobus A., 648  
 van Eemeren, Frans H., 362–364, 372, 374, 665  
 van Eijck, Jan, 322  
 van Fraassen, Bas C., 39, 243–245, 292, 649  
 van Harmelen, Frank, 187  
 van Harreveld, Frenk, 771  
 Van Hoeck, Nicole, 412  
 van Inwagen, Peter, 385  
 van Lambalgen, Michiel, 20, 192–193  
 Van Lange, Paul A. M., 487  
 Van Leijenhorst, Linda, 729

- Van Overwalle, Frank, 412  
 van Rooij, Iris, 34  
 van Rooij, Robert, 193  
 Vantaggi, Barbara, 282  
 van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Janneke, 300, 400  
 Vardi, Moshe Y., 188, 190, 320, 540  
 Varoufakis, Yanis, 626  
 Vartanian, Oshin, 121, 122, 123  
 Vartiainen, Hannu, 625  
 Vasilyeva, Nadya, 289  
 Vaughn, Lewis, 689  
 Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 573  
 Veltman, Frank, 381, 388  
 Veness, Joel, 705  
 Venet, Michèle, 785, 786  
 Venn, John, 715, 717, 736  
 Verbeek, Bruno, 537  
 Verbrugge, Lois M., 617  
 Verbrugge, Rineke, 190–191, 286, 292, 297, 320, 322  
 Verbrugge, Sara, 421  
 Verde, Michael F., 88  
 Verheij, Bart, 373, 665, 670–671  
 Verma, Thomas, 430  
 Verschueren, Niki, 177, 302, 354  
 Vianello, Michelangelo, 487  
 Vineberg, Susan, 241  
 Visschers, Vivianne H. M., 772  
 Vlerick, Michael, 769  
 Voelkle, Manuel C., 35, 56  
 Vogel, Peter, 739  
 von Bülow, Christopher, x  
 von Fintel, Kai, 386, 388, 391  
 von Hayek, Friedrich A., 322, 618, 620  
 von Kutschera, Franz, 604–605  
 von Neumann, John, 15, 464–465, 467, 474–477, 482, 485, 536–537, 540, 543, 553, 558, 566, 629–630, 792  
 von Savigny, Eike, 606  
 von Sydow, Momme, 259  
 von Wright, Georg Henrik, 3, 461, 470, 645, 659, 689  
 Voorhoeve, Alex, 463  
 Voracek, Martin, 35  
 Vosgerau, Gottfried, x  
 Voss, Andreas, 519  
 Voss, Thomas, x, 611, 615, 619, 620  
 Vriend, Nicolaas J., 509  
 Vul, Edward, 151, 289  
 Vygotsky, Lev, 17
- W**  
 Waechter, Randall L., 120, 122  
 Wagemans, Jean H. M., 665  
 Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan, 443  
 Wager, Tor D., 37  
 Wagner, Allan R., 441  
 Wagner, Carl, 582  
 Wagner, Heinz, 659  
 Wakker, Peter P., x, 467, 488–489, 498, 502  
 Wald, Abraham, 308  
 Waldmann, Michael R., ix, xiii, 49, 135, 413, 439–446, 449, 450, 451, 453, 454, 702, 704  
 Wall, Sally N., 783  
 Wallace, David, 244  
 Wallace, R. Jay, 135, 629  
 Walley, Peter, 312–313, 496–497  
 Wallgrün, Jan Oliver, 727  
 Walsh, Clare R., 351, 355, 405  
 Walsh, Vincent, 123  
 Walton, Douglas N., 361–364, 370–371, 373–374, 665, 672, 675  
 Wang, Hao, 186  
 Wang, Yanan, 364  
 Wang, Yanjing, 321  
 Wáng, Yì N., 323  
 Wansing, Heinrich, 280  
 Ward, Gregory, 605  
 Ware, Mark, 752  
 Wareham, Todd, 34  
 Warfield, Ted A., 248  
 Warmbröd, Ken, 385–386  
 Warneken, Felix, 651, 654  
 Warner, Richard, 665  
 Warren, Mark E., 584  
 Warren, Paul A., 166  
 Wartenberg, Thomas E., 79, 85  
 Wason, Peter C., 5–6, 87–92, 106–108, 149, 153, 167, 174, 220–221, 229, 278, 290, 637, 639, 652, 783, 802–803  
 Wasserman, Larry, 503  
 Wassermann, Renata, 333  
 Watanabe, Shigeru, 121, 123, 212  
 Waters, Everett, 783  
 Watson, John B., 738  
 Watts, Paul, 399  
 Weaver, Warren, 288  
 Webber, Lara, 730  
 Weber, Elke U., 489  
 Weber, Martin, 495, 637  
 Weber, Max, 9, 44, 135, 595, 602, 608, 618, 757  
 Wedell, Florian, 36, 123, 739, 758  
 Wedgwood, Ralph, xii, 130, 144, 159, 331, 344, 499, 608  
 Wegwarth, Odette, 167  
 Weibull, Jörgen W., 43, 103, 555  
 Weidenfeld, Andrea, 299, 354, 400  
 Weinberger, Ota, 659  
 Weinstein, Jonathan, 498  
 Weinstock, Michael, 364  
 Weintraub, E. Roy, 529  
 Weirich, Paul, x, 427, 593  
 Weisberg, Deena Skolnik, 105  
 Weisberg, Jonathan, 52  
 Weisberg, Michael, 585, 751  
 Weiss, Arne, 586

- Welch, Ivo, 192  
 Weller, Joshua, 805  
 Welzel, Hans, 663  
 Wenczel, Flora, 729  
 Wendelborn, Christian, 689  
 Wendelken, Carter, 119, 122, 729  
 Wenegrat, Brant, 103, 105, 109  
 Wenmackers, Sylvia, 299  
 Wenzel, Christian H., 49, 82  
 Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 547–548  
 Wertheim, Julia, 729  
 Wessels, Ulla, xiv, 9, 17, 48, 133, 593, 625, 689–690, 707  
 West, Douglas C., 166  
 West, Richard F., xiv, 34, 38, 94, 179, 519, 654, 792, 794–795, 798  
 Weston, Nicola J., 522  
 Westphal, Matthias, 727  
 Wetherick, Norman E., 91, 228  
 Wharton, Charles M., 118  
 Wheeler, Gregory, x, 277, 512–513  
 Whinston, Michael Dennis, 463, 464, 467  
 Whitcomb, Dennis, 579  
 White, Michael V., 470  
 White, Peter A., 444–445  
 White, Roger, 244, 246  
 Whitehead, Alfred North, 370, 645  
 Whitt, Laurie Ann, 759  
 Wice, Matthew, 655  
 Wicherts, Jelte M., 35  
 Wiech, Katja, 702  
 Wiegmann, Alexander, xiv, 49, 422, 702, 704  
 Wilde, Oscar, 147, 156  
 Wilhelm, Oliver, 40, 95, 279, 286, 298–299, 302, 396, 400  
 Wilholt, Torsten, 762, 770  
 Wilkins, Minna Cheves, 13, 87–88, 120, 175  
 Wilkinson, Meredith R., 421, 654–655  
 Willaschek, Marcus, 78, 83  
 Willer, Malte, 386, 388  
 Williams, Bernard A. O., 74–75, 649, 695  
 Williams, E. Belvin, 233  
 Williams, Peter M., 312  
 Williamson, Jon, 248, 277  
 Williamson, Timothy, 16, 52, 132, 213, 243, 413  
 Williamson, Timothy Luke, 248  
 Wilson, Brad, 585  
 Wilson, Christine D., 414  
 Wilson, David Sloan, 103–104, 110  
 Wilson, Deirdre, 29, 273, 286, 290, 605, 770  
 Wilson, L. A., II, 592  
 Wilson, Robert, 547, 549, 626  
 Wilson, Timothy D., 161, 166  
 Wilson, William H., 728  
 Wimmer, Heinz, 43, 104  
 Winman, Anders, 343  
 Winsberg, Eric, 259  
 Winsler, Adam, 780  
 Winters, Barbara, 76, 86  
 Wippler, Reinhard, 611–612  
 Witte, Erich H., 29–30  
 Wittek, Rafael, 611, 619–620  
 Witteveen, Cees, 191  
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 216, 605, 715, 736  
 Wittlin, Maggie, 586, 772  
 Wittmann, Werner W., 40  
 Witzki, Alexander H., 37  
 Wohlrapp, Harald R., 374  
 Woike, Jan K., 512  
 Wojtowicz, Zachary, 290  
 Wold, Herman O. A., 427  
 Wolf, Aaron, 77  
 Wolf, Ann G., 13, 32, 342, 351, 354–355  
 Wolfers, Justin, 585  
 Wolff, Christian, 78–79, 661  
 Wolff, Phillip, 445–446  
 Wölfl, Stefan, 727  
 Woloshin, Steven, 167, 803  
 Wolpert, Lewis, 769  
 Wolter, Diedrich, 727  
 Wolters, Gereon, 748  
 Wong, Jared, 442  
 Wood, Jeffrey S., 420  
 Woodruff, Guy, 190  
 Woods, John, xiii, 29, 42, 188, 190, 215, 259, 362, 367–371, 373–374, 586, 605–606, 665, 676, 690  
 Woodward, Amanda L., 105  
 Woodward, James, 105, 427, 452, 706–707  
 Woodworth, Robert S., 13, 87–88, 228  
 Wooldridge, Michael, 187–188  
 Woolgar, Alexandra, 795  
 Wootton, David, 73  
 Wranke, Christina, 47  
 Wray, Helen, 420  
 Wray, K. Brad, 750  
 Wright, Cory, 753  
 Wright, Helen, 654  
 Wright, Wilbur, 152  
 Wróbel, Andrzej, 122  
 Wróblewski, Jerzy, 662  
 Wulff, Dirk U., 490  
 Wunderlich, Klaus, 703  
 Wundt, Wilhelm M., 2, 4, 81, 86  
 Wylie, Alison, 751  
 Wyner, Adam Z., 374, 673
- X**  
 Xu, Duo, 118  
 Xu, Ming, 188, 648  
 Xu, Shiyong, 118  
 Xue, Yunqi, 192

## Y

Yama, Hiroshi, 364  
Yamada, Tomoyuki, 189  
Yamamoto, Teppei, 436  
Yang, Yingrui, 220  
Yardley, Iain, 147  
Yarkoni, Tal, 35  
Yates, J. Frank, 802  
Yerushalmy, Michal, 736  
Yet, Barbaros, 259  
Yom-Tov, Elad, 521  
Yoon, Haewon, 803–804  
Young, Liane, 702–703  
Yuille, Alan L., 441, 451

## Z

Zabell, Sandy L., 245, 256  
Zadeh, Lotfi A., 307, 341  
Zahn, Theodore P., 47  
Zajonc, Robert B., 468  
Zalmanov, Hagar, 518  
Zalta, Edward N., 38  
Zamir, Shmuel, 53, 529, 532, 535, 539, 545, 689  
Zavala, Julia, 364, 781  
Zeiler, Michael, 35  
Zeller, Eduard, 80–81, 86  
Zenker, Frank, 362–363, 373  
Zhang, Guo, 752–753  
Zhang, Shaobo, 512  
Zhao, Jiaying, 14, 287–288, 401  
Zhu, David H., 30  
Zidek, James V., 582  
Ziegler, Rolf, 614  
Zillmer, Nicole, 781  
Zimmermann, Kai, 726  
Zippelius, Reinhold, 665  
Zitzewitz, Eric, 585  
Zollman, Kevin J. S., x, 80, 585, 751  
Zuber, Niina, xiv, 49, 135, 615, 630  
Zultan, Ro'l, 413  
Zupanek, Natasha, 162  
Zurif, Edgar B., 123  
Zvesper, Jonathan Alexander, 549  
Zwaan, Rolf A., 414  
Zwicky, Arnold M., 219  
Zynda, Lyle, 241, 247



## Subject Index

*Italic* page numbers refer to definitions or explanations.

### A

- Abduction, 104, 112, 153–155, 279, 368, 429
- Abstract reasoning, 782, 786
- Accepted belief, 307, 320, 321
- Accuracy argument (in favor of probabilities), 19, 241–242
- Accuracy–effort trade-off, 511
- Act/Action, 7–8, 14, 427–428
- communicative, 601, 603, 606–608
  - illocutionary, 605, 606
  - instrumental, 601
  - joint, 28
  - performance vs. product of, 604
  - perlocutionary, 606
  - reasons for (*see* Reasons for action)
  - theory, 367, 627, 630 (*see also* Decision theory)
  - type vs. token of, 604
  - understanding of, 427–428, 602, 603
- Adams' thesis, 389
- Adaptation, 635, 636–638, 640
- Adaptationism, 42, 633, 635
- Adaptive function, 162, 633, 635, 637, 640
- Adaptive toolbox, 164, 489, 491, 510
- Admissible set, 432, 671
- Adolescent, 785, 786
- Affirming the consequent (AC), 72, 296, 343, 348, 349, 406
- Agent/Agency, 648
- group, 29, 579, 594, 596–597
- Agent-based modeling, 639, 641
- Aggregation
- of degrees of belief, 582
  - of evaluations, 582
  - of judgments, 581, 594–595
  - of preferences, 582, 595–596
- AGM (Alchourrón–Gärdenfors–Makinson) belief revision theory, 327, 329–331, 340–342
- Akrasia, 72, 134
- Algorithm, 186, 190
- Darwinian, 635, 652
  - informal, 154–155
- Algorithmic level of explanation, 9, 12, 15, 31, 407 (*see also* Process-oriented rationality)
- Algorithmic mind, 407, 794
- Allais paradox, 480–481, 570
- Alternative condition, 348, 349–351, 354 (*see also* Disabler/Disabling conditions)
- Alternative norm, 91
- Alternatives to reality, 405
- Altruism, 633, 640, 683–684, 689. *See also* Egoism
- reciprocal, 42, 103–104, 639–640
- Ambiguity, 489, 495
- aversion, 495, 637
- Analogue simulation, 259
- Analogy, 664, 669
- Analytic philosophy, 4, 50
- Analytic–synthetic distinction, 76
- Anchoring, 161, 167, 805
- Announcement, public (in epistemic logic), 323
- Antecedent, 281, 295. *See also* Denying the antecedent
- zero-probability, 278, 279, 281
- Anti-psychologism, 4, 81
- Anti-rationalism (concerning moral reasons), 693, 695–696
- Anti-science, 767–768, 771–773
- Applied game theory, 535–541, 638, 639–641, 675–676
- Appraisal vs. evaluation, 210
- A priori–a posteriori distinction, 75, 78, 79
- Arbitration problem, 26
- Argument, 277–282, 367–368, 371, 372, 420, 670
- from authority, 770
  - Dutch book, 151, 240–241, 278, 399
  - evidential, 265–274
  - experimental study of, 363–364
  - No-Alternatives Argument, 260–261
  - No-Reason-For Argument, 261–272
  - pragmatic, 477–479
  - probabilistically noninformative, 278, 279–281
  - scheme, 670, 672, 673, 675
  - validity of, 278, 280–281, 361, 362, 363, 671
- Argumentation, 42, 93, 265–274, 282, 290–292, 361–364
- Bayesian, 259, 265–274, 290–292, 362–364
  - defeasible, 361
  - development of, 780, 781
  - epistemic theory of, 362–363

- Argumentation (cont.)  
 legal, 48, 373, 659, 661–666, 669–676  
 norm, 362  
 procedural theory of, 362  
 psychology of, 361–364, 637, 638  
 scheme, 363, 373–374, 672, 673, 675  
 sophisticated, 72  
 Argumentative theory of reasoning, 29, 637, 638  
 Aristotle's Theses, 280  
 Artificial intelligence, 6, 12, 20, 187, 373, 439. *See also*  
 Machine learning  
 explainable, 47  
 and law, 670  
 symbolic, 46  
 As-if model, 485, 490, 491, 618–619  
 ASPIC+, 672, 673  
 Associative strength, 349  
 Attention, 489, 491  
 limited (in behavioral economics), 570  
 perfect attention and rationality, 568  
 Attitude, 23, 771–772  
 epistemic, 7, 11  
 higher-order, 38–39  
 Attribution  
 causal, 443, 452  
 attribution error, 804–805  
 Authority, epistemic, 769–771  
 Autoepistemology, 38–39  
 Automated reasoning, 155  
 Automatic process, 174, 180  
 Autonomy, 686  
 of normative theorizing, 25  
 Availability heuristic, 160, 161  
 Awareness, 321
- B**
- Back-door criterion, 431  
 Background knowledge, 333, 349–351, 767–768  
 Backward induction, 479, 534–535, 538, 549, 639  
 Baconian probability, 307, 341  
 Base rate, 802  
 base rate neglect, 273, 343, 636  
 base rate task, 175, 178  
 Bayesian  
 argumentation, 259, 265–274, 290–292, 362–364  
 belief updating, 300, 400–401, 641  
 conditionalization, 287, 400, 427–428, 633, 636, 641  
 inference, 94, 450  
 learning, 443, 706  
 model, 255, 451  
 network, 12, 253–263, 340, 390, 439–444, 451, 675  
 rationality, 106, 395, 522  
 reasoning, 265–270, 406, 443, 582, 636, 641  
 updating, 287, 400, 427–428, 633, 636, 641  
 Bayesianism, 6, 12, 33, 246–247, 353, 582. *See also* Probabilism  
 Bayes net. *See* Bayesian, network  
 Bayes' rule/Bayes' theorem, 13, 22, 151, 270, 427–428, 450, 582, 633, 636, 641. *See also* Conditionalization, Bayesian  
 Behavioral economics, 22, 37, 618, 640–641  
 Behavioral game theory, 529, 541, 568, 620  
 Belief, 11–12, 115–123, 138–139, 189, 265–267, 337, 347, 349, 440, 771–772. *See also* Belief revision; Knowledge; Logic, doxastic  
 accepted, 307, 320, 321  
 belief base, 11, 32, 328  
 belief bias, 5–6, 8, 36, 88, 92, 175, 178, 772 (*see also* Bias)  
 belief function, 20, 311–312, 341  
 belief set, 11, 32, 338  
 change, 340–342 (*see also* Belief revision)  
 change, iterated, 331–332, 340  
 collective or group, 579  
 common, 603  
 common belief in rationality, 545, 767, 772  
 conditional, 339  
 contraction, 329, 330–331, 340, 342  
 correct, 548, 580, 583  
 degree of, 6, 11–12, 19, 239–240, 278, 279, 282, 337, 397, 582  
 dispositional, 40, 338, 439, 444–446  
 first-order, 544  
 in future rationality, 549  
 in game theory, 535–541  
 hierarchy, 544  
 higher-order, 38, 544  
 joint, 28–29  
 merging, 332  
 non-Bayesian representation, 496, 500–501  
 occurrent, 40  
 prior belief and knowledge, 23, 37, 347, 349–350, 440, 443, 771  
 and probability, 12  
 rational, 495, 608 (*see also* Decision, rational)  
 representation, 328  
 representation, non-Bayesian, 496, 500–501  
 revision (*see* Belief revision)  
 strong belief in rationality, 549  
 and truth, 16–17  
 update (*see* Belief revision)  
 Belief revision, 40, 45, 46, 327–335, 340–342, 347, 350–356, 400–401, 450, 549  
 conservative, 331  
 dynamic logic of, 189  
 external, 331  
 in human reasoning, 347, 350–352, 353, 354, 355  
 iterated, 331–332, 340  
 moderate, 331  
 multiple, 332  
 non-prioritized, 332  
 radical, 331

- restrained, 331  
 two-dimensional, 332  
 Best-response dynamics, 562, 647  
 Bias, 160–162, 436–437, 518–521, 633, 640, 641, 751, 752, 758, 759, 762  
 belief bias in human reasoning, 5–6, 8, 36, 88, 92, 175, 178, 772  
 blind spot, 804  
 confirmation, 29, 638, 639, 771, 772, 804  
 confounding, 432  
 sampling, 490, 491  
 selection, 435  
 bias-variance dilemma, 512  
 Biological naturalism, 9  
 Boethius' Theses, 280  
 Bounded rationality, 6, 15, 24, 34, 89, 92, 164–165, 322, 490, 505–513, 518, 520, 521, 523, 573, 569, 572, 574, 625, 728, 768–769  
 Brain, 35, 117–125, 736, 739, 740. *See also* Cortex; Lobe  
 damage, 36  
 imaging, 35, 36, 37, 49, 739, 740  
 lesion, 36  
 regions associated with decision making, 36  
 regions associated with reasoning, 36, 739, 740  
 volume and cognitive abilities, 35  
 Bridge assumption, 612  
 Bridge principle, 206  
 Brier score, 242  
 Broca's area, 35  
 Burden of proof, 675  
**C**  
 Calculus, causal, 430  
 Capacity (in the mathematical sense), 306, 500  
 Case-based reasoning, 672, 673  
 Categorical imperative, 9, 27, 45–46, 48, 79, 80. *See also* Imperative, hypothetical  
 Causal  
 attribution, 443, 452  
 inference, 279, 411, 413, 439–446, 451  
 model, 371, 374, 413, 439–444, 451, 702  
 network, 429–435, 439–444, 451  
 power, 441, 442, 444, 451  
 reasoning, 104–105, 371, 374, 411–413, 439–446, 451, 786  
 responsibility, 452  
 structure, 431, 441, 443, 451  
 Causation, causality, 105, 427–437, 439–446, 449, 537  
 direct and indirect, 433  
 Caution, 498  
 Centering inference, 399–400  
 Chance (objective), 240. *See also* Probability, physical  
 Change, minimal, 153, 330, 332, 350  
 Cheater detection, 42, 103, 106, 108, 639, 640, 783  
 Children, 104–105, 107, 780–787  
 Chinese philosophy, 49, 802  
 Choice, 138–139, 485  
 complex risky choice task, 489  
 rational, 6, 28, 77, 473, 505, 625, 647 (*see also* Decision theory)  
 resolute, 462, 479, 690  
 risky, 474–482, 485, 486, 487, 488, 510, 636, 637  
 sequential, 478  
 social, 29, 332, 580, 583, 595–597  
 sophisticated, 479  
 theory choice, 748, 749–750, 760, 761  
 Church–Turing thesis, 31  
 Civil law, 661–662. *See also* Criminal law  
 Closed world assumption, 8  
 Coevolution, 101  
 gene–culture, 103  
 socio-cognitive, 104  
 socio-linguistic, 103  
 socio-technical, 104  
 Cognitive  
 illusion, 162, 166  
 labor, 101, 103, 108, 767–768  
 limitation, 162, 489, 505–506, 509, 636  
 miserliness, 517, 520, 521, 522, 523  
 modelling, 491, 729–730, 740–741  
 success, 24–25, 101, 511  
 variability, 651, 653–654  
 Cognitive science, 31, 33, 50, 51  
 Coherence, 130–131, 165, 278–281, 328–331, 399, 519, 520, 523, 630, 801  
 dispositional, 330, 331  
 dynamic, 330, 333  
 interval, 278, 281, 399  
 probabilistic, 278–281, 286–287  
 static, 278, 329  
 Coleman's diagram, 611–612, 613, 614, 616, 618, 619  
 Collaboration, 27, 28, 42–43, 101, 103–104, 615, 627, 638–641  
 Collective  
 good, 612, 613–615  
 intentionality, 597–598, 609  
 knowledge, 580  
 rationality, 28–31, 580, 585, 591–598, 627  
 Collectivism, 626. *See also* Individualism, methodological  
 Combinative preference, 461  
 Commitment, 328, 539–540, 598  
 Common difference effect, 571, 574  
 Common knowledge, 321, 540, 603  
 Communication, 290–293  
 Gricean account of, 29, 45, 601–603  
 normality conditions of, 603  
 Communicative action, 601, 603, 606, 608  
 Communicative situation, perfect, 604  
 Comparative theorizing, 11, 12, 15  
 Compensatory strategy, 164  
 Competence, 21, 25, 328  
 vs. performance, 1, 23, 25  
 of voters, 584

- Completeness, 204, 331, 429, 431, 462  
 Complex cognition, 31, 35, 38  
 Complexity, 508, 729, 768  
   complexity theory, 34  
 Comprehensive rationality, 627  
 Computation, 185, 186, 187, 443  
 Computational level of explanation, 9, 13, 15, 31. *See also*  
   Rationality, output-oriented  
 Computational models of syllogistic reasoning,  
   229–233  
 Computer simulation, 684–685, 689  
 Computing, distributed, 186, 190  
 Concepts, 41, 51  
 Conceptual-role semantics, 216, 223  
 Conditional  
   independence, 254, 267, 340, 430–431  
   preference, 470  
   probability, 108, 239, 265–274, 278–279, 296, 308, 353, 354,  
     389, 407–409, 441, 442, 582, 636, 640–641  
   probability hypothesis, 95, 286, 296–300, 302, 353, 395–397,  
     399–400  
   proposition, 802  
   reasoning in psychology, 38, 43, 108, 177, 348, 349–350,  
     405–410, 637–640, 784–786  
 Conditionals, 20, 38, 95, 266, 273, 277–282, 295, 342, 343,  
   348, 349–355, 395, 405–415, 419–422, 427, 802  
   Adams' probabilistic analysis of, 389  
   context-sensitivity of, 382  
   contraposition of, 281, 384  
   dynamic analyses of, 388  
   indicative, 266, 273, 279, 381, 405–410  
   inducement and advice, 653  
   Lewis-style, 386, 397, 427–428  
   material, 52, 216, 216, 218, 222  
   nonmonotonicity of, 280–281, 367, 385  
   possible-worlds semantics of, 383, 428  
   pragmatics of strict, 385  
   probabilistic analyses of, 389, 398  
   restrictor analysis of, 387  
   similarity analysis of, 386, 428  
   Stalnaker's analysis of indicative, 387  
   strict, 385  
   subjunctive, 391, 536, 539, 410–415  
   transitivity of, 281, 384  
   truth-functional analysis of, 277, 383  
   utility conditionals, 11, 419–422, 473–477  
   variably strict, 386  
 Conditioning/Conditionalization, 13, 244, 340,  
   427–428  
   Bayesian, 287, 400, 427–428, 633, 636, 641  
   Jeffrey, 245, 287, 344, 401  
 Condorcet Paradox, 463  
 Confidence, 501–502, 517–523. *See also* Overconfidence  
   confidence judgment, 38, 306–307  
   measure, 306–307  
 Confirmation, 148–149, 266–273  
   confirmation bias, 29, 638, 639, 771, 772, 804  
   hypothetico-deductive model of, 747–748  
   incremental, 266–273, 339  
 Conflict  
   normative, 648–649  
   resolution, 36  
 Conformity, 30, 586  
 Conjunction fallacy, 10, 91, 154, 273, 281, 399  
 Connective, logical, 202, 277  
 Connectivity of neurons, 35  
 Connexive logic, 278–280  
 Consciousness, 23, 32–33, 40, 42  
 Consensus, 584, 772  
 Consequence. *See* Inference  
   logical, 203, 205, 367, 381, 715, 717  
   unintended, 611, 618, 619  
 Consequent, 295, 381. *See also* Affirming the consequent;  
   Antecedent  
 Consequentialism, 48, 536, 537  
 Conservativity (norm), 256, 330, 332  
 Consistency, 33, 39, 40, 116–117, 154–156, 203, 206. *See also*  
   Inconsistency  
 Constitutivism (concerning reasons for action), 699–700  
 Constrained maximization, 593, 685, 690  
 Constructivism, 17, 580  
 Content, 11, 14, 51, 349, 351, 731  
   content effects in human reasoning, 5, 36–37, 41, 154, 638,  
     639  
   content-specific rule, 638, 639, 652  
   variation, 783, 785–786  
 Context, 350  
   of discovery, 82, 747, 758, 759  
   of justification, 82, 747, 758, 759, 761  
   sociopolitical, 759, 760  
 Continental philosophy, 49–50  
 Continuity effect, 728  
 Contractarianism, 48, 687, 689  
 Contraposition, 281, 384  
 Contrary-to-duty obligation, 648  
 Convention, 46, 593, 604  
 Conversation, 286  
 Conversational implicature, 45  
 Conversational pragmatics, 653  
 Cooperation, 27, 28, 42–43, 101, 103–104, 591–594, 604, 615,  
   627, 638–641  
 Cooperative game theory, 27, 45, 529, 540, 685–686, 690  
   (*see also* Game theory, non-cooperative)  
 Cooperative principle, 45  
 Coordination, 593  
 Correctness, 129, 143–144, 319, 580, 715, 720  
 Correspondence, 165, 801  
 Cortex, 35–37. *See also* Brain; Lobe  
   frontal, 35, 37  
   occipital, 36

- parietal, 36, 739, 740  
 prefrontal, 35, 36, 37  
 temporal, 36  
 visual, 36, 739, 740  
 Costs and benefits, 636–641, 653  
 Counterfactual(s), 279, 327, 381, 405, 430–436, 538–539  
   computation of, 429  
   counterfactual inference effect, 411  
   in human reasoning, 33, 36, 42, 105, 154, 161, 219, 279, 398, 405, 410–415  
   semantics of, 429  
   structural, 430  
 Covert paradigm (of defeasible reasoning), 348. *See also* Overt paradigm  
 Cox axioms, 310  
 Credence, 239–248, 265–267  
 Credibility, 421, 539–540, 637–638, 771  
 Criminal law, 662, 664. *See also* Civil law  
 Critical evaluation, 627  
 Cue utilization, 23, 163  
 Cultural relativity, 41  
 Cumulation principle, 488
- D**
- Darwinian algorithm, 635, 652  
 Decision, 659–666  
   collective or group, 580, 583  
   costs, 34  
   from experience, 489, 490, 491  
   non-Bayesian decision model, 496–497, 500–502  
   policy decision, 757, 761  
   rational, 495, 497–499 (*see also* Belief, rational)  
   under uncertainty, 19, 495–503, 506, 513, 636–637, 640–641  
 Decision making, 93–94, 801–802, 804  
   and practical rationality, 10–11  
   cognitive theories of, 6, 10, 23–24, 162–163 (*see also* Bounded rationality; Prospect theory)  
   emotion-based, 702, 704  
   errors in, 23, 24  
   in artificial intelligence, 46  
   in the brain, 37  
   in groups, 29, 30  
   judgment and, 10, 23, 30 (*see also* Decision theory)  
   rule-based, 659–666  
 Decision theory, 6, 15, 19, 140–141, 333, 368, 427, 473–484, 495–503, 627, 630, 652, 682. *See also* Judgment, and decision making; Rational choice  
   causal, 427, 479–480  
   descriptive, 485, 487, 491, 502  
   dynamic, 16, 477, 498  
   epistemic, 11  
   evidential, 479–480  
   qualitative, 15  
 Declarative memory, 215–216  
 Decreasing abstraction, 614  
 Deduction, 120–123, 148–150, 381, 669–670, 735, 736, 638–741  
   natural, 203, 206  
 Deductive reasoning, 4, 13, 19, 33, 72, 87–89, 91–92, 106, 148–150, 405–410, 715–722. *See also* Dual-process model/theory; Mental, logic; Mental models (theory)  
 Default-interventionist model, 173  
 Defeasible reasoning, 5, 8, 13, 333, 347, 348–350, 352–356, 361, 649, 669–672  
 Deference, 769–771  
 de Finetti truth table, 398  
 Degrees of belief, 6, 11–12, 19, 239–240, 278, 279, 282, 337, 397, 582  
 Degrees of rationality, 140, 143  
 Deliberation, 228–234, 489, 490, 491, 521, 522, 584  
   practical, 693–700  
   social context of, 699  
 Demarcation, scientific, 767–768  
 Demonstrability (of a shared belief), 29  
*Demonstratio (apodeixis)*, 73, 79. *See also* *Intuitio (noûs)*  
 Dempster–Shafer belief functions, 20, 311–312, 341  
 Denying the antecedent (DA), 296, 343, 348, 349, 406  
 Deontic  
   logic, 639–640, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 651  
   reasoning, 638–640, 649, 651–655  
   selection task, 640, 651–653  
   speech act, 653, 654  
 Deontologism, 48  
 Description–experience gap, 489, 490  
 Descriptive decision theory, 485, 487, 491, 502  
 Descriptive–normative divide, 71, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82.  
   *See also* Normative theory/theorizing  
 Desire, 8–9, 14–16, 142, 681–689, 695, 699  
   extrinsic, 9, 14, 15  
   fulfillment, 682–689, 689  
   implicit, 682  
   instrumental, 694, 695  
   intrinsic, 9, 682, 694–700  
   moral, 682–684  
   morally causal, 683–685  
   past, present, and future desires, 685  
   rationality of, 8–9  
   second-order, 38  
 Development  
   of argumentation, 780  
   metalogical, 779, 780  
   of rationality, 779, 780–787  
   of reasoning, 781–787  
 Diachronic theorizing. *See* Dynamics  
 Diagnostic inference, 443, 450  
 Diagnostic reasoning, 443, 449  
 Diagram, 429–435, 735, 736  
   causal, 431–436  
   selection diagram, 434  
 Diagrammatic reasoning, 715–720

- Dialectic thinking, 50, 801
- Dialogue logic, 370
- Dictatorship (social choice theory), 30
- Difference measure, 270–273. *See also* Relevance, measure
- Difficulty in reasoning, 226, 228–229, 234
- Dimension (in legal reasoning), 672
- Diminishing
- critterion model, 521, 523
  - marginal utility, 465, 486, 487
  - sensitivity, 485, 486, 491
- Directed acyclic graph (DAG), 253, 429–435, 441, 451
- Direction of fit, 10
- Directive, 208
- Disabler/Disabling conditions, 348, 349–351, 354. *See also* Alternative condition
- Disagreement, 247
- Discounting
- exponential, 469
  - hyperbolic, 469
- Discursive dilemma, 581
- Disjunction, 148–150, 271, 273, 274, 277, 408–410
- Disposition(s), 32–33, 52, 439, 444–446
- preferences as behavioral, 536
- Dissociation, double, 36, 122
- Distributed computing, 186, 190
- Distributed knowledge, 322
- Divergent thinking, 786, 787
- Diversity, 763
- Division of cognitive labor, 101, 103, 108, 767–768
- do*-calculus, 430–431
- Domain-specific vs. domain-general, 439, 440, 443, 638–640
- Dominance, 210. *See also* Strategy, strictly dominated; Strategy, weakly dominated
- do*-operator, 413, 428, 442
- Double dissociation, 36, 122
- Doxastic
- logic, 319, 337
  - preference, 329–330, 331
  - voluntarism, 11, 333
- d*-separation, 430
- Dual-process model/theory, 22–23, 49, 93–95, 149–150, 167, 173, 174, 175, 176–181, 229, 231, 233, 301, 354, 355, 616, 702, 792
- Dual-source model, 177, 301
- Dual-strategy model, 108, 177
- Dunning–Kruger effect, 518, 519
- Dutch book argument, 151, 240–241, 278, 399
- Dynamical system, 191, 192
- Dynamic-epistemic logic, 189
- Dynamic game, 549
- Dynamics, 12–14, 15
- best-response, 562, 647
  - of evolutionary games, 556
  - externally driven, 13, 15, 32
  - of higher-order attitudes, 38
  - impartial pairwise comparison dynamics, 559, 562
  - internally driven, 12–13, 32
  - separable excess payoff, 558, 562
- E**
- Easiness effect, 771
- Ecological rationality, 7, 93, 165, 510–512, 636
- Ecological validity, 24, 101, 163, 636–637
- Economic rationality, 330–331, 625, 630, 639–641
- Economics, 3, 6, 28, 331
- behavioral, 22, 37, 618, 640–641
  - mindless, 467
- Egoism, 24, 28, 43, 683–684, 689, 694. *See also* Altruism
- Elimination, iterated (of dominated strategies), 546
- Ellsberg paradox, 19–20, 26, 311, 489, 495–496
- Embeddedness, 617
- Embodiment, 413–415
- Emotion-based decision making, 702, 704
- Emotions and rationality, 7, 47, 568, 572
- Empiricism, logical, 20, 52
- Endoxa*, 73
- Enkrasia*, 129, 134
- Enlightenment, 16, 44, 71, 74, 772
- Entailment, 266–267, 272, 367
- Entrenchment, epistemic, 13, 330, 331, 338, 350
- Entropy, 244
- relative, 245
- Environment, 506, 508, 510–511
- virtual, 737
- Epistemic
- attitude, 7, 11
  - authority, 769–771
  - democracy, 580–581
  - entrenchment, 13, 330, 331, 338, 350
  - epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, 567
  - game theory, 27, 529, 540, 543
  - injustice, 586
  - logic, 305, 308, 319
  - model, 544
  - rationality, 17, 29, 44–45, 46, 176, 518, 519, 523, 694–695, 735, 792 (*see also* Rationality, theoretical)
  - reasoning, 29, 769–772
  - skepticism and nihilism, 586
  - status, 412
  - trust/trustworthiness, 351, 769, 770, 771
  - uncertainty, 768–769
  - utility, 209
  - value, 748, 749–750, 760, 761
- Epistemology, 24–25, 328
- emergence of, 80–82
  - genetic (Piaget), 4–5
  - in groups vs. of groups, 579
  - and institutions, 580–581

- moral, 705
  - social, 30, 579–580, 750
  - of visualization, 736–741
  - Equation, the. *See* Conditional, probability hypothesis
  - Equilibrium. *See* Reflective equilibrium
    - beliefs about other players and equilibrium, 537–539, 540–541, 544, 547, 567
    - epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, 567
    - equilibrium selection, 553
    - Nash, 27–28, 532–533, 547, 554, 613–615, 647, 690
    - strict Nash, 532, 533, 539, 554
    - subgame-perfect, 533–535
  - Error(s)
    - in cognitive theories, 5, 8, 13, 18, 22–23
    - in decision making, 23, 24
    - fundamental attribution error, 804–805
    - in human reasoning, 8, 13, 22–23, 738–739, 802
    - inverse, 801
    - error probability, 761–762
    - in syllogistic reasoning, 226, 228, 232, 234
  - Ethics. *See* Philosophy, moral
  - Evaluation
    - vs. appraisal, 210
    - critical, 627
    - phase, 488
  - Evidence, 131, 132, 265–274
    - evidence accumulation models, 491
    - higher-order, 247
    - problem of old, 268
    - for rationality, 570–574
    - weight of, 268–273, 495, 500–501, 804
  - Evolution, 101
    - biological, 102, 633–635
    - cultural, 102
    - individual, 102
  - Evolutionary game (theory), 27, 43, 103, 191, 529, 541, 555, 638, 639–641
    - dynamics of, 556
  - Evolutionary rationality, 42, 92–93, 101, 633–641
  - Exception, 350, 421
  - Exclusionary preference, 461
  - Executive process, 36
  - Expectation, 143, 333
  - Expected utility, 241, 273, 473–477, 486, 487, 495, 545, 636, 682
    - maximin-expected utility, 496
    - principle of maximizing, 15, 19, 27, 33, 473–482
  - Expected-utility theory, 427, 487, 566, 574, 682
    - risk-weighted, 466
    - von Neumann–Morgenstern, 465, 536–537, 682
  - Experienced utility, 465–466
  - Explanation, 152, 153–154, 715, 722
    - algorithmic level of, 9, 12, 15, 31, 407 (*see also* Rationality, process-oriented)
    - computational level of, 9, 13, 15, 31 (*see also* Rationality, output-oriented)
    - implementational level of, 9
    - inference to the best, 45, 291
  - Explanatory depth, illusion of, 518, 770
  - Exponential discounting, 469
  - Extensive game, 189, 190, 529–531, 553
  - Externalism, mental, 132
  - External validity, 91–92, 434
  - Eye-tracking, 491
- F**
- Factivity, 321
  - Factor (in legal reasoning), 672, 673–674
  - Faculty of reason, 72, 74, 75–80, 130
  - Fallacy, 154, 370–371, 372, 399
    - conjunction fallacy, 10, 91, 154, 273, 281, 399
  - False-belief task, 39, 43, 104
  - Falsificationism, 5, 90, 748
  - Fast and frugal heuristics, 15, 93, 163–164, 488, 489, 491, 510–512, 572
  - Feedback, 804–805
  - Feeling of rightness (FOR), 38
  - Feminism, 758, 760
  - Feminist objectivity, 751
  - Feminist philosophy of science, 751
  - First-order logic, 204, 633, 637–640
  - Fluid intelligence, 792
  - fMRI. *See* Functional magnetic resonance imaging
  - Folk psychology, 741
  - Folk theorem, 684–685, 689
  - FOR. *See* Feeling of rightness
  - Force, illocutionary, 605
  - Forecasting, 805
  - Forgetting, 246
  - Formalization, 277, 614, 717, 718
  - Formal operation phase, 90, 782
  - Forward induction, 539, 549
  - Fractionated system, 117
  - Framing effect, 636–637
  - Free choice permission, 648
  - Freedom of the will, 38
  - Free rider problem, 612
  - Frontal lobe, 117–124
  - Functionalism, 9
    - probabilistic, 162
  - Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 35, 739–740
  - Fundamental attribution error, 804–805
  - Fuzzy measure, 306, 500
- G**
- Gamble, 312
  - Game
    - dynamic, 549
    - dynamics of evolutionary, 556

- Game (cont.)  
 evolutionary, 191, 555  
 extensive, 189, 190, 529–531, 553  
 logic of, 189  
 game tree, 529–531  
 graph game, 190
- Game theory, 27, 28, 43, 148, 647, 648, 685–686, 690  
 applied, 535–541, 638, 639–641, 675–676  
 Bayesian, 27, 532  
 behavioral, 529, 541, 568, 620  
 classical, 27, 529  
 cooperative, 27, 529, 540, 685–686, 690  
 epistemic, 27, 529, 540, 543  
 evolutionary, 27, 43, 103, 529, 541, 638, 639–641  
 experiments on, 28, 43, 615, 616, 619, 620  
 limited attention in, 570  
 non-cooperative, 27, 529, 540–541, 613  
 problems of, 28  
 psychological, 568, 572  
 rationality in, 529, 535–539, 541, 567
- Generosity, 640–641
- Global workspace, 33, 40
- Good, collective, 612, 613–615
- Graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT), 43
- Graph game, 190
- Graphoid axioms, 254
- Great rationality debate, 93, 791, 798
- Gricean account of communication, 29, 45, 601–603
- GRIT. *See* Graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction
- Ground, 369. *See also* Reasons
- Group  
 agent/agency, 29, 579, 594, 596–597  
 group size effect, 612, 613, 614, 615, 620  
 objectivity, 751  
 rationality, 580, 585, 628, 749–751 (*see also* Rationality, collective; Rationality, social)
- H**
- Hedged hypothesis, 761, 762
- Hedonism, 48
- Hedonistic utility, 466
- Heuristics, 6–7, 106, 109, 159, 488, 489, 491, 509–512  
 availability, 160, 161  
 and biases, 6–7, 90–92, 159, 176, 509–510, 572, 792  
 fast and frugal, 15, 93, 163–164, 488, 489, 491, 510–512, 572  
 recognition, 164  
 representativeness, 160, 805  
 satisficing, 6, 34, 508  
 simulation, 161  
 in syllogistic reasoning, 228–234  
 take-the-best, 165
- Hidden-profile paradigm, 30
- Higher-order attitude, 38–39. *See also* Metacognition
- Homo economicus, 616, 630, 640–641
- Homo sapiens*, 1, 35
- Human reasoning, 102, 104, 106–107, 277, 279, 282, 347, 736–741. *See also* Bayesian, rationality; Belief, bias; Conditionals; Counterfactual, in human reasoning; Dual-process model/theory; Heuristics; Mental models (theory); Reasoning, temporal; Spatial, reasoning; Syllogistic reasoning; Visualization
- Humeanism (concerning reasons for action), 694–695
- Hume's Principle, 45. *See also* Is–ought (inference)
- Hyperbolic discounting, 469
- Hyperproof, 737
- Hypothesis  
 confirmation, 268–269  
 hedged, 761, 762  
 testing, 90, 92, 153, 639, 747–748
- Hypothetical thinking, 295, 406
- Hypothetico-deductive method, 5
- Hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, 747–748
- I**
- Iconicity, 148, 151, 230–231, 736, 737
- Idealization, 246–247, 368–369
- Identifiability (of a causal query), 430–431
- If. *See* Conditionals
- Ignorance, 319  
 meta-ignorance, 518
- Illocutionary, 605, 606  
 act, 605  
 force, 605
- Illusion  
 cognitive, 162, 166  
 of explanatory depth, 518, 770
- Illusory inferences, 150, 152, 155
- Imagery, 735, 736–741  
 debate, 738  
 visual mental, 36, 736–741
- Imagination, 41, 405, 735–741
- Imaging (vs. conditionalization), 428
- Impartial pairwise comparison dynamics, 559, 562
- Imperative  
 categorical, 9, 27, 45–46, 48, 79, 80  
 hypothetical, 79
- Implementational level of explanation, 9
- Implication. *See* Conditionals  
 material, 52, 216, 216, 218, 222  
 paradox of material, 20, 278
- Implicature, conversational, 45
- Implicit rationality, 781
- Impossibility theorem, 30, 582
- Imprecise probability, 20, 246, 281, 312–313, 496
- Incentive, 584–585, 683–685
- Incompleteness theorem, 31, 33
- Incomplete preferences, 497–498

- Inconsistency, 327, 329–330, 333, 347, 351–352, 353. *See also*  
 Consistency  
 detection, 116–117, 122–123, 153–154  
 time inconsistency, 571
- Independence, 328, 340, 342, 430. *See also* Irrelevance  
 conditional, 254, 267, 340, 430–431  
 of votes, 583–584
- Indeterminacy  
 indeterminacy effect in spatial reasoning, 728  
 tolerance, 122
- Indicative conditional, 266, 273, 279, 381, 405–410
- Indifference Principle, 243
- Individual differences, 363–364, 739  
 in syllogistic reasoning, 226, 228–234
- Individualism, methodological, 601, 611
- Individual rationality, 26, 27, 580, 585, 591–592, 747–748
- Inducement and advice conditional, 653
- Induction, 13, 102, 106, 117–118, 152–153, 720  
 backward, 479, 534–535, 538, 549, 639  
 forward, 539, 550  
 meta-induction, 107–108
- Inductive reasoning, 107, 152–153, 289–290
- Inductive risk, 761
- Inference, 21, 117–124, 162, 348–351, 355, 367, 368–369, 717–720. *See also* Logic; Reasoning  
 Bayesian, 94, 450  
 to the best explanation, 45, 291  
 causal, 279, 411, 413, 439–446, 451  
 centering, 399–400  
 diagnostic, 443, 450  
 generation, 117, 119–120, 123–124  
 is–ought, 18, 24, 26, 45, 654 (*see also* Naturalistic fallacy; Ought)  
 nonmonotonic, 153–154, 333, 649  
 schema, 216–221, 222  
 transitive, 118–122
- Inferentialism, 299
- Inferential-role semantics, 45, 216, 219
- Informal logic, 371–372, 718
- Informal reasoning, 371–372, 770
- Information, 186, 187, 440, 441  
 flow in games, 537  
 gain, 333, 652  
 loss, 246, 327, 333
- Informative (as a communicative attempt), 602, 606
- Institution, 584–585, 612, 615, 618, 620
- Instruction, 350
- Instrumentalism, 76–77, 682–687, 689. *See also* Imperative, hypothetical; Instrumental rationality  
 about practical reasons, 76–77, 78, 79, 82, 686, 690
- Instrumental rationality, 8–9, 27, 45–46, 48, 76–79, 87, 92, 175, 473, 601, 682–687, 689, 748, 792. *See also* Instrumentalism
- Integrity, practical, 628
- Intelligence, 37–38, 792  
 artificial (*see* Artificial intelligence)  
 crystallized, 792  
 fluid, 792  
 and rationality, 37, 38, 94, 791, 792
- Intention, 138, 139, 601
- Intentionality, collective, 597–598, 609
- Intentional object, 14, 52
- Intentional reasoning, 105
- Interpersonal preference combination, 468
- Interpretation, 203, 205, 277–282, 662  
 legal, 662, 669–674
- Interval calculus (Allen), 726
- Interventionism, 391
- Intrapersonal preference combination, 468
- Introspection  
 and visual mental imagery, 737, 741  
 problems of, 42  
 positive and negative (in doxastic logic), 320
- Intuitio (noûs)*, 71–75. *See also* *Demonstratio (apodeixis)*; System 1
- Intuition, 74, 94, 95, 176, 507. *See also* Dual-process model/theory  
 in reasoning with diagrams, 715, 716, 720  
 moral, 701, 702, 704–706  
 normative, 21, 25
- Intuitionism, social, 704
- Inverse error, 801
- Irrelevance, 266–273. *See also* Independence; Relevance
- Is–ought (inference), 18, 24, 26, 45, 71, 74–82, 654. *See also* Descriptive–normative divide; Naturalistic fallacy; Ought
- Iterated elimination (of dominated strategies), 546
- J**
- Jeffrey conditioning/conditionalization, 245, 287, 344, 401
- Jeffrey truth table, 398
- Judgment, 23–24, 337, 801, 802–803  
 aggregation, 581, 594–595  
 confidence judgment, 38, 306–307  
 and decision making, 10, 23, 30 (*see also* Decision theory)  
 moral (*see* Moral judgment)  
 social, 23, 581–583, 802  
 under uncertainty, 636–637, 640–641
- Jury theorems, 583–584
- Justification, 10, 16, 25, 328  
 context of, 82, 747, 758, 759, 761  
 epistemic vs. non-epistemic, 16, 320
- K**
- Kemeny–Oppenheim measure of relevance, 270–271, 274
- Knowability, 323
- Knowledge, 16–17, 39–40, 52, 137–138, 188, 189, 349, 439–444. *See also* Belief; Logic, epistemic  
 background knowledge, 23, 319, 320, 349–351, 767–769  
 change of, 322

- Knowledge (cont.)  
 collective or group, 580  
 common, 321, 540, 603  
 common knowledge, relativized, 322  
 distributed, 322  
 knowledge base, 46  
 knowledge level of explanation, 31  
 moral, 696  
 prior belief and, 23, 37, 347, 349–350, 440, 443, 771  
 reasoning about knowledge in games, 540–541  
 representation, 341  
 resolution of distributed, 323  
 world knowledge, 285–286, 292, 767
- Kullback–Leibler divergence, 256
- L**
- Labor-in-vain effect, 521, 523
- Language, 1, 31–32, 40–41, 42–43, 45–46  
 of thought, 217
- Law  
 case law, 373, 662  
 civil, 661–662  
 criminal, 662, 664  
 pure theory of, 659  
 rule of, 662–663
- Law of  
 large numbers, 473–474, 804  
 likelihood, 271, 274  
 small numbers, 161  
 structural counterfactuals, 430  
 structural independence, 430
- Learning. *See* Machine learning  
 Bayesian, 443, 706  
 rational, 705
- Legal  
 argumentation, 48, 373, 659, 661–666, 669–676  
 interpretation, 662, 669–674  
 logic, 659–666  
 proof, 674, 675  
 reasoning, 48, 661–666, 669, 670
- Lens model, 23–24, 162–163
- Less is more, 164, 511
- Level of explanation  
 algorithmic, 9, 12, 15, 31, 407 (*see also* Rationality, process-oriented)  
 computational, 9, 13, 15, 31 (*see also* Rationality, output-oriented)  
 implementational, 9  
 knowledge level of explanation, 31  
 mechanistic, 31  
 reason-based, 31  
 symbol level of explanation, 31
- Lewis-style conditional, 386, 397, 427–428
- Lexicographic strategy, 165
- Liability, strict, 134
- Liberal paradox, 28
- Likelihood, 313–314  
 law of, 271, 274  
 likelihood ratio, 269–274 (*see also* Relevance, measure)
- Limitation, cognitive, 162, 489, 505–506, 509, 636
- Limited search, 491, 508–509
- Linda problem, 10, 91. *See also* Conjunction fallacy
- Literacy, scientific, 768–769
- Lobe, 117–124. *See also* Brain; Cortex  
 frontal, 117–124  
 parietal, 117–124  
 temporal, 118–119, 121
- Lockean thesis, 12, 211
- Logic, 4, 18–19, 20, 72, 73, 78–82, 83, 115, 117–124, 147–150, 153, 185, 202, 285–286, 327–331, 328, 715–720, 736, 801–802. *See also* Inference; Psychologism; Anti-psychologism; Reasoning  
 conditional, 20, 381, 406, 636–640  
 connexive, 278–280  
 counterfactual, 429  
 default, 13, 20, 333  
 deontic, 639–640, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 651  
 dialogue logic, 370  
 doxastic, 319, 337  
 dynamic-epistemic, 189  
 dynamic logic of belief revision, 189  
 epistemic, 305, 308, 319  
 first-order, 204, 633, 637–640  
 of games, 189  
 inductive, 19  
 informal, 371–372, 718  
 intensional, 38  
 legal, 659–666  
 mental, 88, 216, 223, 279  
 modal, 20, 38, 319, 645–646  
 natural, 21, 215–220, 224, 782  
 naturalized, 371  
 nonmonotonic, 13, 20, 333, 649, 670, 671, 675  
 possibilistic, 309  
 predicate logic, 224  
 probability logic, 33, 108, 277–282, 399  
 programming, 20  
 propositional, 4, 20, 202, 277 (*see also* Logic, sentential)  
 sentential, 722 (*see also* Logic, propositional)  
 temporal, 647–648
- Logical  
 connective, 202, 277  
 consequence, 203, 205, 367, 381, 715, 717  
 empiricism, 20, 52  
 proof, 13, 33, 715–722  
 reasoning, 5, 8, 13, 24, 35, 47, 277, 381, 396, 399, 637–640, 782, 784–787  
 validity, 147, 149, 203, 205, 225, 278, 279–281, 362, 381, 406–407, 720
- Logicism, 4, 81

- Log-likelihood ratio, 269–274  
*Logos*, 3, 71, 72, 74, 82. *See also* *Noûs*  
 Long-term memory, 21, 33, 39–40, 354  
 Long-term planning, 628  
 Loss aversion, 485, 486, 488, 491, 636, 637, 802  
 Lottery paradox, 305, 308, 338
- M**
- Machine learning, 46, 192, 193, 440, 443. *See also* Artificial intelligence  
 Macro-conditions, 612, 613–615, 617  
 Macro-level, 611, 613–620  
 Macro-outcomes, 612, 613–620  
 Magical thinking, 153  
 Majority voting rule, 581, 582, 595–596  
 Markov condition, 105, 444, 452  
   parental, 254  
 Marr's levels of analysis. *See* Level of explanation  
 Massive modularity, 93  
 Material conditional/implication, 52, 216, 216, 218, 222  
 Maximin-expected utility, 496  
 Maximization, 682, 683, 685, 686, 687  
   constrained, 593, 685, 690  
 Meaning, 11, 14, 51, 295, 296. *See also* Semantics  
   linguistic, 604–605  
   regular, 603  
   speaker's, 602–603  
 Measure  
   confidence measure, 306–307  
   difference measure, 270–273  
   fuzzy, 306, 500  
   Kemeny–Oppenheim measure of relevance, 270–271, 274  
   necessity measure, 307  
   plausibility measure, 500  
   possibility measure, 307  
   relevance measure, 268–274 (*see also* Likelihood, ratio; Relevance, quotient)  
   Z measure of relevance, 270–271, 274  
 Mechanistic level of explanation, 31  
 Mediation analysis, 432  
 Meliorism, 798  
 Memory, 39–40, 349  
   capacity of, 39  
   declarative, 215–216  
   episodic, 40  
   game theory and, 537  
   long-term, 21, 33, 39–40, 354  
   semantic, 39  
   short-term, 39 (*see also* Memory, working)  
   visuospatial, 740  
   working, 21, 33, 39–40, 94–95, 150  
 Mental  
   effort, 728, 731  
   externalism, 132  
   imagery, 735, 736–741  
   logic, 88, 216, 223, 279  
   proof, 21, 22  
   rule, 228, 279  
 Mental models (theory), 5, 12, 22, 40, 88–89, 93, 95, 148–156, 221–223, 229–233, 279, 298, 352, 353, 406–415, 728, 738–740  
   and visual imagery (*see* Mental, imagery; Visual, impedance effect; Visual, reasoning)  
   in human development, 784, 785  
   in human belief revision, 353  
   in counterfactual reasoning, 410–414  
   in conditional reasoning, 406–410  
   preferred mental models, 22, 352, 740  
   in spatial reasoning, 105, 352, 715–722, 725–731, 738–740  
   in syllogistic reasoning, 88, 225–234  
   in temporal reasoning, 726, 728  
 Mental state  
   conscious, 23, 32–33, 40, 42  
   occurrent vs. dispositional, 32–33, 40  
 Meta-  
   analysis of reasoning, 225–227, 229, 232  
   ignorance, 518  
   induction, 107–108  
   reasoning, 517–523  
 Metacognition, 38–39, 517–523. *See also* Higher-order attitude monitoring and control in, 38, 517, 518, 519, 523  
 Metalogical development, 779, 780  
 Metaphysics, 71, 73, 74, 75, 78–79, 80–81, 82  
 Method of decreasing abstraction, 614  
 Methodological individualism, 601, 611  
 Micro-conditions, 612, 613–615  
 Micro-level, 611, 612–618, 620  
 Micro–macro diagram, 611–612, 613, 618  
 Micro–macro models, 611–612, 614–619  
 Micro-outcomes, 612, 614, 617  
 Middle-range theories, 615  
 Mindless economics, 467  
 Minimal (epistemic) change, 153, 330, 332, 350  
 Minimal morality, 687, 690  
 Miserliness, cognitive, 517, 520, 521, 522, 523  
 Mixed strategy, 531–533, 534, 539, 554, 613–615, 619  
 Modal logic, 20, 38, 319, 645–646  
 Model(s)  
   Bayesian, 255, 451  
   causal, 371, 374, 413, 439–444, 451, 702  
   cognitive, 491, 730  
   computational, 740  
   diminishing-criterion, 521, 523  
   epistemic, 544  
   mechanistic, 31  
   mental (*see* Mental models (theory))  
   model-based reasoning, 147–156, 703  
   model-building, 611, 614  
   parallel constraint satisfaction, 491

- Model(s) (cont.)  
 perfect market model, 617–619  
 population model, 556, 561  
 preferential, 341  
 rational, 453  
 of rationality, 507, 512, 747–751  
 reason-based, 31  
 structural causal (SCM), 390, 427–436
- Model-free reasoning, 703
- Model theory (mathematical), 204. *See also* Mental models (theory)
- Modularity, massive, 93
- Modus ponens (MP), 216, 219, 222, 279, 281, 282, 296, 343, 348, 349, 382, 405–406, 637  
 probabilistic, 281
- Modus tollens (MT), 296, 343, 348, 349, 388, 406, 637–639
- Money-pump argument, 462, 477–479
- Monitoring and control in metacognition, 38, 517, 518, 519, 523
- Moore sentence, 322
- Moral  
 dumbfounding, 704  
 epistemology, 705  
 grammar, universal, 702  
 judgment (*see* Moral judgment)  
 knowledge, 696  
 machine project, 49  
 philosophy, 71, 75–80, 82  
 rationalism, 685, 690, 695, 698–700  
 reasons, 693–700  
 sentiment, 682–683, 689
- Morality, 9, 16, 30, 48–49, 132–133, 648–649, 681–690, 693–700, 701  
 and blameworthiness, 696–697  
 and impartiality, 693, 695, 700  
 minimal, 687, 690
- Moral judgment  
 descriptive theories of, 701  
 prescriptive theories of, 701
- Motivated reasoning, 771–772
- Motivating reasons, 129, 130
- Mouselab, 490
- MP. *See* Modus ponens
- mReasoner, 230–233
- MT. *See* Modus tollens
- Multi-agent system, 190
- Multiple  
 priors, 496–500  
 realizability, 35  
 systems, 117, 123–124
- Myth theory, 133–134
- N**
- Nash equilibrium, 27–28, 532–533, 547, 554, 613–615, 647, 690  
 strict, 532, 533, 539, 554
- Natural  
 deduction, 203, 206  
 frequency, 636  
 logic, 21, 215–220, 224, 782  
 selection, 42, 633–635, 637, 639, 641
- Naturalism, biological, 9
- Naturalistic fallacy, 24, 53, 654, 655. *See also* Is–ought (inference)
- Naturalized logic, 371
- Necessity, 349–350. *See also* Plausibility; Possibility; Probability measure, 307
- Neo-Kantianism, 80–81
- Network (of agents), 612, 615, 617–619  
 Bayesian, 12, 253–263, 340, 390, 439–444, 451, 675  
 social, 191, 192
- Neuroimaging, 118–123. *See also* Brain, imaging; Functional magnetic resonance imaging
- Neuropsychology, 117–118, 120–123
- Neutrality (of science), 757, 758
- Newcomb’s problem, 479–480, 537, 540
- New paradigm psychology of reasoning, 6, 9, 12, 33, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 279, 285
- No-Alternatives Argument, 260–261
- Non-Bayesian belief representation, 496, 500–501
- Non-Bayesian decision model, 496–497, 500–502
- Non-cooperative game theory, 27, 529, 540–541, 613. *See also* Game theory, cooperative
- Nonepistemic value, 748, 760, 761
- Non-linear probability weighting, 485, 486, 488, 491
- Nonmonotonic  
 inference, 153–154, 333, 649  
 logic, 13, 20, 333, 649, 670, 671, 675  
 reasoning, 8, 13, 20, 23, 153–154, 277, 279, 280, 281, 333, 341, 342, 347, 348, 367, 649, 670, 671, 675
- No-Reason-For Argument, 261–262
- Norm, 18, 645, 647, 648  
 alternative, 91  
 scientific, 44
- Normal science, 749
- Normative  
 conflict, 648–649  
 criterion, 166  
 rationality, 77–80, 101, 176, 372–373, 406–407, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 633–635, 651, 767, 772–773  
 reasoning, 25–26, 337, 406–407, 767, 805  
 reasons, 129, 130, 686, 687, 690  
 rule, 651, 655  
 system, 327  
 thinking, 89, 91–95, 801, 804, 805
- Normative theory/theorizing, 17, 18–21, 24–26, 33–34, 45, 50, 487, 488, 633–635, 636–640  
 autonomy of, 25  
 defeasible, 25–26, 45  
 empirical vs. genuine, 18, 25, 439, 440  
 methodology of, 20–21

Normativity, 44–45, 129, 368–369, 373. *See also* Normative theory/theorizing  
*Noûs*, 71, 72–74. *See also* *Logos*

## O

Object, intentional, 14, 52  
 Objective chance, 240. *See also* Probability, physical  
 Objectivity  
   feminist, 751  
   group, 751  
   scientific, 747, 750, 751  
   social, 763  
 Obligation, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649  
   contrary-to-duty, 648  
 Occam's razor, 45  
 Operation, formal, 90, 782  
 Operational parsimony, 730  
 Opinion pooling, 582  
 Optimization, 507  
   under constraints, 508–509  
 Organization, 618, 619  
   of science, 751, 752  
 Other-regarding preference, 616, 617. *See also* Altruism  
 Ought, 129–132, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649. *See also* Is–ought (inference)  
 Output-oriented rationality, 10, 31–34  
 Overconfidence, 518, 519, 523, 770. *See also* Confidence  
 Overt paradigm, 348

## P

Panglossianism, 91, 798  
 Paradigm, 749, 750  
   covert (in psychological experiments), 348  
   hidden-profile, 30  
   new paradigm of the psychology of reasoning, 6, 9, 12, 33, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 279, 285  
   overt (in psychological experiments), 348  
 Paradox  
   Allais, 480–481, 570  
   Condorcet, 463  
   confirmation paradox, 148–149  
   Ellsberg, 19–20, 26, 311, 489, 495–496  
   liberal, 28  
   lottery, 305, 308, 338  
   of the material conditional, 20, 278  
   preface, 208, 338  
   Raven, 271–272  
   Simpson's, 267  
   St. Petersburg, 481, 487  
   of value, 470  
 Parallel constraint satisfaction models, 491  
 Parental Markov condition, 254  
 Parietal lobe, 117–124  
 Parsimony, operational, 730  
 Pasadena puzzle, 481–482  
 Patient studies, 36–37, 46–47  
 PD. *See* Prisoner's dilemma  
 Peer review in publication processes, 752–753  
 Perfect attention, 568, 569  
 Perfect market model, 617–619  
 Performance vs. competence, 1, 23, 25  
 Permission, 150, 648  
   free choice permission, 648  
 Permissivism (concerning doxastic states), 245  
 Perspectivism, 50  
 Persuasion, 290. *See also* Argumentation  
 Philosophical psychology, 2  
 Philosophy  
   analytic vs. continental, 49–50  
   Chinese, 49, 802  
   moral, 71, 75–80, 82  
   practical, 71, 72, 75–80  
   theoretical, 71, 72, 78–80  
 Physical probability in game theory, 535, 536–537, 539  
 Piagetian theory, 782  
 Planning, long-term, 628  
 Plausibility, 328, 330, 331–332. *See also* Belief; Necessity; Possibility; Probability  
   measure, 500 (*see also* Fuzzy measure)  
 Pleasure, 682–684, 689  
 Policy decision, 757, 761  
 Popper–Kuhn controversy, 5, 26, 45  
 Population dynamics, 556  
 Population model, 556, 561  
 Positive monotone transformation, 464  
 Positivism controversy, 44  
 Possibilistic logic, 309  
 Possibility, 147–150, 156, 230–233, 406. *See also* Necessity; Plausibility  
   measure, 307  
   qualitative possibility theory, 308  
   quantitative possibility theory, 313  
   theory, 20, 280, 307, 328, 341, 342  
 Possible world, 384, 428  
 Possible-worlds semantics, 331–332, 384, 646  
 Potential surprise, functions of, 307, 341  
 Practical  
   deliberation, 693–700  
   integrity, 628  
   reasoning, 15, 75–80, 674  
   reasons, 686, 687, 688–689, 690 (*see also* Reasons for action)  
 Pragma-dialectics, 362–363, 372–373  
 Pragmatic  
   argument, 477–479  
   rationality, 518, 520, 523  
   reasoning schema, 652  
 Pragmatics, 222, 281, 292, 604–605  
   conversational, 653  
   social, 653, 655  
 Pragmatism, 141

- Precedential constraint, 673
- Preconditions of rationality  
 cognitive, 37–42  
 cortical, 35–37  
 evolutionary, 42–43  
 social, 42–43
- Predicate–argument structure, 216, 217, 222
- Predicate logic, 224
- Prediction, 443, 511–512, 802
- Predictive ability, 488, 489
- Preface paradox, 208, 338
- Preference(s), 15, 421–422. *See also* Desire  
 aggregation, 582, 595–596  
 all-inclusive, 536, 540  
 change, 189, 468  
 combination, interpersonal/intrapersonal, 468  
 combinative, 461  
 conditional, 470  
 continuity, 464  
 doxastic, 329–330, 330  
 endogenous change of, 16  
 exclusionary, 461  
 in games, 536–537, 540  
 incomplete, 497–498  
 joint, 28  
 other-regarding, 616, 617 (*see also* Altruism)  
 preference effect, 728  
 revealed, 15, 467  
 revealed preference approach, 536  
 reversal, 469, 570  
 self-regarding, 616, 617 (*see also* Egoism)  
 self-regarding preference and rationality, 568  
 source preference, 502
- Preferential model, 341
- Preferred mental model, 22, 352, 740
- Prerogative, 686–687, 690
- Presumption, 373, 674, 675
- Principal Principle, 243
- Principle of maximizing expected utility, 15, 19, 27, 33, 473–482
- Prior beliefs and knowledge, 23, 37, 347, 349–350, 440, 443, 771
- Priors, multiple, 496–500
- Prisoner's dilemma (PD), 27–28, 532, 533, 591–592, 615, 626, 640, 685, 690. *See also* Trap of prudence
- Pro-attitude, 14
- Probabilism, 240. *See also* Bayesianism
- Probabilistic  
 coherence, 278–281, 286–287  
 functionalism, 162  
 modus ponens, 281  
 Representation Model, 288–289  
 theory, 353, 354, 406 (*see also* Bayesianism)  
 truth-table task, 279  
 validity (p-validity), 150, 389, 399, 409
- Probabilistically noninformative argument, 278, 279–281
- Probability, 12, 19, 140, 143, 150–152, 154, 192, 193, 239–248, 295, 305–306, 353–354, 395–396, 440, 441, 442, 443, 636, 640–641. *See also* Chance; Necessity; Plausibility; Possibility  
 Baconian, 307, 341  
 Bayesian, 106, 310, 406–409, 636, 641  
 big-stepped, 308  
 conditional, 108, 239, 265–274, 278–279, 296, 308, 353, 354, 389, 407–409, 441, 442, 582, 636, 640–641  
 conditional probability hypothesis, 95, 286, 296–300, 302, 353, 395–397, 399–400  
 credal, 265–274  
 error, 761–762  
 imprecise, 20, 246, 281, 312–313, 496  
 logic, 150, 277  
 non-linear probability weighting, 485, 486, 488, 491  
 physical probability in game theory, 535, 536–537, 539  
 Probability Heuristic Model, 288–289  
 probability prototype model, 229–232  
 rank-dependent probability weights, 488  
 and ranks, 341  
 second-order, 246, 502  
 subjective, 6, 21–22, 239–248, 285, 535, 537, 539  
 theory, 107, 239–248, 395  
 training, 805
- Problem of old evidence, 268
- Procedural rationality, 506, 675
- Procedural rules, 362–363
- Process  
 automatic, 174, 180  
 cognitive, 490, 491  
 controlled, 180  
 executive, 36  
 reasoning process, 13, 21–23, 32, 34, 36
- Process-oriented rationality, 10, 31–34
- Promise, 419–421
- Proof, 41, 715–722  
 burden of, 674, 675  
 diagrammatic, 717–720  
 legal, 674, 675  
 logical, 13, 33, 715–722  
 mental, 21, 22  
 story-based approach to, 675  
 theory, 203, 206, 279
- Proposition, 11, 14, 337, 338  
 conditional, 802
- Propositional logic, 4, 20, 202, 277. *See also* Sentential logic
- Prospect theory, 7, 24, 485, 486, 487, 570, 616, 636–637  
 two-stage model of, 488, 490
- Prudence, 685  
 trap of, 685, 690
- Pseudoscience, 767, 768
- Psychological game theory, 568, 572
- Psychologism, 71, 80–81. *See also* Anti-psychologism; Logic
- Psychophysical correlation, 36

Public announcement, 323

Pure theory of law, 659

Pursuitworthiness (of research), 759

p-validity, 399, 409

## Q

Quantifier, 216–218, 222–223, 226, 228, 233, 288–289, 720

## R

Ramsey test, 95, 279, 296, 343, 353, 397, 407

Rank-dependent probability weights, 488

Ranking function, 338, 339, 341

conditional, 338

Ranking theory, 20, 328, 338–340

Rational

learning, 705

model, 453

requirements, 129, 133, 134, 140

thinking disposition, 94

Rational choice (theory), 6, 28, 77, 473, 505–506, 625. *See also* Decision theory

in belief revision theory, 329–331

and game theory, 529, 535–539, 541

Rationalism, 74–75

concerning moral reasons, 76–80, 685, 690, 695, 698–700, 704

Rationality, 3–4, 101, 115–117, 147, 148, 153–155, 215, 217, 219, 368–369, 439–446, 591–598, 633–635, 636–641, 647, 681–690, 704, 792, 801–805

of actions, 8, 75–80, 681–690

and artificial intelligence, 46–47

assessments, categorical vs. relative, 7–8

Bayesian, 106, 395, 522

bounded, 6, 15, 24, 34, 89, 92, 164–165, 322, 490, 505–513, 518, 520, 521, 523, 573, 569, 572, 574, 625, 728, 768–769

under certainty, 565

collective, 28–31, 580, 585, 591–598, 627 (*see also* Rationality, group; Rationality, social)

communicative, 9, 29, 45–46, 50, 608–609

comprehensive, 627

computational, 31, 715, 720

corporate, 591–592

cultural embedding of, 49

debate, great, 93, 791, 798

degree of, 140, 143

of desires, 8–9

development of, 4, 705, 779–787

domain-specific, 44–47

ecological, 7, 93, 165, 510–512, 636

economic, 330–331, 625, 630, 639–641

emotions and, 7, 47, 568, 572

epistemic, 17, 29, 44–45, 46, 176, 518, 519, 523, 580, 694–695, 735, 792 (*see also* Rationality, theoretical)

evidence on, 570–574

evolutionary, 42, 92–93, 101, 633–641

and financial markets, 573

in game theory, 529, 535–539, 541, 567

group, 26, 28–30, 580, 585, 628, 749–751 (*see also* Rationality, collective; Rationality, social)

implicit, 781

individual, 26, 27, 580, 585, 591–592, 747–748

individual rationality in a social context, 27–28

instrumental, 8–9, 27, 45–46, 48, 76–79, 87, 92, 175, 473, 601, 682–687, 689, 748, 792 (*see also* Instrumentalism)

in intertemporal choices, 567, 571

and language, 40–41

local, 767

and memory, 39–40

mistaken consequences of, 568–570

models of, 507, 512, 747–751

and (its relation to) morality, 9, 30, 48–49, 681–690

naturalized, 24

nature of, 71, 72, 74, 75, 82, 772–773

normative, 77–80, 101, 176, 372–373, 406–407, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 633–635, 651, 767, 772–773

objections to, 1–2

objects of, 7

output-oriented, 10, 31–34

perfect attention and, 568, 569

practical, 10–11, 14–16, 17, 19–20, 23–24, 37, 101, 331, 495, 497–499, 693–700

pragmatic, 518, 520, 523

preconditions of (*see* Preconditions of rationality)

procedural, 506, 675

process-oriented, 10, 31–34

requirement of, 129, 133, 134, 140

under risk, 510, 566

scientific, 44–45, 109, 747–751, 757, 758, 759, 762, 767, 772–773

self-regarding preferences and, 568

social, 26, 28–31, 51 (*see also* Rationality, collective; Rationality, group)

strategic, 15

structural, 130, 131, 133, 625–630

supervenience of rationality on the mind, 130–134

technical, 50

theoretical, 10, 11–14, 18–19, 21–23, 101, 331 (*see also* Rationality, epistemic)

theories of (*see* Theories of rationality)

and truth, 16–17, 772–773

value rationality, 9

and visual imagination, 41–42

Rationalizability, 543

Raven paradox, 271–272

Reason, 3, 71, 74, 75–80, 82, 137–138, 331. *See also* *Logos*; *Noûs*; Reasons

faculty of, 72, 74, 75–80, 130

light of, 74

pure, 25, 48, 78–80

self-critique of, 74, 75–80

vs. understanding, 3, 71, 78, 79, 80, 602

- Reason-based level of explanation, 31
- Reasoning, 3–5, 9–11, 21, 24, 104–108, 134, 147–156, 300, 368–369, 347–356, 361, 364, 439–446, 715–722, 801–805.  
*See also* Deliberation; Inference; Logic
- abductive, 153–155
- abstract, 782, 786
- argumentative theory of, 29, 637, 638
- automated, 155
- Bayesian, 265–270, 406, 443, 582, 636, 641
- case-based, 672, 673
- causal, 104–105, 371, 374, 411–413, 439–446, 451, 786
- conditional, 38, 43, 108, 177, 348, 349–350, 405–410, 637–640, 784–786
- counterfactual, 105, 410–415, 637–640
- cultural variation in, 802
- deductive, 4, 13, 19, 33, 72, 87–89, 91–92, 106, 148–150, 405–410, 715–722
- defeasible, 5, 8, 13, 333, 347, 348–350, 352–356, 361, 649, 669–672
- deontic, 638–640, 649, 651–655
- development of, 779–787
- diagnostic, 443, 449
- diagrammatic, 715–720
- difficulty in, 226, 228–229, 234
- epistemic, 29, 769–772
- error in human reasoning, 8, 13, 22–23, 738–739, 802
- evidential, 265–274
- evolutionary theory of, 42
- group, 29
- human, 102, 104, 106–107, 277, 279, 282, 347, 736–741  
*(see also* Bayesian, rationality; Belief, bias; Conditionals; Counterfactual, in human reasoning; Dual-process model/theory; Heuristics; Mental models (theory); Spatial, reasoning; Syllogistic reasoning; Reasoning, temporal; Visualization)
- improvement, 801–805
- inductive, 107, 152–153, 289–290
- informal, 371–372, 770
- intentional, 105
- about knowledge in games, 540–541
- and language, 40–41
- legal, 48, 661–666, 669, 670
- logical, 5, 8, 13, 24, 35, 47, 277, 381, 396, 399, 637–640, 782, 784–787
- meta-analysis of, 225–227, 229, 232
- and metacognition, 38–39, 517–523
- meta-reasoning, 517–523
- model-free, 703
- model theory of, 147–156, 406–407, 703 (*see also* Mental models (theory))
- motivated, 771–772
- new paradigm of the psychology of, 6, 9, 12, 33, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 279, 285
- nonmonotonic, 8, 13, 20, 23, 153–154, 277, 279, 280, 281, 333, 341, 342, 347, 348, 367, 649, 670, 671, 675
- normative, 25–26, 337, 406–407, 767, 805
- practical, 15, 75–80, 674
- pragmatic reasoning schema, 652
- probabilistic, 13, 108, 265–274, 353–354, 406–410
- process, 13, 21–23, 32, 34, 36
- program, 215–219, 223
- relational, 738–740
- rule-based, 277, 669, 670
- rule-based theories of, 5, 22
- semantic vs. syntactic approach to, 31, 331
- social, 290–292, 783
- spatial, 105, 352, 715–722, 725–731, 738–740
- statistical, 803, 804
- syllogistic (*see* Syllogistic reasoning)
- team, 594, 597
- temporal, 726, 728
- tools, 718, 720
- training, 801–805
- uncertain, 12, 277, 279, 282, 341
- visual, 36, 41, 735–741
- Reasons, 9, 142, 266–267, 339, 340, 686, 687, 688–689, 690
- for action (*see* Reasons for action)
- epistemic, 339
- instrumentalism about practical, 76–77, 78, 79, 82, 686, 690
- for intrinsic desires, 694–700
- moral, 693–700
- motivating, 129, 130
- normative, 129, 130, 686, 687, 690
- practical, 686, 687, 688–689, 690 (*see also* Reasons for action)
- responding to, 129, 131, 132–134
- structural, 133
- sufficient, 266, 340
- Reasons for action, 75–80, 686, 687, 688–689, 690, 693–700
- objective vs. subjective, 608, 695
- primitivism concerning, 697, 698–699
- Reciprocal altruism, 42, 103–104, 639–640
- Recognition heuristic, 164
- Redescription, semantic, 785–787
- Reductio ad absurdum, 218
- Reference dependence, 485
- Reflection Principle, 243
- Reflective equilibrium, 21, 25–26, 330
- double, 26
- narrow, 25
- wide, 25
- Reflective mind, 794
- Region connection calculus, 726
- Regularity, 603
- Regularity Constraint, 242
- Relational reasoning, 738–740
- Relations
- spatial, 726, 738
- temporal, 726, 728
- Relative entropy, 245
- Relativity, cultural, 41
- Relativized common knowledge, 322

- Relevance, 265–274, 339, 343, 605, 728  
 amount of, 268–273  
 conditional, 267–274  
 evidential, 265–274  
 Kemeny–Oppenheim measure of, 270–271, 274  
 measure, 268–274 (*see also* Difference measure; Likelihood, ratio; Relevance, quotient)  
 qualitative, 265–268  
 quotient, 270–274  
 theory, 29, 265–274  
 Z measure of, 270–271, 274
- Replication crisis, 53
- Replicator dynamics, 556–558, 634
- Representation, 716  
 format of, 31, 215, 217–218, 223, 638, 639, 640  
 language-based, 21–22, 31, 36  
 mental, 22, 31–33, 36, 41–42, 405–410  
 qualitative, 328  
 theorem, 241, 467, 497, 566, 567, 571, 572  
 visual, 36, 41–42, 716–722, 735–736 (*see also* Imagery, visual mental)
- Representativeness heuristic, 160, 805
- Research goal, 759, 760
- Resolute choice, 462, 479, 690
- Resolution of distributed knowledge, 323
- Responding to reasons, 129, 131, 132–134
- Response format, 350
- Responsibility, 696–697  
 causal, 452
- Revealed preference, 15, 467
- Revolution, scientific, 73–74, 79, 749
- Risk  
 attitude, 465  
 inductive, 761  
 rationality under, 536–537, 566  
 risk-sensitive foraging, 636–637  
 risk-weighted expected-utility theory, 466
- Risky choice, 474–482, 485, 486, 487, 488, 510, 636, 637
- Roll-back analysis, 33
- Rule, content-specific, 638, 639, 652
- Rule-based decision making, 659–666
- Rule-based reasoning, 277, 669, 670
- Rule of law, 662–663
- S**
- Sampling, 289–290  
 bias, 490, 491
- Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, 41
- Satisficing, 508, 520, 521, 523. *See also* Heuristics, satisficing
- Science  
 emergence of, 73, 74, 78, 79  
 normal, 749  
 organization of, 751, 752  
 social structure of, 585, 750  
 trust in, 769–772
- Scientific  
 demarcation, 767–768  
 literacy, 768–769  
 method, 16, 45, 747–748  
 objectivity, 747, 750, 751  
 practice, 751–753  
 rationality, 44–45, 109, 747–751, 757, 758, 759, 762, 767, 772–773  
 revolution, 73–74, 79, 749
- SCM. *See* Self-consistency model; Structural causal model
- Search, limited, 491, 508–509
- Second-order probability, 246, 502
- Seductive details effect, 737
- Selection diagram, 434
- Selection task, 5, 10, 26, 29, 43, 89–91, 93–94, 107, 153, 639–640, 802–803  
 deontic, 640, 651–653
- Self-awareness  
 individual, 597–598  
 plural, 597–598
- Self-consistency model (SCM), 520
- Self-control, 469
- Self-regarding preferences, 616, 617. *See also* Egoism
- Self-torturer, 463
- Semantic redescription, 785–787
- Semantics  
 action-theoretic, 604  
 conceptual-role, 216, 223  
 inferential-role, 45, 216, 219  
 possible-worlds, 331–332, 384, 646
- Semi-graphoid axioms, 254
- Sensitivity, diminishing, 485, 486, 491
- Sentential logic, 722. *See also* Propositional logic
- Sentiment, moral, 682–683, 689
- Sentimentalism, 48, 683, 689, 704
- Separable excess payoff dynamics, 558, 562
- Sequential choice, 478
- Significance (of research), 759
- Similarity, 153, 334
- Simpson’s paradox, 267
- Simulation  
 analogue, 259  
 computer simulation, 684–685, 689  
 mental, 40, 41–42, 154–155, 174, 180, 228, 230, 233–234, 406, 739–740  
 simulation heuristic, 161
- Sincerity condition, 603
- Size principle, 706
- Skepticism, 74, 75, 77  
 epistemic, 586
- Sleeping Beauty problem, 537
- Social  
 choice (theory), 29, 332, 580, 583, 595–597  
 cognition, 103–104, 638–641  
 contract, 220, 221, 223, 422, 640, 652

- Social (cont.)  
 cooperation, 604  
 dilemma, 615, 617, 619, 685, 690 (*see also* Prisoner's dilemma)  
 exchange, 611, 639–641  
 intuitionism, 704  
 judgment, 23, 581–583, 802  
 network, 191, 192  
 objectivity, 763  
 pragmatics, 653, 655  
 reasoning, 290–292, 783  
 structure of science, 585, 750
- Sociopolitical context, 759, 760
- Sophistic argumentation, 72
- Soundness, 204
- Source preference, 502
- Space, 725
- Spatial  
 cognition, 725–731, 737, 739  
 reasoning, 105, 352, 715–722, 725–731, 738–740  
 relations, 726, 738–739
- Speech act, 419, 605–606  
 deontic, 653, 654  
 theory, 605–606
- Stability, 561  
 asymptotic, 561, 562, 564  
 Lyapunov, 561, 562
- Stakes (involved in a decision), 498, 501
- Statistical reasoning, 803, 804
- Statistics, classical vs. Bayesian, 45
- Story-based approach to proof, 675
- St. Petersburg paradox, 481, 487
- Strategy, 531–532, 554  
 behavioral, 531–532, 534, 537  
 compensatory, 164  
 evolutionarily stable, 555, 639–640  
 lexicographic, 165  
 locally superior, 555  
 mixed, 531–533, 534, 539, 554, 613–615, 619  
 strictly dominated, 532, 539, 553, 557, 559, 564  
 weakly dominated, 553, 555, 557
- Strict conditional, 385
- Strict liability, 134
- Structural causal model (SCM), 390, 427–436
- Structural rationality, 130, 131, 133, 625–630
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium, 533–535
- Subjective probability, 6, 21–22, 239–248, 285
- Subjectivism, 132
- Subjunctive  
 conditional, 391, 536, 539, 410–415  
 mood, 411
- Success, cognitive, 24–25, 101, 511
- Sufficiency, 349
- Sufficient reasons, 266, 340
- Supervenience of rationality on the mind, 130–134
- Suppositional theory, 395
- Suppression effect, 343
- Sure-thing principle, 475, 498
- Surprise, functions of potential, 307, 341
- Syllogism, 72, 118–123, 225–234, 367, 420, 661–662
- Syllogistic reasoning, 72, 178, 225–234  
 computational model of, 229–233  
 error in, 226, 228, 232, 234  
 heuristics in, 228–234  
 individual differences in, 226, 228–234  
 neural basis of, 119–120
- Symbol level of explanation, 31
- Sympathy, 682–683, 689
- Synthetic. *See* Analytic–synthetic distinction
- System 1 (intuition), 22, 149, 150, 167, 231–233, 354
- System 2 (deliberation), 23, 149, 150, 167, 231–233, 354
- System P, 280, 281
- System Z, 341
- T**
- Take-the-best heuristic, 165
- Team reasoning, 594, 597
- Temporal  
 lobe, 118–119, 121  
 logic, 647–648  
 relation, 726–728
- Theories of rationality, 18  
 descriptive, 3, 18, 21–24, 24–26, 33–34, 49, 767–768, 772–773  
 normative, 3, 18–21, 24–26, 33–34, 49, 75–80, 633–641, 767–768, 772–773  
 output-oriented, 31–34, 42  
 process-oriented, 31–34, 42
- Theory  
 of action, 367, 627, 630 (*see also* Decision theory)  
 choice, 748, 749–750, 760, 761  
 of mind, 39, 43, 104, 106, 422  
 pursuit, 759
- Thinking, 173  
 dialectic, 50  
 divergent, 786, 787  
 good, 801  
 hypothetical, 295, 406  
 imaginal, 41  
 magical, 153  
 normative, 89, 91–95, 801, 804, 805  
 in pictures, 735  
 rational thinking disposition, 94  
 Western, 802  
 wishful, 8
- Threat, 419–422
- Time. *See* Temporal, logic; Temporal, relation  
 inconsistency, 571

- Tip, 419–420
- TMS. *See* Transcranial magnetic stimulation
- Training effects, 801–805  
video game, 804, 805
- Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 121, 122, 729, 739
- Transfer of attention exchange model, 489
- Transformation  
positive monotone, 464  
rule, 612, 614, 615, 617, 618, 620
- Transitive inference, 118–122
- Transitivity, 281, 331, 462
- Transportability, 434
- Trap of prudence, 685, 690
- Trolley problem, 48–49, 663, 703
- Trust  
dimensions of, 770  
epistemic, 769, 770, 771  
in science, 769–772
- Trustworthiness, 351, 770
- Truth, 16–17, 51, 147, 155  
conditions, 216, 217, 337  
function, 382  
maintenance, 117  
objective vs. subjective, 17  
philosophical and psychological theories of, 17  
probabilistic truth table task, 279  
table, 277, 295, 382, 398  
truth function, 203, 216, 277  
truth table task, 278, 279, 296  
and truth-tracking, 583  
truth-wins principle, 30
- Turing machine, 186
- Two-process model (moral psychology), 702
- Two-stage model of prospect theory, 488, 490
- Type, 544. *See also* Belief, hierarchy
- U**
- Uncertainty, 12, 19, 32, 266, 398, 451, 505, 513, 517, 518, 761, 762. *See also* Certainty  
aversion, 498  
comparative uncertainty aversion, 499  
decision under, 536–537, 539, 636–637, 640–641  
epistemic, 768–769  
judgment under, 636–637, 640–641, 768–771  
reasoning under, 277, 279, 282, 443
- Understandability, 768–769
- Understanding, 3, 602. *See also* Reason, vs. understanding  
bounded, 767
- Unintended consequence, 611, 618, 619
- Uniqueness (of doxastic state), 245–246
- Universality, 41
- Universal moral grammar, 702
- Update/Updating. *See* Belief revision; Conditioning/  
Conditionalization
- Utilitarianism, 48, 682–683, 685, 686, 689
- Utility, 14, 419–421, 427, 535–540, 652–653, 655. *See also*  
Expected-utility theory  
conditionals, 11, 419–422, 473–477  
epistemic, 209  
expected, 241, 273, 473–477, 486, 487, 495, 545, 636, 682  
experienced, 465–466  
hedonistic, 466  
Jeffrey–Bolker, 476–477  
marginal, 465, 486, 487  
maximin-expected, 496  
measurement of, 475–477  
Savage, 498, 537  
von Neumann–Morgenstern, 15, 474–475, 536–537, 682
- V**
- Validity, 367–368, 434  
of arguments, 278, 280–281, 361, 362, 363, 671  
ecological, 24, 101, 163, 636–637  
external, 91–92, 434  
logical, 147, 149, 203, 205, 225, 278, 279–281, 362, 381, 406–407, 720  
probabilistic, 150, 389, 399, 409  
of syllogisms, 227
- Valuation, 203, 205, 646
- Value, 143, 758  
value-based process in the brain, 37  
epistemic, 748, 749–750, 760, 761  
influence, indirect vs. direct, 762  
nonepistemic, 748, 760, 761  
paradox of, 470
- Value-freedom of science, 44, 499, 757, 758, 760, 762
- Value-ladenness, 757, 758, 760, 762
- Variability, cognitive, 651, 653–654
- Variety-of-evidence thesis, 258
- Verbalizer vs. visualizer, 737, 739
- Video game (training), 804, 805
- Virtual environment, 737
- Virtue, 625
- Visual  
impedance effect, 728, 738, 739–740  
mental imagery, 36, 736–737, 738, 739–741  
reasoning, 36, 41, 735–741
- Visualization, 735–741  
external, 735, 737  
internal, 735, 737  
in mathematics, 735–736  
mental, 735–738
- Visualizer vs. verbalizer, 737, 739
- Volunteer's dilemma, 612–613, 614, 615, 618–620
- von Neumann–Morgenstern expected-utility model, 465, 536–537, 566. *See also* Decision theory; Expected-utility theory; Utility

**W**

Warning, 419–421  
Warrant, 369. *See also* Reasons  
Wason selection task, 5, 10, 26, 29, 43, 89–91, 93–94, 107, 153,  
639–640, 802–803. *See also* Selection task, deontic  
Weighing of interests, 663–664  
Weight of evidence, 268–273, 495, 500–501, 804  
Welfare, 681, 682, 683, 685, 686, 687, 689, 700  
Well-informedness, 681, 682, 683, 685, 686, 687, 688  
Wisdom of the crowd, 30, 583  
Wishful thinking, 8  
Woods–Walton approach to argumentation, 370–371  
Working memory, 21, 33, 39–40, 94–95, 150  
World knowledge, 285–286, 292, 767  
Würzburg School, 737

**Z**

Z, system, 341  
Zero-probability antecedent, 278, 279, 281  
Z measure of relevance, 270–271, 274